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Saharan Africa have caused water scarcity, hence an urgent need for institutional arrangements 
that will lead to sustainable water management.  This study analyzes the impact of customary 
institutions on rural water management in Tanzania, and shows how they might be used to 
complement the statutory institutions. The study was conducted in Bariadi district, northwestern 
Tanzania. The data were collected from household surveys, focus group discussions, key 
informants, participant observations, photographs, and secondary data sources. The results 
indicate that customary institutions are the most commonly used in regulating equitable access to 
water, prevention of water pollution and abuse, and natural resource conflict resolution. The 
awareness of the customary laws was higher than statutory laws because of the participatory 
nature of the customary institutions.  Statutory institutions were found to be important for 
regulating water development issues. Villagers were not aware of statutory laws related to 
equitable water access, and prevention of water pollution and abuse. The study also found that 
customary institutions tend to discriminate against women. Women do not have land rights and 
were not allowed to participate in customary institutions activities. These results suggest the need 
for the government to recognize the importance of customary institutions in water management. 
The government needs to design policies and strategies that will ensure that women’s rights are 
respected by the customary institutions. There is also a need for fostering women’s participation 
in decision making, and designing cooperative institutions that are organized and governed by 
resource users themselves. 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 1.1. Research Problem 
 
Water is one of the most important natural resources, without which life cannot exist. 
Households use water for drinking, cooking, sanitation, for irrigating their crops, and watering 
their livestock. Water is also used for industrial production, for water-based recreation and 
transportation. Water provides energy through hydro-electric power, it affects environmental 
quality and food production. In that respect, the United Nations (UN) has designated water as a 
basic need and right for all human beings (Ramaswamy 2003). Access to safe water is very 
important for human survival and very crucial when addressing poverty and health problems. 
Without enough water for hygiene, the health of human beings will suffer; and without sufficient 
water to consume, human beings will perish (White et al. 1972). 
In Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries today, the demand for water resources is 
increasing. Rising demand is caused by rapid population growth, industrialization and 
urbanization (Mollinga 2000). Since water supplies have not kept pace with demand, water 
resources have been over-utilized, polluted, and water shortages have emerged (Huggins 2000). 
Most people in SSA experience lack of access to safe water, a great concern especially in rural 
areas where most of the poor live. It is estimated that only about 51 percent of the population in 
SSA has access to safe water, and 45 percent to sanitation (UNDP 1997). Lack of access to safe 
water has a disastrous impact on society especially on women and children who suffer in terms 
of illnesses and lost opportunities (Kaliba 2002). It is estimated that rural people in SSA, mainly 
women and children, spend about 40 billion hours each year fetching water.  
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Moreover, lack of access to safe water traps rural people in the vicious cycle of poverty: 
water related illnesses reduce one’s ability to engage in a full day of productive work, which in 
turn increases poverty and the risk of subsequent illnesses. For these reasons, efficient 
management of water resources is a fundamental building block for sustainable development and 
improvement in the quality of peoples’ lives (WFP 2001).  
 During the past thirty years, the management of water resources in most SSA countries 
was the responsibility of central governments. Unfortunately, many large water projects that 
were established and managed by central governments in SSA failed mainly due to a lack of 
community participation in planning and implementing such projects (The World Bank 1996a). 
In the 1990s, many SSA governments decided to embark in decentralization of their 
administrative and legislative powers. Decentralization refers to the transfer of authority to plan, 
make decisions, and manage public affairs from central government to local government 
(Rondinelli 1981; Smith 1985). Decentralization has greatly affected local institutions, which are 
increasingly being viewed as important actors in natural resource management (Rasmussen and 
Meinzen-Dick 1995; Baland and Platteau 1996; Blackburn and Holland 1998; Raussen et al. 
2001).  
Decentralization has presented many challenges that most countries are still struggling to 
address. For example, the cost of managing water resources forces local governments to impose 
burdensome taxes on the local community. Local government may lack the specialized experts 
needed to manage water development projects. As a result, a few financial elites or people who 
are well-connected to the government buy favours or obtain access to community natural 
resources and other privileges.  
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Another challenge facing local governments is inadequate knowledge or legal recognition 
of the customary laws and institutions that governed African communities and resources prior to 
colonization. In many SSA countries, management of water resources is governed by multiple 
legal systems with various kinds of laws. The common types of laws found in SSA countries are: 
(i) Statutory laws. These are laws that are formally written and changed in legislation and 
court judgments, and are enforced by the central government (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 
2002). In countries with decentralized governments, the lower level governments (local 
governments) also enact subsidiary laws called ordinances and by-laws.   
(ii) Customary laws. These are unwritten laws that are maintained from one generation to 
another through various transmission mechanisms such as imitation, oral tradition, and 
teaching (White 1965).  They are based on society’s implicit understanding including the 
community’s perceptions, the accumulated wisdom from past experiences, and a current 
set of values. Examples of customary laws include cultural norms, taboos, superstition, 
beliefs, values, and social codes of conduct (Pejovich 1999).   
(iii) Organization laws. These are laws that are made by a formal group of people such as 
water-user groups or associations. 
(iv) Religious laws. These are codes of ethics and morality,  including written doctrines and 
accepted practices  based  on certain religious  beliefs. 
(v) Project/donor laws. These are laws associated with   particular programs or   
          projects such as rural water supply project. 
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The different kinds of laws tend to interact and coexist in everyday social life, creating 
“legal pluralism” (Griffiths 1986; Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002; Merry 1988).  
In some situations, there is a possibility for the different kinds of laws to overlap as illustrated in 
figure 1.1. Local level institutions are embedded in other institutions at the local, organizational, 
national and international levels. The statutory, religious, project and organizational institutions 
are also embedded in the same institutions as the local level institutions.  
 Although these laws tend to interact and co-exist, they do not have equal power status. 
Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan (2002) argue that the state law is usually more powerful especially 
when it comes to state and local community relationships. However, this does not mean that 
statutory laws are the only relevant ones. Other types of laws may be viewed as relevant and 
more effective by local communities as well.  Additionally, the different sets of laws may be 
applied at different places and times by different groups of people (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick 
2000:28). The different types of laws have a different impact on different groups of people in a 
community. For example, Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan (2002) observed that women may be 
excluded from decision making bodies due to customary or religious laws even if state laws 
prohibit gender discrimination. 
The multiple legal institutions play a vital role in property rights and natural resource 
management (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002). At the local level, management of water 
resources may be guided and defined by local or customary laws that may significantly differ 
from other laws. Religious law can have a great impact on water management in one way or 
another even if people appear not to seriously abide with it. Moreover, state laws may be 
composed of different sets of laws that may interact with each other. Likewise project or donor 
laws may have an impact on water management.   
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Figure 1. 1: Co-existing Multiple Legal Systems 
 
International 
State 
Religious 
Project 
Local/customary 
 
 
 
Source: Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002:4.     
 
 
As observed earlier, management of water resources using statutory institutions is faced 
with major challenges, such as interest capture by local elites. Other problems relating to 
statutory institutions include over-exploitation of natural resources driven by the need to create 
local revenues, inadequate financing (taxation), arbitrarily imposed fees and levies, and lack of 
human resource capacity at the local level to plan, manage and implement developmental 
activities and policies. In this study, the effectiveness of the local and central governments in 
water management is analyzed and compared to the customary institutions. 
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1.2. Research Questions and Objectives 
 
The objective of this study is to analyze the impact of customary institutions on rural 
water management and show how they might be used to complement statutory institutions.  This 
study uses Bariadi district, located in northwestern part of Tanzania, as a case study. Institutions 
are defined as humanly devised rules and norms that structure human interactions. They are 
made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions) and informal constraints (norms of 
behavior, conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics 
(North 1990), or alternatively as complexes of norms and behaviors that persist over time by 
serving collectively valued purposes (Uphoff 1986). Although other scholars have defined 
institutions as organizations or establishments founded for a specific purpose based on a set of 
working rules (Jaspers 2003:80), it is important to distinguish between the two.  Organizations 
are groups of people bound together by a common purpose of achieving certain shared 
objectives. They include political, economic, social and educational bodies (Colding and Folke 
2000).  Institutions are codes of conducts and rules that are used by these bodies to define 
practices, assign roles, and coordinate interaction within and among them (Berkes 1995; North 
1990). These rules originate from customs and laws or relationships in a community, and can be 
formal or informal.  
Formal institutions refers to rules that are observable through written documents and are 
executed though formal positions or authority. They include constitutions, statutes, ordinances, 
laws, by-laws, property rights and other governmental regulations.  Pejovich (1999) points out 
that informal institutions determine the political system (the governance structure and individual 
rights), the economic system (property rights and contracts), and the enforcement system (the 
judiciary and the police).
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 Hereafter, the formal institutions will be referred to as “statutory institutions.” The enforcement 
of formal rules by the government is carried out through the use of sanctions such as fines and 
imprisonment (Pejovich 1999:167).   
Informal institutions refer to unwritten social norms and codes of conducts based on 
implicit social understandings (North 1990; Pejovich 1999). They include the community’s 
perceptions, the accumulated wisdom and knowledge of past events, and a current set of values. 
Informal institutions are the part of a community’s heritage or culture that is maintained and 
transmitted from one generation to another through imitation, oral tradition, and teaching 
(Pejovich 1999). Examples of informal institutions include sanctions, taboos, traditions, cultural 
norms, beliefs, values, social networks, kinship ties, and codes of conduct (Nemarundwe 2003; 
North 1990).  
Informal rules are enforced through the use of sanctions such as fines, expulsion from the 
community, ostracism by friends and neighbors,1 or loss of reputation (Pejovich 1999). 
Hereafter, the informal institutions will be referred to as “customary institutions.” These methods 
of customary law enforcement contrast starkly with the methods used to enforce statutory laws. 
This difference has a strong bearing on the degree of compliance and cost of enforcement. 
Moreover, the understanding of the relationship and impact of both types of institutions is very 
crucial for an assessment of whether formal institutions support or undermine the contribution of 
informal institutions for water management. 
                                                 
1 Ostracism is defined as social form of rejection and exclusion whereby disapproved individuals are excluded from 
interaction with a social group. The word ‘ostracism’ is derived from a Greek word that means the broken shards on 
which the citizens of ancient Athens recorded their votes that expelled individuals regarded as threats to the state 
(Hirshleifer and Rasmussen 1989). 
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 To achieve the purpose, this study has four main objectives. More discussion of these objectives 
is done in chapter four:   
(i) To analyze the determinants of compliance with both customary and statutory 
institutions;  
(ii) To analyze the role of gender in water management and identify the customary and 
statutory institutions that offer opportunities and/or impede the role of women in 
water management. This includes an analysis of how institutions affect women’s 
and men’s access to water and whether the current institutional arrangement 
promote the sustainable management of water resources in rural areas; 
(iii) To determine the effectiveness of customary and statutory institutions in water 
management; 
(iv) To determine the strengths and weaknesses of customary and statutory institutions 
for water management; 
(v) To determine role of customary and statutory institutions in access to water for 
different uses. The main water uses that will be investigated are: water for domestic 
use, water for animals and water for crop irrigation.   The analysis of different 
water uses will reveal whether the type of water use has an impact on institutional 
arrangement in determining who has rights to water. 
The importance of customary institutions in Africa cannot be underestimated. Most of 
human behaviors are defined, shaped and influenced by society’s norms, values and customs 
(Steins 1999). For example, the majority of the population in many African countries prefers to 
use customary institutions to resolve conflicts than use statutory institutions. Moreover, 
customary land tenure covers about 75 percent of the land in Africa. In that regard, this study 
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will investigate the importance of customary institutions in rural water management in Tanzania. 
Chirayat et al. (2005) argues that ignoring customary institutions may create numerous problems:  
1. The failure by the state to recognize different institutions may in itself be     
     discriminatory or exclusionary, and hence inequitable.  
2. Local communities have very good reasons why they chose to use customary     
    institutions which should be considered and understood.  
3. Ignoring customary institutions and believing that top-down strategies might change  
    the local level strategies for managing resources may mean that ongoing     
    discriminatory practices and the oppression of marginalized groups in the local context  
     goes unchallenged.  
4. Focusing purely on statutory institutions in some ways assumes that these institutions  
   can be made accessible to all, while clearly even in the most developed countries this is     
   not the case. 
1.3. Justification of the Study 
Researchers have tried to understand how customary institutions affect natural resource 
management, but only few have analyzed how customary institutions might complement the 
efforts of local governments and the state. While many studies have examined the weaknesses of 
statutory institutions, few have examined the weaknesses of customary institutions. 
Understanding the weaknesses of customary institutions is important because they remain the de 
facto institutions for most poor rural areas on issues such as land tenure, intra-household 
resource allocation, and conflict resolution. This understanding could potentially help policy 
makers to enact laws and design policies that address these weaknesses.   
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This study will contribute to the literature by filling three major gaps that past researchers 
have not adequately addressed. First, the literature fails to appreciate the differential impact of 
customary institutions on drinking and irrigation water management. Most sociological studies 
on rural water management in SSA have addressed water management issues without adequately 
analyzing customary institutions and showing how they affect rural water management. Most 
studies in river basin management focus on water for irrigation (Boesen et al. 1999; Jaspers 
2003; Kashaigili et al. 2003; Lankford and Mwaruvanda 2005; Lankford et al. 2004; Machibya et 
al. 2003; Maganga 2003; Sokile et al. 2002; The World Bank 1996b). Few studies have 
examined how the customary and statutory institutions influence water management for different 
water uses.  This research will look at how the management of water for domestic use differs 
from the management of water for livestock and small scale irrigation.  
 The second weakness in literature is the failure to analyze the role of women and to 
understand how customary and statutory institutions affect women’s participation in water 
management.  Few studies have looked at the role of women and their contribution to rural water 
management. Where scholars have studied this, they have focused on the statutory institutions. 
There is a need to seek deeper understanding of the role of women in water management and 
their use of customary institutions in rural areas (Nemarundwe 2003).  
           The third weakness is the absence of studies that compare the effectiveness of the 
statutory and customary institutions in enforcement of their regulations, resolving natural 
resource conflicts, and in ensuring access to water for different uses. Although many researchers 
recognize the importance of customary institutions, they tend to focus their analysis on the 
statutory institutions for water management (Uphoff 1986). Few studies have done a rigorous 
comparison of customary and statutory institutions and how they each affect rural water 
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management.  Some studies have noted that statutory systems for water management have 
caused an increase in upstream-downstream conflicts because those who live upstream and pay 
for the water rights feel that they can use the water any way they like (Huggins 2000; Jaspers 
2003; Lankford 2004; Van Koppen et al. 2004). Other studies have observed that many water 
users rely on customary institutions to settle their water disputes (Sokile and Van Koppen 2004). 
This study will investigate the effectiveness of customary institutions as compared to statutory 
institutions, and examine the nature and pattern of interaction between customary and statutory 
institutions.  
1.4. Water Situation in Africa 
 
This section highlights the water situation in Africa in general. The African continent has 
abundant freshwater resources from large rivers and lakes such as the Congo, Nile and Zambezi 
river basins, and in Lake Victoria. However, access to water within Africa and between African 
countries is affected by uneven distribution of water resources. A large percent of the continent 
(54 percent) is arid to semi-arid, 14 percent is humid to very humid and only 31 percent has good 
rainfall (Rached et al. 1996). Water supplies have failed to keep pace with fast population growth 
and rapid economic development. As a result, many people in Africa are facing water scarcity 
and conflicts over water.  
According to Hinrichsen et al. (1997), Africa is one of the two regions in the world facing 
serious water shortages. Currently, there are 14 countries in Africa facing water stress or water 
scarcity. Water stress occurs when there is insufficient water to satisfy the demand or when poor 
quality of water restricts its use, leading to water shortage. A country is termed as “water 
stressed” when its annual supply of renewable fresh water is about 1,700 m3 or less per person. 
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On the other hand “water scarcity” is a situation where annual supply of renewable fresh water 
drop to 1,000 m3 or less per person (Gardner-Outlaw and Engelman 1997; Hinrichsen et al. 
1997). Water scarcity and stress can be caused by physical, economic, and institutional factors. 
Physical water scarcity and stress occur when the demand for water exceeds the capacity 
of potentially utilizable water resources (PUWR). This condition can occur when a country’s 
primary water supply exceeds 60 percent of its PUWR.  Economic water scarcity and stress 
occur mainly due to lack of water infrastructure. Countries with economic water scarcity and 
stress have sufficient water resources to meet their primary water supply needs, but lack financial 
resources, economic incentives and development capacity to invest in water management and 
development (Molden et al. 2001). This condition is experienced by the majority of poor people 
in SSA, especially in rural areas.  Economic water scarcity and stress may also be caused by 
institutional failures. This can occur in a situation where a country has available water resources 
and infrastructure, but people are water-poor. Water poverty can occur when people are landless 
or do not have rights to land or water. 
In SSA, physical water scarcity is experienced by arid areas of North and South Africa. 
Most SSA countries are classified as economically water scarce or stressed mainly because even 
though water resources are abundant, water development and management is still a big problem. 
Currently, Northern Africa is facing the worst water situation in Africa.  More countries (11) are 
expected to experience economic water scarcity and stress in the next 20 years. Thus, by the year 
2015, it is expected that about 25 African countries (including Tanzania) will be experiencing 
water scarcity or water stress, as shown in tables1.1 and 1.2, and figure 1.2. 
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Table 1. 1: Water Scarcity in Water Short Countries in 1995 and/or 2025 
 
 Population in millions 
Water per capita in 
cubic meters per year 
Country 
 
1995 
 
2025 
 
1995 2025 
Burundi 6.1 12.3 594 292 
Cape Verde 0.4 0.7 777 442 
Comoros 0.6 1.3 1,667 760 
Egypt 62.1 95.8 936 607 
Ethiopia 56.4 136.3 1,950 807 
Kenya 27.2 50.2 1,112 602 
Libya 5.4 12.9 111 47 
Malawi 9.7 20.4 1,933 917 
Morocco 26.5 39.9 1,131 751 
Rwanda 5.2 13.0 1,215 485 
Somalia 9.5 23.7 1,422 570 
South Africa 41.5 71.6 1,206 698 
Tunisia 9.0 13.5 434 288 
 
Table 1. 2: Water Stress in Water Short Countries in 1995 and/or 2025 
 
 
Population in 
millions 
Water per capita in 
cubic meters per year 
Country 
 
1995 
 
2025 
 
1995 2025 
Burkina Faso 10.5 23.5 2,672 1,194 
Eritrea 3.2 6.5 2,775 1,353 
Ghana 17.3 36.3 3,068 1,464 
Lesotho 2.0 4.0 2,565 1,290 
Mauritius 1.1 1.5 1,970 1,485 
Niger 9.2 22.4 3,552 1,452 
Nigeria 111.7 238.4 2,506 1,175 
Tanzania 30.7 62.4 2,964 1,425 
Togo 4.1 8.8 2,938 1,370 
Uganda 19.7 45 3,352 1,467 
Zimbabwe 11.2 19.3 1,787 1,034 
Source: Gardner-Outlaw and  Engelman 1997. 
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Figure 1. 2: Map of Africa Showing Water Scarcity and Water Stress 
in the Year 2025 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Clarke 1999. 
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Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show that per capita water availability is decreasing in 25 African 
countries. The factors contributing to decreasing water availability are inadequate assessment 
and underdevelopment of water resources, little stakeholder and community participation in 
setting water policies and laws, the lack of technical and institutional infrastructure, and the lack 
of investment in water resource development. The situation is worse in rural areas where only 50 
percent of the population has access to safe water (Hinrichsen et al. 1997). 
The water situation in Africa indicates that as the demand of water continues to grow, 
African countries will need to manage their water resources in a more sustainable way. 
Sustainable water management refers to water management systems that will satisfy the 
changing demands on water resources and take into account the needs of present and future 
water users without any degradation of water resources. Without sustainable water management, 
communities will continue to experience water scarcity and water stress. Water scarcity and 
stress causes a chronic and widespread shortage of water that affects human health, blocks 
development, deepens inequality, and undermines the survival of the entire society (Brooks 
2002). Moreover, water scarcity and stress cause competition and trigger conflict among 
different water users. These conflicts can occur within a community, between villages, districts, 
regions and even countries. With the current state of affairs, Tanzania and other African 
countries need to take corrective measures to avoid the deterioration of the water resources. 
 
1.5. Anticipated Outcomes 
 
The findings of this research will serve as the basis for formulating policies and programs 
that include customary institutions in the management of rural water resources in Tanzania.  In 
Tanzania, lack of access to safe water for many rural populations is a major concern. 
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Lack of safe water has implications for rural people and the country as a whole. Policy makers, 
non-governmental organizations, planners and water providers need to be informed so they can 
incorporate customary institutions into policies and strategies for management of rural water 
resources. 
 
1.6. Organization of Chapters 
 
This study is presented in six chapters. Chapter one introduces and provides a general 
background for the research. It also presents a snap shot of water management issues and water 
situation in Africa and discusses the objectives and justification and anticipated outcome of the 
study. Chapter two provides background information on Tanzanian water resources, a history of 
water development in Tanzania and national policies that relates to water management, property 
rights, and customary and statutory institutions.  
Chapter three presents a conceptual framework and the theoretical foundation for the 
study. Theoretical propositions on the relationship between customary and statutory institutions 
for managing water resources are also presented, and the importance of incorporating and 
recognizing customary institutions in the management of rural water resources are highlighted 
 Chapter four describes the methods used in data collection and analysis. This includes 
description of household surveys, focus group discussions, key informant discussions, participant 
observation, and secondary data collection.  Methods of data analysis, both qualitative and 
quantitative, the definition of variables used, and the explanatory variables of the econometric 
model to be used in the analysis are discussed. 
Chapter five presents an in-depth analysis of customary institutions and water resources 
in the study area. This includes an analysis of both private and community-owned water 
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resources, how communities get access to these resources and an analysis of customary 
institutions used for management of water resources in the study area.  
Chapter six presents an analysis of statutory and customary institutions, their effectivess, 
the level of compliance with these institutions and their role in water allocation for different 
water uses. This includes an analysis of three categories of water management laws: equitable 
water access laws, prevention of pollution and water abuse laws, and water development laws. 
An analysis of compliance and of the role of each institution in water management is provided 
for domestic use, livestock watering, and irrigation. Moreover, an econometric analysis of factors 
affecting compliance with customary and statutory laws is conducted.  
Chapter seven presents an analysis of gender and water management offering an 
assessment of both statutory and customary institutions. By using gender analysis, the chapter 
will explore the status of women in Tanzania, gender relations and property rights, gender 
perceptions, the gender division of labor, and the relationship between gender and institutional 
arrangements for management of water resources.  
Chapter eight analyses the effectiveness of statutory and customary institutions in terms 
of conflict resolutions, community participation and gender considerations. The chapter also 
compares customary and statutory institutions by looking at the strengths and weaknesses of 
each institution and at how these two institutions complement and compete with each other. 
Chapter nine provides the conclusion and recommendations for policy makers to design policies 
and strategies that will use customary laws to promote a more sustainable rural water 
management and help prevent a “tragedy of the commons.” 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
2.1. Introduction  
Tanzania is located in the Eastern  part of Africa (Figure 2.1), with Kenya to the north, 
Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the west,  Zambia, Malawi and 
Mozambique to the south and Indian Ocean to the east (Kashaigili et al. 2003). Tanzania is the 
largest country in East Africa comprising both the mainland and the Zanzibar islands.  
Tanzania has an area of 945,000 square kilometers (387,000 square miles) with about 46 
percent of the total land area being arable (The World Bank 2002a). Tanzania mainland covers 
more than 99 percent of the total area and the Zanzibar Islands cover one percent of the total 
area. The 2002 national population census estimated an average growth rate of 2.9 percent per 
year.  The population of Tanzania has grown from 12.3 million people in the first census after 
independence conducted in 1967 to 34.6 million people in the 2002 population census as shown 
in figure 2.2. The majority of people (77 percent) live in rural areas (TNW 2003).  
Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world.  Its economy is heavily dependent 
on agriculture which employs over 70 percent of the labor force in Tanzanian, contributes nearly 
45 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and is a major source of livelihood to about 80 
percent of the population (Sarris et al. 2006). The climate of Tanzania ranges from tropical in 
coastal zones to temperate in the highlands. About one third of Tanzania is arid or semi-arid, 
receiving on average less than 800 mm of rainfall per year. The average precipitation is 937 mm 
per year, with about 50 percent of the country receiving less than 750 mm, and 80 percent 
receiving less than 1000 mm per year (FAO 1995).  
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Figure 2. 1:  Map of Africa Showing the Location of Tanzania 
 
 
 
Tanzania 
 
Source: The World Gazetteer 2004.                                               
Figure 2. 2: Population Growth in Tanzania 
 
 
Source: TNW 2003. 
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2.2. Water Resources in Tanzania 
Tanzania is rich in water resources. The water resources consist of open water bodies 
(surface water) and groundwater (URT 200a). These water resources are used for human 
consumption, irrigation, industrial uses, livestock/wildlife consumption, marine transport, and 
hydro- electric power generation. 
 
2.2.1. Surface Water 
 Surface water in Tanzania consists of lakes, rivers, springs, natural ponds, and man made 
reservoirs. About 7 percent (about 60,000 sq. kilometers) of the land area is covered by fresh 
water lakes. The lakes include Lake Victoria, Tanganyika, Lake Nyasa, Rukwa, Eyasi, Natron, 
and Manyara (Kashaigili et al. 2003; URT 2002a). Lake Victoria is the largest lake in Africa and 
second largest fresh water lake in the world after Lake Superior in US/Canada. Lake Tanganyika 
is the longest freshwater lake in the world (419 miles) and the second deepest lake in the world.  
Lake Nyasa is another narrow and deep fresh water lake (Laure and Ettagale 1995). There are 
numerous rivers, which flow to the lakes, and bigger rivers which flow into the Indian Ocean. 
About 50 percent of the surface run-off is obtained from the main rivers that flow directly to the 
Indian Ocean. These rivers include Wami, Ruvu, Rufiji, Pangani, Ruaha, Matandu, Mbwemkuru, 
and Ruvuma. The remaining 50 percent of surface run-off is divided into surface water drainage 
and the main internal drainage basin, which has no outlets to the sea such as Lake Rukwa, Lake 
Manyara, and Lake Eyasi. Other numerous rivers flow into Lake Victoria and into Lake 
Tanganyika (Kashaigili et al. 2003).  
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Rainfall is the major contributor of water to the surface water bodies through run-off. The 
amount of run-off is regulated by the combined effect of the rain water that falls on earth and 
evapo-transpiration processes. Surface water is the major supply of water in urban areas.  Figure 
2.3 shows the major lakes and rivers in Tanzania. 
  
2.2.2. Underground Water 
  Underground water is also another important source of water for both rural and urban 
population. It refers to the water that has accumulated in the aquifers located below the earth’s 
surface. This water can be extracted through springs, boreholes, and dug wells such as deep and 
shallow wells.  The availability of underground water depends on the topography, climate, and 
rainfall pattern. Underground water is the most viable alternative supplement for water needs 
especially in the central and northern parts of Tanzania, which are semi-arid.  Most people who 
live in rural areas depend on underground water sources for domestic, irrigation, and livestock 
water needs. This is because most of available surface water resources are seasonal.  
The preceding discussion shows that Tanzania is richly endowed with water resources, 
especially in the areas around Lake Victoria, the northeastern highlands and the southwestern 
highlands. The central region around Dodoma and Singida are less endowed with surface water, 
hence more likely to experience severe water shortages. Although Tanzania has sufficient water 
resources, access to safe drinking water remains a problem for many people. One of the major 
factors that leads to water scarcity in Tanzania, despite its abundant water resource endowment, 
is limited water development and management as explained in chapter one. Most communities 
experience economic rather than physical water shortage.  
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Figure 2. 3:  Major Rivers and Lakes in Tanzania2 
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2 Adapted from FAO. 2003. “Gateway to  Land and Water Information” 
http://www.fao.org/ag/agl/swlwpnr/reports/y_sf/z_tz/tzmp311.htm  
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 The internal renewable water resources (IRWR)3 in Tanzania amount to about 82 km3 per 
year, of which 30 km3 is groundwater (Table 2.1). Surface water produced is about 80 km3 per 
year. Tanzania does not receive much water from neighboring countries. Only one major river, 
the Kagera, flows into Tanzania from the Rwandan highlands. The country shares three major 
lakes (Victoria, Tanganyika and Nyasa) as well as the Ruvuma River on the border with 
Mozambique (Figure 2.3).  
Figure 2.4 shows total water withdrawal in Tanzania in 2002.4  Water withdrawal for 
agricultural, domestic and industrial purposes was estimated to be 5184 million m3.  
 
Figure 2. 4:Water Withdrawal by Sector in Tanzania  
 
4%
85.3%
10.2%
0.5%
Irrigation
Livestock
Domestic
Industry
 
 Source: FAO 2005a. 
                                                 
 3 This is the average annual flow of rivers and recharge of ground water (aquifers) generated from    
    endogenous precipitation, i.e. precipitation from within the country’s boundaries (WRI 2004). It is     
    measured in cubic kilometers per year (km3/year). 
4 The total water removed for human uses in a single year, not counting evaporative losses from storage     
    basins. This includes water from nonrenewable groundwater sources, river flows from other countries,     
    and desalination plants. It is measured in million cubic meters. 
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Agriculture accounted for 4632 million m3 (89.4 percent), of which 4425 million m3 
(85.4 percent) was for irrigation and 207 million m3 (4 percent) for livestock. Withdrawals for 
domestic and industrial use were 527 million m3 (10.2 percent), and 25 million m3 (0.5 percent) 
respectively (FAO 2005a). Tanzania water resources are grossly under-utilized, primarily 
because much of the unused land either does not have good soils or is not located near a source 
of water (FAO 2002a).  
 
Table 2. 1: Water Resources in Tanzania and other Tropical Regions  
 
 
Tanzania Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Asia 
(exclude 
Middle East) 
South 
America 
 
Surface water produced internally5 (km3) 80 3812 10985 12198 
Groundwater Recharge6 (km3) 30 1549 2472 3693 
 Overlap7  (km3) 28 1468 2136 3645 
Total IRWR8 (km3) 82 3901 11321 12246 
Per capita IRWR9 (m3/person/year) 2227 5705 3241 34428 
 
Source: WRI 2004.  
 
                                                 
5  The average annual flow of rivers generated from endogenous precipitation and base flow generated by  
    aquifers. It is computed by measuring or assessing total river flow occurring in a country on a yearly    
    basis. 
6  Total volume of water entering aquifers within a country from endogenous precipitation (precipitation    
    from within the borders of a country or region) and surface water flow.  
7  The volume of water shared by surface and ground water. It is subtracted when calculating IRWR to      
    avoid double counting. Two  types of exchanges create overlap: contribution of aquifers to surface flow,    
    and recharge of aquifers by surface run-off. 
8  The sum of surface water and groundwater recharge minus overlap. Natural incoming flow originating   
    outside a country's borders are not included in the total. 
9  This is annual flows of rivers and recharge of ground    
    water (aquifers) generated from endogenous precipitation.  It is measured in cubic meters per person per  
    year (m3/person/year). 
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According to URT (1997a), Tanzania has 43 million hectares of land which are suitable 
for agriculture, of which only 6.3 million hectares are under cultivation. This represents 15 
percent of arable land (URT 2002a). The majority of people in Tanzania are subsistence farmers 
who practice small-scale agriculture in rural areas. The main farming activities are food, cash 
crop, and livestock production. The potential for irrigation development is estimated to be 
828,000 hectares based on soil and water availability- that is 2.2 percent of the cultivable area.  
URT (2002a) states that only 150,000 hectares (18 percent) of irrigable land is irrigated. 
Irrigation potential exists in river valleys and alluvial plains. The major river basins and alluvial 
plains in Tanzania are the Ruvu, Kilombero, Wami Valleys, Kilosa, Lower Kilimanjaro, Ulanga, 
Kagera Basin, Kyela, Usangu, Rufiji, and the black cotton clay soils around Lake Victoria. The 
main crop in large and small scale irrigation projects is rice. Sugar cane occupies about 10,000 
ha of the irrigated area.  
Most irrigation in Tanzania (80 percent) consist of small-scale indigenous schemes where 
production of irrigated vegetables is commonly undertaken more extensively than any other crop 
on a much smaller scale of typically less than half an acre.  The remaining 20 percent comprises 
large irrigation schemes that are centrally managed and owned by public or private institutions 
and individuals (URT 2002a). Table 2.2 presents a summary of irrigation facts in Tanzania. 
Table 2. 2: Tanzania Irrigation Facts 
 
Characteristic Statistic
Total land area (million ha)  94.5 
Percent of arable area 40.0 
Irrigation potential (million ha) 0.83 
Area irrigated(thousands ha) 150.0 
Percent of irrigable area irrigated 18.1 
Percent of irrigated area under small holder farmers 80.0 
Source: Tafesse 2003. 
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2.3. History of Water Development in Tanzania 
To understand the current water management systems, this section reviews the history of 
water development in Tanzania. Tanzania was colonized by Germany from the 1880s to 1919. It 
came under British colonial rule from 1919 to 1961. The mainland Tanzania (known as 
Tanganyika during colonial times), became independent in 1961. Shortly after independence, 
Tanganyika merged with its neigbouring country Zanzibar on April 26, 1964 (Zanzibar received 
its independence from the United Kingdom in 1963). The union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar 
formed the United Republic of Tanzania. 
Colonialists wanted to supply water to areas where they resided, in government offices 
and residences occupied by the colonial rulers, missions, large estates, cities, and trading centers. 
During the period of British colonialism, Tanzania (Tanganyika then) formed the Department of 
Water Development, which was later called Water Development and Irrigation Supplies. This 
department was established to develop and manage domestic water supplies. The government 
owned these resources and people who were supplied with water were required to pay for it. 
Some local governments managed to raise money to maintain the water supplies installed by the 
central government (Maganga et al. 2001). 
After independence from the British rule in 1961, the new socialist government was 
committed to providing free basic social services to the population. To minimize the costs of 
providing basic social services to the dispersed rural communities, the government forcefully 
moved villagers into “Ujamaa” (socialist) villages. The government then built schools, health 
clinics, water supply, and road systems to serve the Ujamaa villages. The central government 
took responsibility for developing water projects in the country, and “decided to meet the costs 
of operation and maintenance of all rural water supply projects” (Maganga et al. 200:172).   
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The government’s goal was to provide free access to safe water for all. There was, 
however, no plan to provide free water in urban areas.  For example, urban residents who had 
water piped into their houses paid for the water they used. But people who collected their water 
from a public water source did not have to pay for it. Unfortunately, because of economic 
problems, the government failed to meet its objective of providing safe water to everyone. As the 
population grew, water supplies failed to keep up with rising demand.  
The International Monetary Fund and World Bank austerity program that was introduced 
in the late 1980s led to cuts in social services, and the government reduced spending on water 
infrastructure. Some of the water supply systems that had already been installed ceased to 
function. More than 90 percent of piped water supplies in Tanzania ceased to work because of 
inadequate repair and maintenance. This greatly reduced water quality and many people came to 
rely on untreated water sources, which were a threat to their health. The following section 
discusses policies and legal instruments related to water management in Tanzania. 
2.4. National Policies and Water Management10 
Water is a basic natural resource that is essential to human health in low-income 
countries like Tanzania.  So the degradation of water resources contributes to poverty and 
undermines economic development. The government of Tanzania recognizes that protection of 
the environment and water is a social and economic necessity and a crucial ingredient of 
sustainable development.   
                                                 
10 “Water” here refers to various types of water uses. 
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In that regard, in 1997, the government’s National Environmental Policy (NEP) was 
adopted to provide policy guidelines and regular policy review to ensure sustainable use of the 
natural environment. The goals of the NEP are to ensure sustainable and equitable use of 
resources without degrading the environment or risking health or safety, prevent and control 
degradation of land, water, vegetation, and air, conserve and enhance the country’s ecosystems, 
improve the condition and productivity of degraded areas so that all Tanzanian citizens may live 
in a safe and productive environment, raise public awareness on the importance of environmental 
conservation, promote individual and community participation in managing the environment, and  
promote national and international co-operation (URT 1997b).  
NEP uses different policy instruments to achieve its goals, including environmental 
impact assessments, environmental legislation, economic instruments and environmental 
standards and indicators.  The National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) was developed to 
reinforce the sustainable use of natural resources by incorporating environmental issues in 
development policies. In that regard, the government has designed the National Water Policy, the 
Land Policy, Agriculture and Livestock Policy, and decentralization policies to protect the 
environment and ensure that natural resources are used in a sustainable way.  
 
 2.4.1. National Water Policy  
Since 1974, water management in Tanzania has been governed by the Water Utilization 
(Control and Regulation) Act. More discussion of this Act is provided below in section 2.5.2. In 
1991, the government formulated the Water Sector Policy which marked a shift from the “free 
water era” that began in 1967 when the country followed socialist policy, to cost sharing in the 
operation and maintenance of water supply schemes.  But, as explained above, Tanzania has 
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been experiencing water scarcity. Water supplies failed to cope with the increased water demand 
because of lack of clearly defined and comprehensive legal and institutional framework (URT 
2002a). 
The Water Sector Policy was revised in 2002, and was replaced by the National Water 
Policy (NAWAPO). NAWAPO included issues like demand responsive approach (DRA) 
principle leading to community ownership and management (COM) of water/sanitation facilities, 
private sector participation, integration of water supply and sanitation, and decentralization of 
service delivery from central government to district councils. The major goal was to ensure 
active participation of communities, private sector and local government in the management of 
water resources as the central government reduced its role in the provision of social services 
(URT 2002a). This policy forms the basis for the creation of the institutional framework for 
sustainable development and management of water resources in Tanzania. NAWAPO tries to lay 
a foundation for stakeholders’ active participation in planning, construction, operation, 
maintenance and management of community water supply schemes. In rural areas, local 
governments are assigned the responsibility to maintain and run small-scale water systems. 
 According to NAWAPO, the government will provide financial support for water 
development, but communities are required to demonstrate their ability to sustain their water 
sources before they can be granted financial support. The NAWAPO requires the rural 
communities to share the costs of managing water supplies and to participate in financing their 
water supply programs. Rural people share the costs of managing water supplies by paying part 
of the capital costs, both in cash and in kind, whenever they develop a new scheme, rehabilitate 
or expand an existing water scheme (URT 2002a:63).  In many rural areas such as Bariadi 
district, this includes development and maintenance of water supply for domestic and livestock 
 
30
watering (charco-dams) because most irrigation is small-scale and uses natural water sources like 
rivers. Larger water sources like lakes are maintained by regional/national authorities.  
However, customary arrangements for water management were hardly considered in the 
Water Utilization Act of 1974 and in the NAWAPO. The government continues to regulate the 
water sector and “impose” formal registration of water entities (URT 2002a). This creates 
competition between the customary and statutory legal systems. Future policies need to consider 
and incorporate customary arrangements to ensure sustainable water management. 
 
 2.4.2. National Land Policy 
 The National Land Policy in Tanzania stipulates that all lands in Tanzania belong to the 
Republic and are vested in the President as the trustee for and on behalf of all citizens. People 
cannot own land privately but instead can obtain the right to use and occupy land through a 
system that assigns a right of occupancy, which is granted by the government. The policy 
recognized that customary laws tend to discriminate against women and have stipulated that 
every citizen shall have equal and equitable access to land.  
The National Land Policy of 1997 was designed to promote and ensure security of tenure 
to all citizens. Specific objectives of the Land Policy included: providing equitable land 
distribution and access to all people; ensuring that customary land rights were recognized; 
clarified and secured, protecting land resources from degradation; improving land management 
systems; ensuring that land was put to productive use; and setting ceilings to prevent  the 
concentration of land ownership.  Moreover,  section 4.2.10 of the National Land Policy stresses 
the protection of highly “sensitive” areas including water catchment areas, forests areas, rivers, 
river basins and banks, and wetlands (URT 1997).
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The policy explained: 
In order to ensure and guarantee women access to land and security of tenure, women 
will be entitled to acquire land on their own right, not only through purchase, but also 
through allocation. However, inheritance of clan land will continue to be governed by 
customs and traditions provided such customs and traditions is not contrary to the 
constitution and is not repugnant to principle of natural justice. (URT 1997c:13). 
The actual implementation of the Land Policy with regard to womens’ right to land is still 
limited because most of the land in rural areas is already controlled by men. Moreover, acquiring 
land through allocation is difficult for rural women because most of them are not able to pay the 
costs involved in acquiring a formal land right. More discussion about the land tenure system and 
land rights will be done in section 2.4.1. 
2.4.3. National Agriculture and Livestock Policy  
A majority of people in Tanzania live in rural areas and depend on agriculture as their 
major means of survival. Most of these people are livestock keepers and small holder farmers. 
They depend on rain fed agriculture, which is susceptible to drought and unreliable rainfall. The 
National Agriculture and Livestock Policy of 1997 recognized the need to improve agricultural 
technology and agriculture practices and increase productivity. The major goal was to improve 
the well being of people by ensuring food security at all levels.  The policy focused on increasing 
income generation from agriculture and livestock production, promoting irrigated agriculture, 
and irrigating high value crops such as vegetable and fruits. The policy focused on the 
commercialization of agriculture and the transformation from the subsistence agriculture to 
market-based production (URT 1997a). This policy was designed to ensure sustainable 
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management of natural resources since agricultural activities contributed to water pollution from 
agrochemicals that were washed into water sources. 
 
 2.4.4. Decentralization 
The management of water resources in Tanzania is the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Water and Livestock Development (MWLD). Water resources management involves 
development of water resources, water allocation, pollution control and environmental 
protection. Decentralization was introduced in Tanzania to increase the participation of local 
communities in decisions about management of water resources. This followed the view that the 
failure of the state’s management of the environment was connected to the concentration of 
decision-making powers and ownership of natural resources by the central government 
(Mniwasa and Shauri 2001). Thus, the top-down approach to environmental management and the 
lack of   participation by local communities in the management of their natural resources 
contributed to natural resource degradation. A study of 121 rural water supply projects 
undertaken jointly by 18 development organizations found that community participation in 
decision-making and local ownership resulted in more effective and sustainable rural water 
systems (Narayan 1995).  
Under the decentralization policy, the central government transferred management of 
water resources to local government. The local government authorities were required to protect 
and properly utilize the environment for sustainable development. They have been given 
legislative power under Act No. 7 of 1982 and Act No. 8 of 1982 to enact and enforce water 
ordinances and by-laws that are appropriate in their areas of jurisdiction (Mniwasa and Shauri 
2001).   
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Tanzania operates with two levels of government: the central and local governments. The 
central government has authority and control over all matters in the country. It has three organs: 
the executive, judiciary, and the legislature. The local government structure is subdivided into 
village, ward, and district levels. At the village level, there is a village council whose members 
are elected by a village assembly. The assembly is comprised of all members of the village who 
are 18 years and older (Huggins 2000; Mniwasa and Shauri 2001). The major functions of the 
village council are to plan, coordinate, propose by-laws, and mobilize villagers to participate in 
development activities and water management. Each village has a committee in charge of water 
management. The major task of the water committee includes local water allocation, resolving 
disputes among water users, and crisis management particularly during drought (Mujwahuzi 
2002). The village is the lowest level of the local government structure. 
Next to the village is the ward development council, which is responsible for formulation 
of general development plans and environmental management within its ward. The highest level 
of the local government structure is the district councils. The district councils are required to take 
the necessary measures to protect and manage the environment. They have legal power to pass 
by-laws that can be applied to the whole district. The by-laws are then submitted to the regional 
officer who will comment and then submit the draft by-laws to the minister of local government 
affairs for approval. Once approved, the by-laws are gazetted and are enforceable from the date 
of publication or from the commencement date specified in the by-laws (Mniwasa and Shauri 
2001). The by-laws and ordinances passed by the local councils must be in accordance with the 
state law and constitution. So while the government in Tanzania recognizes the existence of 
customary institutions, it imposes an institutional framework that seriously undermines the 
efficiency of customary institutions.  
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2.5. Property Rights and Water Management 
 
 This section reviews how customary and statutory institutions affect water and land 
rights. Property rights affect how people interact with natural resources because they dictate who 
may use what and how (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002). Property rights refer to “the capacity 
to call upon the collective to stand behind one’s claims to a benefit stream” (Bromley 1991). 
This capacity can be derived from the state, customary, religious and other normative 
institutions. Property rights include bundles of rights that can be characterized as use and control 
rights. Use rights, which include access and extraction rights, determine whether an individual 
has the right to cross a particular piece of land and to obtain access to or fish in a particular water 
source and whether an individual has the right to draw water from a river. Control rights include 
management, exclusion, and alienation. These rights determine whether an individual has the 
right to modify or transform the resource, or restrict how much can be taken from the resource, 
determine who else can use the resource, and determine whether  the rights can be transferred 
through inheritance, gift or sale (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1999; Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Property 
rights determine who has the right to access, use, manage, transfer to others, and exclude others 
from using the resource (El-Mikawy et al. 2003; Schlager and Ostrom 1992). 
De Soto (2000) theorized that property rights are an essential ingredient of economic 
development. He emphasized that statutory or formal laws had to be amended to bring them into 
congruence with the customary or informal property rights that have arisen through negotiation. 
When this is accomplished, De Soto argues, a huge source of capital will be mobilized, a factor 
that will facilitate development. From this perspective, customary property rights may be 
effective if they are formally recognized by the state. If not, customary communities may fight 
with people who hold formal property rights. In some instances, village customary resource users 
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have lost access to resources when non-villagers or people with access to courts or government 
agencies override customary property rights by using statutory law (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 
2002).  The following section will discuss property rights to land and water. 
2.5.1. Land Rights in Tanzania 
In addition to the Land Policy discussed earlier, there are customary land rights among all 
ethnic groups in Tanzania. Typically, the customary land tenure systems require heads of 
households to hold land in trust on behalf of the clan and their families. Land is passed from one 
generation to another through inheritance. Holders of land are not allowed to sell their land 
without the express permission of elders or clan leaders. Although the state recognizes the 
existence of customary land tenure systems and rights of occupancy (Shivji 1999), the statutory 
laws prevail whenever customary laws are in conflict with statutory laws.       
  The statutory land tenure system in Tanzania can be divided into three groups: village 
land, general land, and reserved land.  Village land is all the land within the village and is 
managed by the village council. General land refers to the land under the management of the 
Commission of Lands. This includes lands in urban areas, land that is "free" for allocation, and 
all the land that has been allocated by the government. Reserved land refers to lands reserved for 
various conservation purposes: wetlands, land on steep slopes, wildlife, forests, national parks, 
land within 60 meters of riverbanks, and mangrove swamps. Both reserved and general lands are 
regulated by the Land Act of 1999, which deals with lands outside villages or reserved areas. 
Village land is regulated by the Village Land Act of 1999 (Shauri 1999; Wily 2003).  
According to the Village Land Act of 1999, all land in the village is vested in the village 
assembly. Land rights are administered by the village council through the authority of the village 
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assembly. The Village Land Act recognizes customary rights of land occupancy and treats them 
as having equal status to a granted (statutory or formal) right of occupancy. The problem with 
customary land rights is that they are insecure because people lack formal documentation of their 
rights. In order to have secured rights, holders of customary rights are required to register their 
land and receive a certificate of customary right of occupancy.  The procedures of acquiring 
customary land rights are the same as those of statutory rights and are too expensive to most 
rural people. In addition to official cost, unofficial charges or bribes and a complicated and 
bureaucratic registration process discourage many villagers from registering their lands. 
2.5.2. Water Rights in Tanzania 
Water is not static. It moves from one place to another. Multiple users of water tend to 
have different rights to the same water. It is therefore very important to understand the types of 
water rights because water rights are a source of conflicts and are important for water allocation 
and water markets.  
 As with the case of property rights,11 water rights entail a bundle of rights that include 
use, control and decision-making rights. Water use rights include the right to use and obtain 
benefits from water. Control and decision-making rights include the right to determine who will 
or will not have access to water (exclusion right), the right to regulate water-use patterns, and the 
right to sell or lease water resources (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Types of water rights include 
open access, public, common, and private rights (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick 2003; Bruns and 
Meinzen-Dick 2000; Paul 2003). 
 Public rights are water rights held by the government. The government can obtain water 
rights through establishment of laws that give the state control over water allocation (Paul 2003). 
                                                 
11 See section 2.4 above. 
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Water rights in Tanzania are regulated by the Water Utilization (control and regulation) Act 
number 42 of 1974, and its subsequent amendments. This is the major legislation on water in 
Tanzania. The Act declares all the water in the country to be the property of the Republic of 
Tanzania, and gives everyone the rights to use but not to own water (URT 1974).  In this Act, 
water is considered as a public resource that belongs to the whole nation and needs to be 
available to every citizen (Mwaka et al. 1999). The Act established control and regulatory 
mechanism to administer water rights and to make water available to everyone.  
 Because the Water Utilization Act of 1974 prohibits private ownership of water, it 
provides the need for water users to obtain rights to use water by acquiring a water permit, which 
gives them legal license to use water but not to own it. The government issues water permits 
based on the needs of the applicant and the expected benefits of the proposed water use. The Act 
requires the applicant to state the use of water, the amount required, and the period of use. The 
water use right is classified in order of priority. Water for domestic use is given the highest 
priority, followed by livestock use, irrigation, industry, power generation, and mining (Mwaka et 
al. 1999). Once a water right is acquired, an individual is required to pay water user fees 
depending on the quantity of water abstracted (Sokile and Van Koppen 2004).  
In rural communities, individual water users are authorized to have water use rights 
without any payment, registration or licensing if the water is used for domestic purposes, small 
gardening and for animal watering. If the water is used for commercial purposes, then 
individuals are required, under the Water Utilization Act, to obtain a legal entitlement or license 
to use water. Regulations to public water rights are meant to control water use and resolve 
problems that might occur as a result of water over use, and resolve conflicts that arise from 
competing uses. Statutory law requires people to obtain water rights for extraction of surface 
 
38
water (except for minor water collection). Ground water extraction of 22,700 liters  or more per 
day also requires a water right (URT 1974). Shallow wells with a hand pump do not need water 
rights, but users are required to obtain land rights to the area around a shallow well. However, 
many rural people are not willing to apply for water rights and pay water fees because water 
permits are expensive and because rural communities believe that water is a common property 
resource.  
Common water rights refer to communal water rights where water is free and open for all 
the people to use in specified ways. Under customary water law, natural water sources are 
considered as a community property. There is no private control of natural water sources, but the 
community leader or customary institutions, have the right to control and determine the use of 
water resources for the benefit of the whole community. The traditional view on water rights was 
also incorporated in the Water Utilization Act of 1974.  Under this Act, surface water is 
accessible to everyone. In rural areas, people do not need to acquire water rights if they are using 
the water for domestic purposes, small gardening, and for animal watering.   
Private water rights are rights held by an individual or legal individuals like corporations 
(Bruns and Meinzen-Dick 2003). They refer to permits or licenses that give an individual a right 
to use water in certain ways (Paul 2003). In Tanzania, individuals or groups of individuals who 
want to acquire private rights to water sources are required to obtain land rights before they 
construct a well. After the wells have been constructed, an individual holds all the rights to both 
the land and water (Carlsson 2003). The above types of water rights can be contrasted with open 
access water right where communities have more or less unrestricted right to use the resource. 
There is no a social authority or institutions that define and enforce the rights to use water. 
Everyone has free access to water (Bromley 1992; Nemarundwe 2003).  Also, there are no 
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specific rights assigned to anyone and no one can be excluded from using the resource. In 
African countries, free access may include rangelands, rivers and streams (Bruns and Meinzen-
Dick 2003; FAO 2002).  
De Soto (2000) argues that people need to have secure water rights, because secure rights 
give them an incentive to participate in water management programs and to plan and work on 
long-term water management strategies. Once water rights are secure, people will have 
confidence that they will benefit from the investments they make in the resource. Moreover, 
secure water rights give communities a legal authority to manage water resources. They will be 
able to make decisions and enforce water management rules and regulations. Without secure 
rights, the potential for rural communities to protect their natural resources remains untapped (De 
Soto 2000).  
In pre-colonial times, the management of rural water resources was determined by 
customary institutions and behavioral norms. Most of these norms still operate while some of 
them have been modified or discarded (Huggins 2000; Sokile et al. 2002; Woodman 1996). For 
the majority of rural people in Tanzania, access to and use of natural resources is regulated by 
customary institutions that stipulate that all natural resources are owned in common by all 
members of the community. Membership in a community ensures the right to use communal 
resources (Carlsson 2003). According to customary law, surface water is accessible to everyone 
and people do not need to acquire water rights if they use the water for domestic purposes, 
watering livestock, and small-scale irrigation.  
2.5.3. Relationship between Land and Water Rights  
Land tenure rights and water rights are legal rights with similar purposes. First, they 
permit the orderly allocation of valuable resources. Secondly, they confer the necessary security 
 
40
to invest in the resource or activities entailing its use (Hodgson 2004). It is important to study the 
issue of land rights because it greatly influences women's access to land and water in general. In 
many African societies, most men imagine that women need water only for domestic uses. The 
truth is that women also need water for irrigation and livestock watering.  
In many situations, water rights are given to landowners, who are usually men. Women 
obtain use rights through men. Participation in water users' associations can give women a voice 
in decisions, but women rarely join these associations. Women’s low rate of participation may be 
caused by rules that may limit participation to only one member per household, in which case the 
man usually attends meetings, by women’s reluctance to appear in public, which may result in a 
loss of social prestige, by the fact that men do not allow women to talk much at meetings, and 
because of the fact that many are illiterate, which means they have lower status in meetings 
(Meinzen-Dick 1999a). The low participation of women in irrigation institutions creates 
problems for the health and welfare of families, and reduces the economic prospects of women in 
poverty reduction (Agarwal 1994). 
Water is very important for the productive use of land in arid and semi-arid Africa, where 
agricultural development depends highly on the availability of water. Additionally, land and 
water rights are very important for allocation of both water and land resources, a factor that 
affects the use of land and water resources and the manner in which these resources are managed 
by communities (Hodgson 2004). In many instances, water rights depend on land rights, 
especially if water is needed for irrigation. Secured water rights are very important for irrigators. 
Many irrigators in Tanzania will take water from a river by diverting water from a reservoir or a 
dam. Then water will flow through earthen canals or channels to irrigate the land. An irrigator 
will require water rights to be able to extract water from a river. Thus, water and land tenure 
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rights are closely related to each other, as they are both the most important resources on earth 
(Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya 2005). 
2.6. Statutory Water Management Institutions in Tanzania 
 The British established most of existing statutory water institutions in Tanzania. In 1948, 
the British colonial government passed a Water Ordinance that stipulated that all water in the 
country was vested in the Governor (Van Koppen et al. 2004).  
After independence in 1961, the government of Tanzania inherited the legal system created by 
the British, and continued to use the same instruments with limited amendments (Allott 1984).  
  The major statutory water management institutions in Tanzania that regulate water 
management at the national level is the Water Utilization (Control and Regulation) Act Number 
42 of 1974, and its subsequent amendments as described above (Sokile et al. 2005:1). Tanzania 
adopted a river basin management approach through Water Utilization Act No.10 of 1981, which 
was an amendment of the Principal Act No. 42 of 1974. 
  In addition to the Water Utilization (Control and Regulation) Act, Tanzania designed a 
National Water Sector Development Strategy (NWSDS) that will be implemented from the year 
2005 to 2015, and subjected to a comprehensive review in the year 2010.  The NWSDS sets out 
the implementation of NAWAPO and develops a coherent, holistic, and integrated strategy for 
the water sector in order to implement NAWAPO (URT 2004a:5). The institutional framework 
for NWSDS is summarized in figure 2.6. Through this strategy, five levels of operation in 
management of water resources were established: the national level, basin level, river catchment 
and sub-catchments level, the district level, and water-user association level.  
 At the national level, the Ministry of Water and Livestock Development was put in 
charge of policy formulation, coordination, formulation of standards guidelines, and cross-
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sectoral planning through central water boards (CWB). The CWB consists of a chairman 
(appointed by the President), and 10-15 members (appointed by the Minister of Water). The 
board’s task includes inter-sectoral water resource management planning, coordination of basins 
and inter-basins planning, and advice to the Minister on matters regarding water management 
(URT 2004).  The Minister of Water is responsible for ensuring that national water policies and 
strategies are implemented. He or she appoints the Principal Water Officer (PWO) to be in 
charge of apportioning national water supplies, modifying and granting water rights, and water 
management.  The PWO is the national water officer with absolute authority for setting policy 
and allocation of water rights at the national level (Mwaka et al. 1999).   
At the basin level, Basin Water Boards (BWBs) were established in each basin.  A water 
basin is any area of land designated and declared by the Minister of Water to be a water basin in 
relation to any river or water source (Maganga 2002; Mwaka et al. 1999). Tanzania has been 
divided into nine water basins (URT 2002): Pangani, Wami/Ruvu, Rufiji, Ruvuma and Southern 
Coast, all of which drain to the Indian Ocean, and Lake Nyasa, Lake Rukwa, Lake Victoria and 
the internal drainage basins such as those of Lake Eyasi and Manyara and Bubu depression 
(Figure 2.5).  
The BWBs are represented by regional secretariat and the district council. The BWBs  
are responsible for technical functions and regulation. They formulate recommendations on 
water management issues, enforce pollution prevention and control measures, such as controlling 
the discharge of effluents by industrial and other water users, and ensure compliance with water 
management institutions (Maganga 2003). The BWBs are also in charge of approving 
applications for water use rights and discharge water permits, collect water extraction fees, and 
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distribute water among different users (Jaspers 2003; URT 2004). Where a conflict arises, the 
BWB has the power to settle disputes and punish non-compliance (Carlsson 2003).  
Each water basin is divided into catchment and sub-catchments. Each catchment and sub-
catchment has established water committees. The BWBs delegates responsibilities to catchments 
and sub-catchment water committees who are responsible for management and conflict 
resolution. The district councils are supposed to “participate fully” in BWBs and Catchment 
Committees (URT 2002a:47). They are also responsible with district planning, enacting by-laws, 
and conflict resolution for the whole.  They assess the demand of water in their districts, and 
“participate fully” in the preparations of Basin plans (URT 2002a:47).   
Next to the district level are communities/ water-user associations (WUAs).The WUAs 
are defined by the NWSDS as:  
“Legally constituted bodies drawing their membership from water users in a particular 
locality. They may need to employ a few staff in order to carry out the limited functions at 
the local level and the costs of Associations will be borne from charges levied on water 
users.(URT 2004a:19).  
 
  The formal WUAs are expected to operate through formal principals such as electing 
leaders for the association, paying membership fees, attending meeting, etc. (Sokile et al. 
2005:8). WUAs are responsible for management of allocated water resources, crisis management 
during drought, and for resolving water disputes among water users and between groups within 
their areas of jurisdiction, implementations of conditions of water rights, and control pollution 
(URT 2004a: 47-48; URT 2002a). 
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The National Water Sector Development Strategy (NWSDS) outlines the management of 
water resources through national, catchment and sub-catchment water committees, Water 
Boards, and Water User Associations (WUAs). This indicates that the river basin management 
approach is focused on management of irrigation water. The NWSDS’s emphasis on basin 
management does not provide for management of underground water sources which are the 
major sources of water (especially domestic water) in rural areas. Although the local 
governments at the district level have roles to play under NWSDS, the role of village councils, 
small informal associations or cooperatives of water users, and customary institutions are 
ignored by the National Water Sector Development Strategy.  
As Sokile et al. (2005:9) explained: 
Formal WUAs have little contact to informal local associations of water users. 
Furthermore, the formation of WUAs has neither built on nor encouraged the existing 
local associations of water users. While the formation process of WUAs requires users to 
come together, hold meetings, write constitutions, pay monetary 
membership fees and apply for registration with some supra institutions, the informal 
associations simply require one to have a stake in the water use undertaking. 
 
Therefore, a new approach is needed to incorporate all stakeholders, both informal and 
formal, and to recognize the importance of local level institutions in the management of water for 
different uses. The new approach also needs to consider what people can and cannot do, and 
recognize the needs of different water uses and users. Formal institutions should recognize the 
formal-informal relationships and provide more opportunities for the informal institutions 
(Sokile et al. 2005). 
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Figure 2. 5: Map of Tanzania Showing Water Basins  
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Source: Kalinga and Shayo 1998. 
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Figure 2. 6: Statutory Institutional Framework for Water Management in Tanzania 
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2.7. Description of the Study Site 
2.7.1. Background to Bariadi District 
Tanzania is divided into 26 regions (mikoa), 21 of them are in the mainland and five are 
in Zanzibar islands (Figure 2.7). These regions are subdivided into districts (wilaya), which are 
further subdivided into divisions (tarafa), wards (kata) and villages (vijiji).  Villages are further 
subdivided into the smaller units called sub-villages (vitongoji). Sub-villages are further broken 
down into smallest unit of ten households each (ubalozi). Each ubalozi is led by a nominated 
leader called balozi.  
This study was conducted in Shinyanga region, the 9th largest region in the country. 
Shinyanga region lies south of Lake Victoria in the North-western part of Tanzania. The region 
has a population of 2,805,580 with average family size of 6.3 and a growth rate of 2.9 percent 
per annum (TNW 2003).  The region covers 50,781 km2  of which 31,140 km2 is arable land;  
12,079 km2  is grazable land,  and 7,544 km2  is forest reserves (HASHI 2002). Shinyanga region is 
bordered by Mwanza, Kagera and Mara regions to the north, Arusha region to the east, Singida 
and Tabora regions to the south, and Kigoma region to the west (Figure 2.7). The people of 
Shinyanga practice mixed farming, with agriculture as the major source of livelihood followed 
by pastoralism. Shinyanga region has the largest number of cattle herd of all the regions in 
Tanzania, comprising about 22 percent of the total cattle population in Tanzania (TMLD 2005).  
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Figure 2. 7:Map of Tanzania Showing Regions 
 
     Source: TNW 2003. 
 
 
Shinyanga region is divided into eight administrative districts: Bariadi, Bukombe, Kahama, 
Kishapu, Maswa, Meatu, Shinyanga urban, and Shinyanga rural (Figure 2.8). The districts are 
subdivided into 27 divisions, 160 wards, and 817 villages. 
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Figure 2. 8: Maps Showing the Location of Bariadi District, Shinyanga Region 
 
                               
Source: TNW 2003. 
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Shinyanga region is occupied mainly by the Sukuma ethnic group. Other groups include 
Wanyamwezi, Wanyaturu, Wasumbwa, Wanyiramba, and Wahadzabe. Compared to other regions 
in Tanzania, Shinyanga region is the second highest in terms of household size as shown in 
figure 2.9. 
Figure 2. 9: Average Household Size in Tanzania 
 
Source: TNW 2003. 
 
Bariadi district was chosen as a focus of this study because the place is typical of most 
rural areas in the Shinyanga region:  relatively high population density, poor soils, and water 
shortage. Bariadi district has limited permanent water resources due to unreliable rainfall and 
drought occurrences that affect household water access and leads to crop failures. 
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Therefore, findings from this research may be applicable to other districts in the Shinyanga 
region as well as other rural areas in Tanzania which have similar characteristics. 
2.7.2. Topography, Climate, and Agricultural Potential 
Tanzania is a tropical country, which can be subdivided into seven agro-ecological zones 
(Figure 2.10). According to FAO (2005a), agro-ecological zones (AEZ) refer to land resource 
mapping units, such as climate, landform and soils, and/or land cover. These units have specific 
range of potentials and constraints for land use. The following are the AEZ of Tanzania as 
explained by FAO (2005a): 
(a) The tropical coastal plains with rainfall ranging from 750 to 1,200 mm per year and soils 
with variable fertility. The northern part experiences bi-modal rainfall season while in the 
south rainfall is usually unimodal.   
(b) The arid lands with low and unreliable unimodal rainfall ranging from 500 to 600 mm 
per year. The soils are relatively infertile and highly susceptible to erosion.  
(c) The semi-arid lands with unreliable unimodal rainfall ranging from 500mm to 800mm 
per year, and soils of variable fertility. The area is mainly dominated by low to medium 
undulating plains with rocky hills and low scarps in central and south-eastern areas. 
(d) The plateau area with generally reliable rainfall ranging from 800 to 1300 mm per year. 
The area has medium altitude plains (800 to 1,500 meters above sea level) in western and 
southern areas with some rocky hills, rift valley scarps, and swamps. The soils fertility 
varies from high fertility soils in the alluvial plains to infertile soils on sandy plains. 
(e) The southern western highlands with rainfall ranging from 800mm to 2000mm per year 
depending on the location. For example rainfall in the southern and south-western areas 
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are generally reliable and unimodal ranging from 800 to 1,400 mm per year, while the 
western areas experience bimodal and higher rainfall  ranging from  1,000 to 2,000 mm 
per year. The area has high altitude plateaus of about 1,200 to 2,300 meters above sea 
level, dissected hills, and mountains. The soil is of low to moderate fertility.  
(f) The northern highlands and granitic mountains comprises of volcanic highlands and high 
plateaus of about 1,000 to 2,500 meters above sea level. They have deep and moderately 
fertile to fertile soils, with bimodal rainfall of variable reliability ranging from 1000mm 
to 2000mm per year. 
(g) The alluvial plains which comprises of seasonal flooded alluvial fans and swamps with 
seasonally flooded alluvial and lacustrine sediments. The area experiences a unimodal 
rainfall distribution ranging from 800 to 1800 mm per year. 
Shinyanga region falls under a semi-arid zone with approximately 600 mm to 1000 mm 
of rainfall per annum. The region has a mean of 700 mm of rainfall per year and a low potential 
for water resources. The altitude of Shinyanga region varies between 1,000 to 1500 meters above 
sea level (Blay et al. 2004).  There are two rainy seasons: the short rains (vuli) which occur from 
September to November, and long rains (masika), which occur from December to April in each 
year. The average monthly temperature ranges between 82° to 86° F maximum and 59° to 65° F 
minimum. The region is characterized by small hills, plains, and gentle slopes (Blay et al.  2004) 
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Figure 2. 10: Map of Tanzania Showing Agro- Ecological Zones12 
 
 
2.7.3. The Socio-Political Context 
Bariadi district is one of the eight districts in Shinyanga region (Figure 2.8). It is located 
in the northwest central region of Tanzania. The 2002 population census in Tanzania shows the 
district had a population of 605,509, annual average growth rate of 3.3 percent, and a population 
density of 62 people per km2 (TNW 2003).  The district has an area of 9,777 km2, representing 
                                                 
12 Adapted from De Pauw (1984), and The World Bank (1994). 
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19 percent of the total area of Shinyanga region.  Compared to other districts in the region, 
Bariadi district had the highest population during the 2002 population census (22 percent of the 
regional population) as shown in table 2.3.  Bariadi district is made up of four divisions, namely, 
Dutwa, Itilima, Kanadi, and Ntuzu. There are a total of 26 wards and 125 villages with Ntuzu 
and Kanadi Divisions having the highest numbers of wards (7 wards each). Others (Dutwa and 
Itilima) have 6 wards each.  
Table 2. 3: Population in Shinyanga Region 
District Total Population 
Bariadi 605,509 
Kahama 596,456 
Bukombe 396,423 
Maswa 305,473 
Shinyanga (Rural) 277,518 
Meatu 248,949 
Kishapu 240,086 
Shinyanga (Urban) 135,166 
Total 2,805,580 
Source: TNW 2003. 
2.7.4. The Socio-Cultural Context 
Tanzania is a multi-ethnic country with more than 120 different indigenous ethnic groups 
as well as small groups of Asians and Europeans origins.13 Bariadi district is mainly occupied by 
the Sukuma ethnic group. The Sukuma are Bantu-speaking people who live in North-West 
Tanzania around Lake Victoria (Sukumaland). The Sukuma are the largest ethnic group in 
Tanzania, constituting about 13 percent of the total population (Yasir 2003).  
                                                 
13 Tanzania. 2006. “Encyclopedia Britannica.” accessed  on March  14, 2006, from Encyclopedia Britannica 
Premium Service  http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-37565 
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The Sukuma people have very strong primary ties. The strongest intimate ties are usually 
with immediate kin like children and parents. Although a free rider problem exists among 
Sukuma, they use many organized sanctions to punish free-riders. Free-riders are individuals who 
fail to participate in collective profitable activities because they believe that they will receive the 
gain or security even if they do not participate (Popkin 1979:25; Stigler 1974). The Sukuma 
practice reciprocal obligations. In times of need, a family may look for help from friends, 
villagers, and kinsmen. Free riders such as those who fail to render assistance to communal 
action are subject to fines. Those who are advantaged have more obligations to help those who 
are not: “the principle of reciprocity is based on the idea that one should help those who help 
him” (Scott 1976:167).  
2.7.5. Livelihood Sources in Bariadi District14 
2.7.5.1. Agriculture 
 The people of Bariadi district are mainly agro-pastoralists who rely on a combination of 
agriculture and livestock keeping. Agriculture is the most important source of livelihood among 
the Sukuma. Small scale subsistence agriculture is common in Bariadi district, with very few 
large scale farms. The people produce both food and cash crops. Food crops include maize, 
cassava, sorghum, beans, rice, chickpeas, groundnuts and sweet potatoes. Vegetable and fruits 
gardening is practiced through small-scale irrigation.                   
                                                 
14 Livelihood sources refer to different activities adopted by the household to generate a living. 
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Cotton is the only major cash crop grown in Bariadi district.  In Tanzania, cotton is the 
second largest export crop after coffee. Most cotton produced in Tanzania is exported, 
contributing to about $90 million to export earnings. Cotton in Tanzania is produced in two 
zones: the Western and Eastern zone. The Western zone produces over 90 percent of the cotton 
in Tanzania (Baffes 2002). This zone includes Shinyanga, Mwanza, Tabora, Mara, Singida, 
Kagera, and Kigoma regions. The Eastern zone includes Morogoro, Coast, Tanga, Iringa, 
Kilimanjaro, and Manyara regions. Bariadi district lies in the Western zone, hence it is one of the 
largest cotton producing districts in Tanzania (Figure 2.11). Most of the cotton is produced on 
small holder farms of about 0.5 to 10 hectares (Baffes 2002). 
2.7.5.2. Pastoralism 
Tanzania is one of the wealthiest nations in Africa in terms of livestock. It ranks third in 
livestock population after Ethiopia and Sudan.  Tanzania is estimated to have about 105 million 
acres of pastoral land, with about 17 million head of cattle, 8 million goats, 3.7 million sheep, 
750,000 pigs and about 30 million poultry (Table 2.4). Most of the cattle (97 percent) are of the 
traditional type, the Tanzania Short Horn Zebu. The largest percent of the livestock in Tanzania 
(99 percent) are owned by pastoral small holders (Arhem 1985; Ndagala 1991). Traditional 
pastoralism is very important for economic development as it contributes about 18 percent of the 
GDP produces about 78 percent of the total national milk requirements, as well as a substantial 
amount of red meat consumed daily all over Tanzania (Bee et al. 2002). 
Pastoralism is the second important source of livelihood among the Sukuma. The major 
livestock kept in Bariadi are cattle mainly stunted zebu type (359,760), goats (246,724), and 
sheep (120,989) (Figure 2.12 and Table 2.4).  The local breed of cattle (zebu type) are preferred 
because they have high rates of reproduction, higher resistance to diseases, and can survive the 
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chronic shortages of grazing land that affect the district especially during the dry season (Wright 
1953).  
For the Sukuma, livestock have great value. They use cattle for subsistence, security, 
rituals, paying fines, and as a symbol of wealth and status. Cattle also serve as a medium of 
exchange and transportation. Cattle also provide traction for ploughing, and payment of bride 
price before weddings. Moreover, cattle are an object of affection and supreme religious 
significance (Arhem 1971). Cattle can also be used as a source of family income through milk, 
meat, skin, and animal sales. Additionally, cattle supply milk for domestic use, an important 
component of the Sukuma diet. Cattle can be obtained through purchase, dowry and “rustling” 
from neighboring livestock keepers like the Maasai. If a household does not have cattle, they 
may be given some cattle by relatives to look after and use for milk particularly if they have 
children (Bee et al. 2002). 
Slaughtering livestock for household consumption among Sukuma families is mainly 
done during special occasions. Livestock are slaughtered for ritual purposes, such as offering to 
ancestral spirits, rain making, and traditional healing. Also livestock may be slaughtered for a 
special visitor, when a new baby is born, during weddings, and funeral ceremonies. 
Table 2. 4: Livestock Population in Tanzania 
 
Livestock type Bariadi District Shinyanga Region Tanzania 
Cattle 359760 3749735 17014969 
Goats 246724 1000045 7831199 
Sheep 120989 460725 3733078 
Pigs 6584 43669 745910 
Chickens 673212 4356428 29914247 
Total  1407269 9610602 59239403 
 
Source: TMLD 2005. 
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Figure 2. 11:  Map of Tanzania Showing Cotton Producing Regions15 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 This map was adapted from USDA (United States Department of Agriculture).2003.  Production Estimates and 
Crop Assessment  Division at http://www.fas.usda.gov/pecad2/highlights/2003/03/tanzania/images/cotton_prod.htm 
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2.7.5.3. Non-farm activities 
Non-farm activities in Bariadi district have co-existed along with farm activities, and 
have been used to supplement farm income (Figure 2.13 to 2.15). There are only a few people 
who depend on non-farm activities for their livelihood. But over the years, the number of people 
engaging in non-farm activities has increased due to land scarcity and poor returns from farming. 
Non-farm activities in Bariadi district can be grouped into three categories: productive, 
commercial, and service activities. Productive activities include carpentry and local beer 
brewing. Commercial activities include grocery shops, pottery, butchery and small food and tea 
rooms (mama ntilie). Service activities include traditional healing, rain making, midwifery, 
bicycle repair, tailoring, shoe repairs, radio repair, pharmacy, grain milling and office work (such 
as teaching and nursing). Despite the existence of non-farm activities in Bariadi district, farming 
activities remain the most important source of livelihood among the Sukuma. Table 2.5 
summarizes the major livelihood sources in Bariadi district. 
 
 
Table 2. 5: Summary of Major Livelihood Sources in Bariadi District 
 
Livelihood source  Activities 
Agriculture 
 
 
Production of crops like maize, cassava, sorghum, beans, 
rice, chickpeas, groundnuts, sweet potatoes and cotton. 
 
Pastoralism Rearing of cattle, goats and sheep. 
Gardening 
 
 
Production of tomatoes, onions, sugarcane, cabbage, fruits, 
okra, and greens. 
Non-farm activities 
 
 
 
 
Carpentry,  local beer brewing, traditional healing, rain 
making, midwifery, bicycle repair, tailoring, shoe repair, 
radio repair, pharmacy, office work, grocery shops, pottery, 
butchery, grain milling, and small food and tea rooms. 
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Figure 2. 12: Pastoralism in Bariadi district 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 13: Bicycle repair 
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Figure 2. 14: Small business by the road (shoes, suit cases, and dresses sale) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 15: Pot business 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYZING WATER MANAGEMENT   
INSTITUTIONS 
  3.1. Introduction 
To conceptualize the impact of customary and statutory institutions on water 
management, this study will examine three sets of institutional theories. The first set consists of 
moral theories that focus on moral codes, traditions and value systems that are crucial for the 
management of water resources. These theories include the moral economy and the “evil-
market” thesis. The second set is built on rational choice theories.Rational choice theories view 
individuals as rational decision makers who calculate the relative costs and benefits of alternative 
actions, and make choices that will maximize their utility. Examples of these approaches include 
the tragedy of the commons, political economy and the community-yoke thesis. The weaknesses 
of the first set and second set of institutional theories can be addressed by the use of Hayami’s 
(1998) theory, which attempts to reconcile the two sets of theories.  The third set of theories 
consists of the new institutional theories that focus on the importance of self-governance in the 
management of common-pool resources. Although some of these theories were not specifically 
designed for water management, they can be used to understand how the customary and statutory 
institutions work, evaluate their strength and weaknesses and determine what can be done to 
bring them together for effective water management. 
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3.2. Conceptual Frameworks 
 
3.2.1. The Tragedy of the Commons Theory 
One of the well-known theories of natural resource management is the Tragedy of the 
Commons Theory. The theory was originally proposed by Hardin (1968), who maintained that 
resources held in common were bound to be subject to massive degradation, because people did 
not have an incentive to use common resources in a sustainable way.  When resources are free or 
open for everyone, no one is responsible for their sustainable use. Instead, the self- motivated 
individuals have an incentive to maximize their profit and take as much as possible from the 
resources before everyone else does. Hardin proposes that the state needs to use coercive 
regulations to control and restrict the over-use and degradation of resources. He uses a metaphor 
of common pastures, the "commons,” to refer to the resources that are shared by a group of 
people. As Hardin explained: 
 
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as 
many cattle as possible on the commons. Ruin is the destination towards which all men 
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the 
commons. In vying with each other to benefit individually from the commons, each one of 
the users keeps increasing the number of animals he brings to the common pasture even 
if he realizes that this in the long run will lead to destruction of the common pastures 
through overgrazing and bring ruin to all. Each user concludes that the abstinence on his 
part, if he chose it, would only incur private losses without significantly altering the long 
term outcome, as others in any case will continue to bring additional animals into the 
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common pasture. Each user therefore decides upon a course that is rational from his or 
her individual point of view but which leads to the irrational over- exploitation of the 
common pool resources and its ultimate and unavoidable destruction. (Hardin 1968: 
1244-45). 
 
Hardin’s metaphor implies that individuals are self interested and have a tendency to 
maximize their utility at the expense of group interests. Therefore, Hardin argues, the best way to 
solve the tragedy of the commons is to use coercion administered by outside agents. This idea 
involves the use of direct authoritarian control of natural resources by state institutions. Another 
way to avoid a tragedy of the commons is privatization, which requires external institutions and 
the force of law to defend the rights of the private enterprises that manage resources. Although 
Hardin’s metaphor has been used by some policy makers to rationalize state control of 
community resources, his thesis has come under attack by advocates of cooperative management.  
Many scholars agree that the tragedy of the commons occurred in many rural 
communities. But they argue that Hardin failed to recognize the fact that over the years, some 
communities have struggled successfully to prevent resource degradation, maintained their 
customary institutions, and organized the effective management of their water resources.  Critics 
of Hardin argues that communities “do devise long-term, sustainable institutions” for managing 
water resources. They also maintain that the use of privatization and state coercive power as 
suggested by Hardin, has often failed (Dietz et al. 2003; Ostrom et al. 1999:278). Privatization 
does not ensure the sustainable use of resources because private resource owners will always try 
to harvest more profit from the resources. Moreover, critics argue that the use of coercive control 
by the state may motivate people to be free-riders. This is because there is a human tendency to 
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react against compulsion. The use of coercion to involve people without their consent motivates 
them to resist the demanded and want the forbidden (De Young 1999; De Young and Kaplan 
1988).  
Another criticism of Hardin’s thesis is based on his notion of rational choice.  From the 
rational choice perspective, individuals anticipate the outcomes of alternative courses of action 
and adopt the outcome that is best for them. Rational individuals choose the alternative that will 
most likely give them the greatest satisfaction (Blau 1994; Carling 1992; Coleman 1990; 
Coleman 1973; Heath 1976; Human 1990). But rational choice theories have been criticized for 
defining human behavior in economic terms and for assuming that individuals are rational. 
Critics such as Simon (1957) argue that individuals are “bounded rational,” that is, they have a 
limited ability to evaluate and verify all possible alternatives when they make decisions. Critics 
of rational choice have argued that customary institutions are capable of overcoming the problem 
of free-riders and self- interested individuals through collective action (Gibbs and Bromley 1989; 
Ostrom 1990). 
Perhaps one of the most important criticisms to the tragedy of the commons theory is its 
failure to recognize the different types of property rights that exist in rural communities. Critics 
have argued that Hardin assumed that property rights in the “commons” were open access 
property regimes (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975). Contrary to Hardin’s assumptions, 
literature classifies property rights in the “commons” as public, common, private, and open 
access based on who holds the right (Table 3.1). As explained in chapter two, in public property, 
the state holds the rights, in private property, legal  individual or firms holds the right, in 
common property, the rights are held by a group of people, and in open access, there is no 
restrictions on the use of the resource (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick 2003; Ostrom et al. 1999).  
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Table 3. 1: Types of Property Rights  
 
Property rights Characteristics 
Open access Absence of enforced property rights 
Common Rights held by a group of resource users who can  exclude others 
Private Rights held by individuals or firms who can exclude others 
Public Rights held by the government that can regulate or subsidize resource use 
 
Adapted from Ostrom et al. (1999). 
 
 
Although it is possible to differentiate the four different types of property rights, they 
tend to overlap in practice.  Natural resources are rarely managed solely by any one of the four 
types of property rights (Nemarundwe 2004). Instead, natural resources can be held under more 
than one or a combination of different types of property rights. For example, in Tanzania the 
state claims ownership of all the water resources in the country, but recognizes communal rights 
over public water sources like rivers, springs, and streams. When the water from public sources 
percolates into the ground, and an individual digs a well to access the water, the well is then 
considered to be a private property by the individual who developed it (Meinzen-Dick and 
Nkonya 2005). The same water has multiple uses and rules to govern its use (customary and 
statutory).  
Scholars who study common property regimes have argued that the “tragedy of the 
commons” is mainly caused by the failure of institutions to enforce water management laws. It is 
not typically caused by collective mismanagement by users. The problem of resource 
degradation and over exploitation they argue, can be tackled by proper community participation 
and strengthening customary institutions (Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990; Wade 1987).  
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3.2.2. Moral Theories 
Moral theories perceive human actions as being controlled by social norms and traditions. 
Examples of these theories include the “moral economy” perspective and the “evil-market” 
perspective. The moral economy approach started with the work of E.P Thompson who focused 
on impoverished people in England during the 18th century. He maintained that rural 
communities contained a sense of “traditional rights” or customs that each members of 
community was aware of (Kurtz 2000; Thompson 1971). Moral economists believe that 
economic actors are pressured to conduct their activities according to community norms and 
values, even if the norms and values do not conform to individual’s self interests.  Moral 
economists argue that people behave in certain ways because they are bound by moral 
obligations. This morality explains and justifies individuals’ support for water management 
programs in rural areas (Health 2001; Scott 1976). 
The moral economy perspective urges traditional communities to organize cooperatively 
through shared values and communal institutions. The moral economists assume that peasants 
are risk averse, so their behavior is directed at ensuring survival and developing social insurance 
mechanisms. To moral economists, peasants are not concerned with maximizing profit, but to 
reduce vulnerability and to ensure subsistence. This is what is termed as the “subsistence ethic” 
where community interests override individual interests. Scott (1976) maintained that the 
“subsistence ethic” defines peasant culture, controls human actions, facilitates collective 
behavior, and produces a specific set of social relations, including reciprocity and forced 
generosity, and governs the development of village welfare and social institutions. Through the 
“subsistence ethic,” every member of the community is allowed access to necessary resources for 
production so they can maintain their subsistence as households. Individuals in rural 
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communities have strong ties, community identity and rely on communal property. Therefore, 
community members are obliged to conduct their economic affairs in a way that allows others to 
survive. In this regard, the value system, the moral codes of a community, and reciprocity are 
seen as key to social behavior in peasant societies (Booth 1994; Etzioni 1988; Miller 1998; Scott 
1976). 
Thus, the moral economists assume that rural communities have shared beliefs and 
practices. They have “morals” and tend to behave according to “subsistence ethics” (Scott 1976). 
To moral economists, the state is the major force that weakens the moral economy by 
encouraging people to act in their own self interest, rather than the interest of the community in 
general. Moreover, the national state has attacked traditions by imposing external laws in 
recognizing private, not collective property rights. The moral economist believes that if the state 
neglects the distinctive and specific character of customary institutions, the consequences can be 
disastrous (Kurtz 2000). Many scholars have supported the ideas of moral economists by arguing 
that statutory institutions are unnecessary because customary institutions based on trust and 
social norms can support greater cooperation at a lowest cost than statutory institutions 
(Ellickson 1991; Gulati 1995; Powell 1990). 
The moral economy theory emphasizes the strengths of the customary institutions, 
namely their legitimacy and acceptance by rural communities. One implication of this theory is 
that customary institutions are likely to promote sustainable water management because they are 
more likely to be sensitive to the local socio-cultural environment and to the physical 
environment. I will use this theory to explain some of the potential strengths of customary 
institutions. 
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3.2.3. Political Economy Approach 
A number of scholars have criticized the idea held by proponents of moral economy that 
human action is guided by moral codes. These critics argue that the moral economy 
underemphasizes the problem of free riders and over emphasizes the degree of solidarity in 
traditional rural communities. They also criticized the theory for playing down the problem of 
elite capture, whereby customary institutions give special favors to few local elites and chiefs.  
Among critics of the moral economy approach are proponents of the political economy approach.  
The political economy approach, which derives from neo-classical economists of the 19th 
century, argues that individuals generally seek personal gain rather than collective prosperity. 
The approach rejects the idea that peasant communities are morally obligated to protect the poor 
among them (Colburn 1982; Popkin 1979).  Moreover, political economists argue that 
individuals are rational economic actors who are interested in maximizing their individual 
benefit at the lowest possible cost (Carling 1992: 27; Coleman 1973; Heath 1976: 3). An 
individual’s decision to participate in community development involves a trade off between short 
and long-run investments that will improve the wealth of an individual (Kurtz 2000; Popkin 
1979). Individuals contribute to collective action and community development if they think they 
will be caught if they don’t participate, and if they feel that they are better off by participating in 
collective action.16 Collective action may be hindered by distrust, suspicion, and lack of skilled 
leadership, which is common among peasants (Popkin 1979). Community members would like 
                                                 
16 Collective action is defined as cooperation among individuals in a group to achieve common goals. Hence 
collective action success is dependent on institutions such as laws, norms, taboos, and organizations set to enforce 
collective action and manage the distribution of benefits resulting from collective action.   
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to get a free-ride, that is, receive full benefits of collective action without having to participate. 
While all peasants would benefit from certain collective goods, some have little incentive to act 
because they would benefit just as much if others acted and they did not.  
Political economists believe that a statutory legal system is required for sustainable 
development. They believe that state institutions are beneficial because they free rural 
communities from the control of village elites and allow people to behave based on their own 
individual economic calculations (Hayami 1998; Popkin 1979). Proponents of political economy 
argue that free-riders, elite capture, and the lack of expertise to manage and govern complicated 
processes, are the major weaknesses of customary institutions.  But political economists have 
overlooked the weaknesses of statutory institutions, which may lack the resources to monitor and 
enforce statutory laws and lack popular legitimacy and acceptance, which may undermine their 
effectiveness. The political economists also underestimate the enforcement power of customary 
institutions.  As Greif (1997) explained: 
This neoclassical view that places the legal system at the center of contract enforcement 
in market economies has recently been criticized on the basis of evidence indicating that 
many contemporary exchange relations in the West and elsewhere are informal. The 
associated contract enforceability is not provided by the legal system but is based on 
reputation, general morality, and personal trust within social networks. Empirical 
evidence indicates the importance of two distinct systems of informal contract 
enforcement: the individualistic system of informal contracts enforcement prevalent in 
the West, under which the reputation and morality of the individuals are key, and the 
collectivist system of contract enforcement prevalent in most other societies, under which 
personal trust within the social network is critical. (P.239-240). 
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3.2.4. “Community-Yoke” and “Evil-Market” Thesis  
The debate between proponents of the moral economy and political economy 
perspectives was a response to the differences between the community-yoke and evil-market 
thesis.  These differences are explained by Hayami (1998) who argued that the community-yoke 
thesis viewed traditional institutions as feudal yokes. The community-yoke thesis maintained that 
the “market” was efficient because it had the capacity to provide rules of justice that free people 
from the traditional ties and despotism. On the other hand, the “evil-market” thesis maintained 
that the market was “evil” because it exploited poor people, undermined the traditional moral 
codes, and contributed to greater inequality and poverty.  
Hayami argued that both theses were probably correct. For example, in some situations 
the market may fail to achieve efficient resource allocation or provide social services. If that 
occurs, people will use community relations to correct market failures. Customary institutions 
may be more efficient at settling conflicts and reducing opportunism, cheating, and free rider 
problems than statutory institutions. This is because customary institutions in rural areas are 
“enforced through intensive social interactions,” where people watch each other closely and  
where any misconduct quickly become known, and  where the violation of village rules entail a 
significant cost to the individual (Hayami 1998: 93). This is one reason why customary 
institutions work better than statutory institutions. People may not violate customary laws, even 
if they expect a violation to benefit themselves, because they won’t risk the harsh criticism, 
public disgrace, and possible exclusion from the society that may result if they do (Hayami 1998: 
93). At the same time, customary institutions cannot work efficiently without statutory 
institutions in areas that are highly commercialized or socially heterogeneous (Poteete and 
Ostrom 2004).  
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This view is supported by Agrawal and Yadama (1997), Chomitz and Gray (1996), and 
Poteete and Ostrom (2003), who observed that in the absence of well-enforced regulations, 
collective action to protect natural resources from over-harvesting in areas with high market 
access is likely to be difficult.  
 Hayami (1998) argued that the market and community institutions should be seen as 
complementary. The management of local resources should be delegated to local communities 
rather than subjecting the communities to the control of the government through the use of 
statutory institutions. The state should use the community for the things that it is good at and 
should facilitate customary arrangements for water management by formalizing them.  
Hayami’s theory combines the strengths of the moral economy and political economy 
perspectives.  His theory is relevant to this study because the theory will be used to conceptualize 
the relation between customary and statutory institutions. This research will analyze each 
institution to determine how they might contribute to poverty reduction and welfare 
improvement in the study area. In this research, inference can be drawn from Hayami’s 
perspective that water management policy needs to recognize and consider both institutions as 
legitimate and mutually dependent. Relying on a single institution to manage water resources is 
not enough. The collaboration of different institutions is essential to the efficient management of 
rural water resources. Customary institutions require support from the state for them to be 
effective, and statutory institutions need participation by customary ones. 
3.2.5. New Institutionalism 
Proponents of new institutionalism have analyzed the factors that lead to successful 
collective action for the management of natural resources (Poteete and Ostrom 2004). New 
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institutionalism recognizes that the operation of institutions is constrained by other institutions 
(institutional environment), but that a mutual monitoring of institutions can motivate community 
members to participate in collective action to manage their resources. Local resource user 
groups are capable of managing such resources through collective action (Bromley et al. 1992; 
McCay and Acheson 1990; Ostrom 1990). The theory maintains that community members will 
be willing to participate in collective action to manage their resources if they are assured that the 
benefit of institutional arrangements will be limited to small and stable communities (Berkes 
1993; Ostrom 1990). 
 A seminal paper by Olson (1965) posited that smaller groups are more successful in 
organizing collective action than larger groups because smaller groups are better able to 
overcome the common problems of collective action, namely free riding, and the high cost of 
monitoring and enforcement of regulations. Olson observed that individuals, acting in their self-
interest, are unlikely to act in ways that would facilitate the provision of collective goods for a 
group, even if all group members share the same interests. According to Olson, "unless the 
number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special 
devices to make individuals act in their common interest, rational self-interested individuals will 
not act to achieve their common or group interests" (Olson 1965: 2). However, other studies 
(e.g. Agarwal and Yadama 1997) have shown that smaller groups may find it too arduous to 
create viable institutions that will persist long enough to encourage collective actions.  
Assuming well defined and enforced property rights and homogenous groups, Buchanan 
and Tullock (1962) observed that as group size increases, the costs of decision-making 
externalities fall but the costs of coordination rise (Tullock 1962: 63-64). As a result, medium-
sized groups are more likely to organize themselves for collective action. But group 
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heterogeneity in terms of resource endowment, ethnic composition, goals and objectives, cultural 
values, also plays a vital role in effectiveness of organizing collective action in a given group 
(Poteete and Ostrom 2004). The more heterogeneous a group is, the lower its prospects for 
collective action (Ibid). The lack of well defined and enforceable property rights are always a 
problem in communities that can lead to the failure of collective action. 
 Ostrom (1990) maintains that the best approach to resolving the problem of the commons 
and achieve sustainable resource management is by designing cooperative institutions that are 
organized and governed by resource users themselves.  Scholars who have studied common pool 
property management have maintained that the use of customary laws is a crucial strategy to deal 
effectively with possible “tragedies of the commons.” Statutory institutions should not 
underestimate the creativity, power, and initiative of community members involved in 
management of their resources (Bromley 1992). Thus, it is very important to involve the local 
users and customary institutions to promote successful and sustainable natural resource 
management (Blomquist 1990; McKean 1992; Pinkerton 1989; Singleton and Taylor 1992; Tang 
1992). 
 The argument here is that both customary and statutory institutions are needed for 
sustainable management of rural resources. Neither should preempt the other (Lambach 2004). 
Migdal (2001) pointed out that “states may help mould, but they are continually moulded by the 
societies with which they are embedded.”  This means that statutory institutions and customary 
institutions need each other because both institutions influence and shape each other (Lambach 
2004).  Statutory institutions will be more efficient if they are congruent with customary 
institutions.  
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 Lambach (2004) and Migdal (2001) views are consistent with Rodrick (2000:3), who 
criticized statutory institutions. Rodrick  argued that institutions “must not over-emphasize best 
practice ‘blueprints’ at the expense of local experimentations” (Rodrick 2000:3).  He believed 
that neither statutory nor customary institution can work effectively on their own, but need each 
other because they all interact and may complement or substitute each other. Similar view are 
explained by North and Thomas (1973), and North and Weingast (1989), who observed that 
stable and secure property rights were crucial ingredients for sustainable development because 
rural communities won’t have the incentive to invest in the management of water and other 
resources unless they have adequate control of the resources. Statutory institutions may not work 
effectively in rural areas unless they offer control rights to rural communities. For example, the 
state may protect community water resources from outsiders, while customary institutions can be 
effective in controlling free-riders and the undesirable behavior of individuals in the community.  
If statutory institutions ignore or undermine customary institutions, conflicts and failure in water 
management are likely to occur (Grafton 2000).  
Figure 3.1 presents a conceptual framework for this study. It shows that sustainable water 
resources management practices need to deal with water management in a holistic fashion, taking 
into account various factors that affect water use in rural areas. Sustainable water resource 
management is defined as the design and management of water resource systems that consider 
the needs of present and future water users without system degradation (Richter et al. 2003). 
The conceptual framework in figure 3.1 shows that sustainable water management in rural areas 
is the outcome of the interaction between the multiple legal framework  that govern water 
management and community characteristics.  
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Customary institutions emerge from the interaction between community characteristics 
and statutory institutions (such as local government officials, state legislators, and village 
leaders), who make decisions about water management laws and property rights.  This indicates 
that customary institutions are not static, but they emerge and evolve depending on changes that 
occur in the community. For example, changes in people’s behavior may require customary 
institutions to enact new laws or modify existing laws in order to reinforce desired individual 
behavior. Institutional arrangements affect individual’s behavior and their interaction with water 
resources through the laws and sanctions imposed to those who fail to comply with the laws. On 
one hand, statutory institutions may enact laws on land use, property rights, and water 
management. On the other hand, land use, property rights, and water management in a particular 
community may be governed by customary institutions. This include social norms and societal 
expectations that influence individuals’ behavior and their participation in the management of 
water resources 
Moreover, community characteristics affect individuals’ behavior and interaction with 
water resources. For example, competition for water resources may be higher in communities 
with shortage of water than in communities with plenty of water. Also community members may 
choose to participate in the collective action for management of their water resources according 
to their resources, needs and values, and their perception of whether statutory or customary 
institutions will grant them security of tenure and benefit of their actions.  Community 
participation in the management of water resources may lead to sustainable water management, 
improvement of water access to safe water and equitable water allocation.  
Thus, sustainable water management in rural areas must involve a trade off between a 
multidisciplinary and multi-decision making process that involves all stakeholders and all 
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institutions in the decision making process. “I believe no single discipline, and certainly no 
single profession or interest group that has wisdom to make these tradeoffs themselves” (Loucks 
2000: 3).  
 
Figure 3. 1: A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Institutions for Water 
Management 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS 
We need to know how many people you want to interview, how many villages you want 
to visit   and how long it will take you to conduct all this. We want to have your work plan 
and discuss it because we need to write letters to introduce you to the village executive 
officer of each village. Can you give us an overview of how you are going to conduct 
your research? (Bariadi District Water Engineer, June 2005). 
4.1. Introduction 
Research methodology refers to the procedures used by the researcher to investigate the 
research topic and to answer research questions. In other words, methodology refers to how the 
research is conducted and how the hypotheses are tested. This chapter offers the description of 
how the research was conducted including the approach used, sampling procedures, data 
collection, data analysis, and hypothesis testing.   
As explained in chapter one, the major objective of this study is to analyze the impact of 
customary institutions on rural water management, and show how they might be used to 
complement statutory institutions.  Specific objectives are: the analysis of determinants of 
compliance to water management laws, the role of gender in water management, the 
effectiveness of customary and statutory water management institutions, the strengths and 
weaknesses of customary and statutory institutions and their role in water access for different 
water uses. Data used in this research was collected at both macro and micro levels. 
            At the macro level, data were collected at the Ministry of Water and Livestock 
Development. At the micro level, data were collected from the local government offices and 
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community members. At all levels, a combination of different data collection methods was used. 
Data collection methods included household survey, focus group discussions, key informants, 
participant observations, secondary data, and photographing.  Figure 4.1 presents a summary of 
data collection at the micro and macro levels, and shows the different data collection methods 
used in this research.  
Figure 4. 1: Summary of Different Levels of Research and Data Collection Methods 
 
         
                                  
            
  
             
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2. Household Survey  
The major purpose of collecting data from household surveys was to get data on how 
households use and manage public water sources, develop and manage private water sources, the 
role of gender in water management, and how households perceive and respond to different 
institutions that affect water management. To achieve this purpose, three types of water uses, 
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namely drinking water, irrigation water, and water for livestock, were identified for analysis. The 
three types of water uses were used to stratify the villages. However, availability of drinking 
water differed significantly across villages in Bariadi district. There are villages with very severe 
safe drinking water shortage and others with relatively adequate safe drinking water. Hence the 
District Water Office in Bariadi district has divided villages into two categories, namely those 
with severe shortages of safe drinking water and the villages with adequate or less severe safe 
drinking water. The list of villages that were major irrigators was obtained from the District 
Water Office and District Planning Office. These villages were those with more small-scale 
irrigation activities than others. The list of villages that were major livestock keepers was 
obtained from the District Livestock Development Office. 
 A total of 16 villages were sampled for the household survey, four villages in each 
category explained above (severe safe drinking water shortage, less severe safe drinking water 
shortage, major irrigators, and major livestock keepers). At the village level, households to be 
interviewed were randomly selected from the village sampling frame. The village sampling 
frame was obtained from Village Executive Officers (VEOs) in each village. The number of 
household heads to be interviewed in each village was determined by using population as a 
sampling weight.  Sampling weights weigh the data in order to ensure that the sample is 
proportional to the target population of interests. A unweighted sample is not representative of 
the target population. The weight reflects unequal sample inclusion probabilities, and 
compensates for sampling bias, and for over and under representation of the sample 
(Pfeffermann 1993). In this research, the sample weight was obtained by dividing the population 
of people in each of the purposively sampled villages with the total population in all sampled 
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villages. To obtain sample size of households in each village, the total sample size planned to be 
collected in the district (223 households) was multiplied with the sample weight of each village. 
To allow analysis of gender aspects, the weighted sample in each village was divided into 
female and male headed households. The village sampling frame was obtained from Village 
Executive Officers (VEOs) in each village. From the male and female-headed list, households 
were randomly sampled, with 28 percent of the total sampled households in each village being 
female-headed households. A total random sample of 223 households was selected and 
interviewed from all four divisions of Bariadi district. To capture the socio-economic 
heterogeneity of communities, two wards hosting division headquarters (namely Dutwa and 
Bumera) were purposively selected. The interview was carried out by trained research assistants 
in the Sukuma language. The household heads were interviewed at their households. The 
interview consisted of both open and closed ended questions. Information on customary 
institutions and their water management practices was collected.  
The survey gathered data on household characteristics (demographic, socio-economic, 
and cultural information), household participation in different programs and organizations, 
sources of water for different uses, water management laws and enactment, enforcement and 
compliance with water laws, gender roles, strengths and weaknesses of customary and statutory 
institutions, irrigation, distance to water sources, and household health. For details on household 
survey, see appendix A. Table 4.1 presents the basic statistics about the surveyed villages, and 
figure 4.2 shows the spatial distribution of the villages selected in Bariadi district. 
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Table 4. 1: Basic Statistics about Surveyed Villages 
 
Division 
name 
Village name 
 
Total 
population
Number of 
households 
Number of 
shallow wells 
Cattle 
population 
 
Ntuzu Majahida 2354 343 5 1067 
  Matale17 3908 495 5 2921 
  Ngulyati 8046 1240 24 3803 
  Sakwe17 6413 885 19 3408 
  Bunamhala 6772 959 22 3318 
  Gambosi 3860 500 10 2322 
 
Dutwa Igaganulwa 6376 1044 9 2998 
  Bupandagila 3647 487 4 4115 
  Gasuma 7842 1018 5 5866 
  Guduwi17 5425 690 12 3135 
 
Kanadi Mwaumatondo 5652 774 10 7405 
  Bumera 3146 426 13 2161 
  Mwamugesha 2450 371 13 1934 
  Mwamtani 8010 1185 4 6856 
  Nanga 7424 991 16 5588 
  Budalabujiga 5651 751 17 2016 
 
Itilima Ikunguilipu 6910 976 19 3190 
  Mwamapalala 4909 823 8 3391 
  Zanzui 4651 662 2 2817 
  Kinang'weli17 4145 623 14 1833 
                                                 
17 The village was sampled for focus group discussions only.   A household survey was not conducted in this village. 
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Figure 4. 2: The Map of Bariadi District Showing Surveyed Villages 
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The questionnaire was divided in to three parts and covers different aspects of water 
management in Tanzania. These parts included: 
1. Part one is about household characteristics. This part gathers household information on 
the age, sex, ethnicity, religion, education, source of income, type of roof for the main 
house and household size. It also identifies when the household was established in the 
district plus those who migrated in to the district from other places. 
2.  Part two in the first section examines household participation in various programs and 
organizations, including water management institutions. Specific information gathered in 
part two includes information on the type of organization that the household belong to, its 
focus, and household contribution to the organizations. Other information includes 
sources of water for different uses, such as domestic, livestock watering and irrigation, 
number of ruminants and watering points,  the location of crop plots in relation to water 
sources, and soil conservation and pollution prevention practices.  The second section of 
part two includes three categories of water regulations for domestic, irrigation, and 
livestock watering from both private and public water sources. This section also includes 
respondents’ opinions on the major strengths and weaknesses of statutory and customary 
institutions. 
3. Part three is about water management systems. It includes information on land, irrigation, 
livestock watering, land ownership, and their relationship with gender. It also collects 
information on water scarcity and household health. 
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  Table 4.2 shows that the majority of respondents (91 percent) are Sukuma from the 
Bariadi district. The inference from this sample is that the sample is representative of all the 
Sukuma people of Bariadi district. Female respondents are 62 (28 percent of all the respondents). 
I chose this number because female-headed households are approximately 28 percent of all 
households in Tanzania. Most respondents (66 percent) ranged from age 35 to 64, and the 
average age of respondents is 51 years. The majority of respondents who are 80 years and above 
were females compared to younger respondents (age 22-34) who were mostly men. More than 50 
percent of the respondents are non-Christian, with 0.5 percent Moslems, 36.9 percent atheists, 
and 16.8 percent worship ancestors. There are more males (21.4 percent) than females (4.5 
percent) in ancestral worship, while the distribution of males and females in atheistic religion is 
more or less the same. This indicates a strong allegiance to customary laws and traditional beliefs 
among the Sukuma.  
  The highest level of education is secondary school education.  Respondents with no 
formal education are about 40 percent, while the majorities (63 percent) are females. Most 
respondents (56 percent) have primary school education, only a few (4.3 percent) have secondary 
education, the majority of them being males. The table reports that womens’ level of education is 
low compared to men. The major source of income among the respondents (92 percent) is 
agricultural production of both food and cash crops. Livestock production is an exclusively male 
activity because no females depend on livestock as their major source of income. About 6 
percent of respondents depend on non-farm activities as their major source of income. This 
includes formal employment (such as teachers, nurses and doctors), and business (such as pot 
making, grocery shop, bicycle and shoe repairs, traditional healers, and rain makers).  
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Table 4. 2: Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Household Survey 
Respondents (Percentages) 
    
 
   Females 
   N=62 
Males 
 N=161 
 Total 
 N=223 
       Percent distribution  
 
Age of respondents  
22-34 4.8 14.0 11.5 
35-49 30.6 36.3 34.7 
50-64 38.4 28.7 31.3 
65-79 23.0 18.8 20.0 
80+ 3.2 2.2 2.5 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Ethnic background    
Sukuma from Bariadi 93.2 90.3 91.1 
Sukuma from outside Bariadi 5.0 6.7 6.3 
Non-Sukuma 1.8 3.0 2.6 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Religion    
Christian 56.0 41.9 45.8 
Moslem 1.8 0.0 0.5 
Ancestor 4.7 21.4 16.8 
Atheist 37.5 36.7 36.9 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Level of education    
No formal education 63.0 30.7 39.6 
Primary education 33.5 64.7 56.2 
Secondary education 3.5 4.6 4.3 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Major source of income    
Agriculture production 95.0 91.9 92.7 
Livestock production 0.0 1.9 1.3 
Non farm activities 5.0 6.3 5.9 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Family size    
1-10 83.0 71.8 74.8 
11-20 17.0 23.6 21.8 
More than 20 0.0 4.6 3.4 
Total 100 100 100 
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Most of the respondents (75 percent) live in a household with up to ten people, the 
average family size among the respondents is nine people, which compares to a national average 
of five people per household (URT 2002). Large families are desired among the Sukuma. The 
cultural norm is for women to bear as many children as possible. This norm is promoted by 
lower education and early marriages among the Sukuma women. 
 
4.3. Focus Group Discussions 
A focus group is defined as a group of individuals selected and assembled in a non-
threatening environment by a researcher to discuss and comment on the predetermined research 
topic (Bers 1989; Krueger 1994; Powell and Single 1996).  Focus groups are also instruments for 
collecting qualitative data. Researchers have explained different advantages of the use of focus 
groups. These include: (i) the use of focus groups as a preliminary step to a large quantitative 
study with the aim of identifying the language used in order to frame the questionnaires and (ii) 
the use of focus group discussions as a stand alone method or together with quantitative data to 
provide a deeper understanding of the subject being researched (Bers 1989; Krueger 1994; 
Morgan 1993; Stewart and Shamdasani 1990).  
    Focus groups proved to be very useful in gathering information on sensitive issues. They 
were used in this study as a means of collecting in-depth qualitative information and deeper 
insights about community’s beliefs, values, perceptions, attitudes, experiences, opinions and 
understanding of customary and statutory institutions for managing water resources in ways that 
would be less easily accessible in a one to one interview (Morgan 1996; Wilson 1997). The focus 
groups were drawn from the 16 villages that were sampled for household surveys.  To increase 
the number of focus groups, four additional villages were sampled using the same criteria as the 
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one used for sampling household survey. Two focus groups were sampled in each village, 
making a total of 40 focus groups. I chose large number of focus groups because conducting 
multiple focus group discussions with similar groups of participants was very important to detect 
patterns and trends of perceptions across groups. “Solo focus groups are risky because 
occasionally moderators will encounter “cold” groups-groups in which participants are quiet or 
seemingly reluctant to participate” (Krueger 1994:17). 
Focus group discussions were conducted with groups of five to fifteen people to allow for 
smooth flow of conversations. Although Krueger (1994:17) suggests that focus groups may be 
typically composed of six to ten people, the size can also range to as few as four people or as 
many as twelve people. However, Merton et al. (1990:137) suggests that "the size of the group 
should manifestly be governed by two considerations...it should not be so large as to be unwieldy 
or to preclude adequate participation by most members nor should it be so small that it fails to 
provide substantially greater coverage than that of an interview with one individual."  The choice 
of focus groups was done with intention to gather information about institutions and 
management of water for different uses. Seven different categories of focus group were selected. 
These groups included domestic water-user groups (20 percent), irrigators (15 percent), women 
(15 percent), members of customary institutions (15 percent), livestock keepers (15 percent), 
local government officials (10 percent), and village elders (10 percent).  This allowed for a 
comparison of differences based on characteristics of each group.  Table 4.3 shows percent 
distribution of focus groups.  
 The decision about the number of focus groups in each category was determined by the 
information provided by key informants, whereby the domestic water-user groups were given the 
highest priority. The composition of each focus group was selected strategically, bearing in mind 
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the importance of homogeneity. “Some mixes of participants do not work well because of 
limited understanding of other lifestyles and situations” (Krueger 1994).  Therefore, participants 
were invited based on common characteristics such as age, education, and social-economic 
status, experience, or expertise so that they would feel more comfortable to express their feelings 
and ideas.   
Table 4. 3: Percent Distribution of Focus Groups 
Focus groups Total No. Percent 
   
Domestic water-user groups 8 20 
Irrigators 6 15 
Women 6 15 
Customary institutions (Dagashida and Sungusungu) 6 15 
Livestock keepers 6 15 
Local government officials 4 10 
Village elders/customary leaders 4 10 
Total 40 100 
 
The recruitment of focus group participants relied heavily on the information provided by 
Village Executive Officers (VEOs) and village chairpersons who constructed a list of "ideal" 
participants for each group. I provided the criteria for selection of each participant depending on 
the focus of the group. For the purposes of this study, I was interested in recruiting people who 
were capable of providing the highest quality information for this research, that is, adult persons 
who were likely to be knowledgeable about Sukuma culture, customary and statutory water 
institutions, and water management and development issues for different water uses. The names 
of persons who fit these categories were listed by VEOs and village chairpersons, and then I 
randomly selected up to fifteen people from the list just in case some people don’t show up at the 
focus group discussion. Randomization was used to select focus group participants in order to 
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minimize selection bias. Those who were selected received an invitation from the VEOs to 
participate in the focus group discussions.  
 Women focus groups varied.  There were women groups for widows only, married 
women, women who were involved in income-generating activities (in some villages, women 
have organized themselves into groups and established different income-generating activities), 
and all women regardless of marital status or participation in women groups. The different 
categories of women groups allowed for comparison of groups’ reactions, perspectives, and 
feelings among different groups of women. Women were selected for focus group discussion in 
order to collect more information about gender and other “delicate” issues from womens’ 
perspective. Because of Sukuma culture, women may be reluctant to discuss some issues if 
mixed with men. Therefore, women groups provided informations on “sensitive” issues which 
women did not discuss freely when mixed with men in other groups such as water user groups, 
local government officials, and irrigators. 
Domestic water-user groups comprised of both men and women who were active 
members of domestic water-user groups. This group was chosen with the aim of getting specific 
informations on the management of water for domestic use. Irrigators comprised of groups of 
men and women involved in irrigation activities. This included those who practiced dry-season 
irrigation such as vegetables, and those who practiced wet season irrigation such as rice growers, 
and those who practiced both dry and wet season irrigation. Livestock keepers were all men 
involved in livestock keeping because livestock keeping is dominated by men. Both irrigators 
and livestock keepers were selected in order to collect specific information on how rural 
communities manage water for irrigation and livestock watering respectively.  
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There were two groups of members of customary institutions. The first one was 
Sungusungu and the second one was Dagashida. All members of customary institutions were 
men who were either in Dagashida or Sungusungu. Members of customary institutions were 
selected because the focus of this research is to analyze the impact of customary institutions in 
rural water management. Members of customary institutions provided specific informations on 
enactment, and enforcement of water management laws, effectiveness of customary institutions 
and statutory institutions, the strength and weaknesses of statutory and customary institutions, 
property rights, and gender issues. 
Local government officials comprised of both men and women who were members of 
local Village Councils, and who were more active in village welfare and development. Local 
government officials were selected in order to collect information on statutory laws for water 
management and possible conflicts with customary laws, and the role of local government in the 
development and management of rural water resources for different uses. This includes 
enactment and enforcement of statutory laws, effectiveness, and strengths and weaknesses of 
both statutory and customary institutions in water management. Village elders/customary leaders 
comprised of old members of community and customary leaders, such as chiefs who were more 
knowledgeable about Sukuma culture and customary laws. This group was selected in order to 
collect information about Sukuma customs, beliefs, traditions, values, and norms that affect the 
way people interact with each other and with their environment. 
The focus group discussions were conducted with the goal of identifying patterns and 
comments across groups.  The focus group discussions were very exciting because I could 
respond to questions and probe for more detailed responses, and participants were able to build 
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upon one another’s comments. I was able to tap into the many different forms of communication 
such as jokes and proverbs that the Sukuma people use in their everyday interactions. Observing 
different forms of communication during focus group discussions provided information about 
group norms, culture, and values. In general, focus group discussions gathered data on 
background information, cultural information, enactment, enforcement, compliance with water 
management regulations, effectiveness, strengths and weaknesses of statutory and customary 
institutions, and gender roles.  
Additionally, the focus group discussions provided suggestions or opinions about water 
management institutions and information about their view on women’s role in rural water 
management. Most of the focus group discussions were conducted in the Sukuma language, the 
local language of Bariadi district. Because the majority of people were bilingual in Sukuma 
(local language) and Swahili (national language), and I speak both languages, I left language 
choices totally up to them. The use of the interview guide helped me to recognize those subjects 
that have a correlation with culture, gender roles, and water management institutions.It was not 
easy to limit the number of people in the focus groups because some of those who were selected 
to participate in focus groups brought their friends with them. They told me their friends wanted 
to be part of the discussion too. I had to politely turn them away to avoid the focus group being 
too large.  On some few occasions, while conducting focus groups, I could see people nearby 
listening and observing what was going on though they did not approach me directly. I thought 
that everybody knew what we were talking about because some of them asked me questions 
wherever they found me.  
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4.4. Key Informants 
Key informants were purposively sampled at district and regional levels, and at the 
Ministry of Water and Livestock Development based on the following criteria: gender, age, in-
depth knowledge about water management institutions and customary laws of Bariadi district. 
The key informants  comprised older members of  the community (both men and women), those 
who are very active in community institutions like the Sungusungu commanders, Dagashida 
chairpersons (customary institutions), women, water-user group chairpersons or members, 
customary leaders (chiefs),Village Executive  Officers,  Village Chairmen, and  District Water 
Engineers. At the ministry level, key informants included officials in the Department of Rural 
Water Supply, other water officers, and hydro-geologists.  
 Key informants gave general ideas about the institutional framework for water access and 
management, gender and water management, enactment and enforcement of water regulations, 
and historical trends in water availability. One of the drawbacks of key informants is inaccuracy 
of their memories about some past issues (Golden 1992; Kumar et al. 1993). This drawback was 
overcome by the using multiple informants to increase the reliability and validity of information 
(Phillips 1981; Shwenk 1985). 
4.5. Participant Observation 
 Participant observation is a method that can be used to study relationships among people, 
processes, and truths about human life (Jorgensen 1989). Participant observation was used in this 
study with the aim of gaining intimate familiarity, and some insights concerning the Sukuma 
people, their perceptions about water management and customary institutions, their involvement 
in water management, and their social settings and relationships. This was carried through 
informal interviews, direct observation, and participation in the social life of the people, 
 
94
collective discussions, and life-histories.  I attended church gatherings, participated in funerals, 
weddings, village meetings,  was invited to a family meeting by a friend,  watched people and 
participated in fetching water, and firewood,  watched people water livestock and irrigate their 
farms, and attended traditional  festivals (mbina). By observing and participating in the social life 
of  people, I was able to establish personal relationships  that  helped me learn about their 
culture, gender roles, water use and adherence to water management institutions.   
Moreover, through personal relationships, I was able to talk or gossip with people and, in the 
process,  say or present an idea that encouraged an informal response. 
 Although participant observation was found to be very useful in this study, it is important 
to explain its weaknesses. Researchers have pointed out that it is difficult for a participant 
observer to “go native” and be fully intergrated into the community being researched (Cheater 
1986; Nemarundwe 2003). There are social factors like class, race, education, culture, language 
and power that are very difficult to bridge. At the same time, there is a danger of losing 
objectivity if a researcher attempts to be fully a part of the community (Cheater 1986; 
Nemarundwe 2003). In my case, I tried to address this problem by speaking the local language 
(Sukuma) and wearing traditional outfits which helps to close the cultural barrier. I was also able 
to talk with people and tried to blend with them by associating myself with different social-
cultural activities like funerals, weddings, and traditional festivals (mbina). 
4.6. Secondary Data  
Secondary data were obtained from Village Executive Officers, the Bariadi District 
Council Office, the Bariadi District and Shinyanga Regional Water Offices, and the Ministry of 
Water and Livestock Development.  The data obtained included population size, growth, and 
population composition, physical conditions, water resources, and the degree of water scarcity, 
 
95
different water uses, irrigation, and livestock keeping in each division, ward and village. Other 
data included statutory water laws, national policy for environmental conservation, and available 
water management institutions. I also obtained secondary data from literature and past studies 
done in the district and the country in general. 
 
4.7. Photographing 
  Photographs are used in qualitative research, particularly in the fields of visual 
anthropology ( Banks and Morphy 1997; Hockings 1995) and visual sociology (Harper 1994). 
Taking photos with a digital camera proved to be a useful tool in providing visual documentation 
of important customary elements related to water management and life in general. Understanding 
customary laws and practices of the Sukuma people means taking a closer look at what people 
actually do.  It is worth saying that "a picture is worth a thousand words." This is very true since 
some observations are best recorded as photographs than as words. The collection of visual data 
was used to create a deeper understanding of the community and illustrate information gathered 
from other data collection tools. Photographic illustration helps readers to understand what is 
being described and communicates information more effectively, especially with those who are 
not familiar with the subject matter (Donaldson 2001). 
 
4.8. Data Analysis 
4.8.1. Qualitative Data Analysis 
I personally collected the qualitative data from participant observation, focus group 
discussions, and key informant interviews to ensure that I synthesized them properly during the 
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course of discussions with groups and key informants. I facilitated group discussion and listened 
to all speakers as they discussed my research questions. As far as possible, I also cross-checked 
the information that I obtained from groups and informants to validate the reported information.  
Qualitative data were analyzed using two steps. The first was to transcribe the data in 
order to have complete records of all qualitative information. Second was the analysis of the 
content of qualitative data. Content analysis is a systematic technique for drawing valid 
inferences from existing records or documents (or other meaningful matter) to the circumstance 
of their use. This entails reading and compressing many bodies of text or images into fewer 
content categories (Krippendorff 1980; Weber 1990). The aim of content analysis was to look for 
trends and patterns that reappear within either a single body of text, image or among various 
texts or images. Qualitative information was synthesized and, where possible, quotes and photos 
that represent key points were used as illustrations. Qualitative analysis of data obtained from 
focus group discussions, key informant interviews, photographs, and participant observation was 
used to complement the quantitative analysis described below. 
4.8.2. Quantitative Data Analysis 
To assess the role of customary and statutory institutions for water management, 
quantitative analysis of household level data was done using STATA statistical software. Other 
analysis consisted of descriptive univariate statistics that provided information on the descriptive 
statistics of water management variables. To find out about the determinants of compliance with 
statutory and customary institutions, a logistic regression analysis using the household level data 
was done. Comparisons were made across sub-samples by the use of appropriate test statistics. 
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For example, I compared compliance with customary and statutory institutions across gender of 
household head, and across different measures of heterogeneity of community members. 
4.8.3. Measurement of Study Variables 
(i) Determinants of compliance with customary and statutory institutions  
 The term “compliance” refers to all behavior of rural communities that conform to the 
requirements of customary or statutory institutions.  These institutions give rise to efforts to 
structure the incentives of rural communities with respect to their choices concerning 
compliance.  This can be done through the use of enforcement mechanisms like punishment or 
rewards, monitoring systems to reduce the probability of undetected violations, publicizing data 
on non-compliance or involvement in cooperative socialization schemes designed to foster habits 
of obedience (Young 1979).  
The objective of the quantitative analysis was to investigate the determinants of existence 
and compliance with customary and statutory water management institutions. Using data from 
household survey, I analyzed the existence of customary and statutory institutions related to 
water management using cross tabulations only. Econometric analysis was not possible because I 
did not expect significant variation of enactment of customary and statutory institutions given 
that my study area was small with the same ethnic group (the Sukuma). However, I expected the 
determinants of compliance with these institutions to vary significantly due to the potential 
socio-economic heterogeneity of the communities and households. Hence I used logistic 
regression model to analyze the determinants of compliance with customary and statutory 
institutions using household level data.  
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4.8.3.1. Dependent Variables18 
The major problem encountered in asking and collecting information about compliance 
with customary and statutory laws was the sensitivity of these questions. If asked directly, 
respondents were not likely to tell the truth especially if they didn’t comply with the laws. To 
address this problem, enumerators were trained to ask indirect questions or to make observations. 
For example, enumerators established whether a household had a toilet structure by requesting to 
go to the toilet. Households without a toilet always requested the enumerators to just go behind a 
bush. On the distance from farm plots to water sources, focus groups discussion revealed that the 
law wasn’t enforced by statutory institutions, so respondents responded freely to this question 
without any fear. 
Three regression models were run in this research, one for each dependent variable. The 
first regression model assessed the determinants of compliance with customary laws. The 
customary law used in the model was “no washing clothes or bathing at the drinking water 
source.”  Respondents were asked to report the major source of water for washing or bathing 
(river, spring, shallow well, deep well, a pond, or a dam). Both customary and statutory laws 
require people not to pollute water sources. Hence respondents were asked where they bathe or 
wash their clothes (whether at the source of water, at home or other place away from the water 
source).  Therefore, compliance =1 when the household reported not to wash or bathe at the 
drinking water source and compliance=0 when the household washed clothes or bathed at the 
                                                 
18 For dependent variable, a value of “0” indicated non-compliance, and “1” indicated compliance with the law. 
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drinking water sources (did not comply with customary law that prohibit washing clothes or 
bathing near or at the drinking water sources). 
The second and third regression analysis  assessed compliance with two statutory laws:  
A). Each household must have a toilet facility.  
Compliance =1 if a household had a toilet and compliance=0 if the household didn’t have 
a toilet. Even though this law was not recognized and reported as a statutory regulation by 
respondents, enumerators made an observation at the household whether there is a toilet facility 
or not. In a situation where a toilet facility was not visible, enumerators asked for a place to 
release themselves. Respondents having no latrine normally referred the enumerators to visit a 
neighbor’s place or stated that they did not have such a structure.  However, this is one of the 
few laws that was well known and observed but was not addressed directly during the interview 
due to its sensitive nature. 
B). No agricultural activities by water sources. Agriculture should be practiced at a distance not 
less than 30 meters from water source.  
Compliance =1 if crop plots were located more than 30 meters from water sources; and 
compliance= 0 if crop plots were located less than 30 meters from water sources. 
 
4.8.3.2. Independent Variables 
 Compliance with customary and statutory institutions was affected by a number of socio-
economic factors that are important to understand in order to design policies and strategies for 
better water management. In addition to enforcement mechanisms used by institutions, factors 
that affected an individual’s decision to comply with water management laws included human 
capital, natural capital, financial capital, physical capital, market access, livelihood strategies and 
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group size (Agrawal and Yadama 1997; Chomitz and Gray 1996; Hayami 1998; Ostrom 1990; 
Poteete and Ostrom 2004).19  
Human capital (HC) refers to knowledge, skills, experiences and ability to work that 
helps people to pursue different livelihood activities (Carney 1998:7; Ostrom 1994: 528).  
Human capital variables used in this research included the level of education, age, gender, 
human health, and size of family labor. The level of education was measured as the number of 
years in schools. Education was expected to have a negative relationship with compliance to 
customary laws and ambiguous impact on compliance with statutory laws. Highly educated 
people were more informed than less educated people who may not  have been aware of the 
existence of the statutory laws. Also a higher level of education may have increased people’s 
awareness of future benefits of complying with natural resource management. But education may 
increase the value of labor, which would reduce the probability to comply with water 
management regulations that are labor-intensive. Education may also increase non-farm 
opportunities, which would then compete for labor with labor intensive activities (Scherr and 
Hazell 1994) and give people more “exit options,”  thus a tendency to undermine collective 
action (Bardhan 1993). 
Human health was measured as number of lost labor days in the past three months due to 
sickness in the family. Human health was expected to have a positive relationship with 
compliance with both statutory and customary laws, because water management activities 
require a healthy person to perform them effectively (Bloom et al. 2004). Hence it was expected 
that human health contributed positively to the adoption of water resource management 
                                                 
19 In this research, cultural heterogeneity is not likely to differ significantly since the study was confined to only one 
ethnic group, the Sukuma of Bariadi district. Hence the cultural variable was not analyzed in this study. 
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strategies, both formal and informal. It was expected that human health will contribute to better 
management of water resources. This implies that healthy families had more family labor, and 
hence it was expected they will comply with regulations because they had greater opportunities. 
Age of the household was expected to have a positive relationship with compliance with 
customary laws and negative relationship with statutory laws. This was because older people 
have strong allegiance to customs and may not care much about statutory laws. Gender was an 
important determinant of compliance with water management laws because the burden of 
fetching safe water from distant sources falls on women (Ramaswamy 2003:265).  The gender of 
household head was coded as “0” or “1”; with “0” representing female and “1” representing 
males. It was expected that females were less likely to comply with water management laws than 
males because they had limited access to resources and information that would enable them to 
comply. Family size was drawn from the question that asked the number of household members, 
both children and adults. Family size was measured as the total number of people who reside in 
each household. It reflected household economies of scale for participation in water management 
projects. Family size was expected to have a positive association with compliance with water 
management laws because larger families were expected to have more labor than smaller 
families. Hence they were more able to comply with regulations that were labor intensive. 
Natural capital (NC) refers to natural resources that the household owns (Carney 1998).  
Natural capital increases the endowment that the household holds. Hence, NC represented wealth 
of the household. In this research, farm size was used as an indicator of natural capital.  People 
with natural capital have greater capacities because they have access to better opportunities that 
would enable them to comply with water management laws. NC can be a source of income that 
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can be used to pay for labor and other expenses required to comply with water management 
laws.  
An abundance of natural capital in high potential areas or places that have not been 
severely degraded may reduce the incentive for community members to practice water resource 
conservation (Ostrom 1999). High natural capital is also likely to create more productive 
activities that may increase the opportunity cost of labor for water resource management (Ostrom 
1999). This in turn could have a negative impact on the likelihood to comply with water 
management regulations, both statutory and customary, that require substantial labor input. But 
people with low natural capital may have to practice extensive agricultural production in order to 
meet their subsistence needs.  As a result, people with low natural capital may not be willing to 
invest in water management activities or restrain themselves from unsustainable use of water 
resources even if doing so will improve their health and livelihood in general. They may be 
forced even to engage in unsustainable agricultural practices that do not follow statutory or 
customary laws, or  cultivate on fragile lands that may trigger severe land and water degradation.  
Physical capital (PC) is the tangible assets that the household has accumulated and uses 
in production to improve flows of future incomes (Lachmann 1978; Soubbotina et al. 2000). 
Physical capital was represented by ownership of livestock and the roof type of the main house.  
Livestock included cattle, sheep, and goats. They were converted to a common number called 
tropical livestock unit (TLU). TLU is a scale used to sum all livestock to a single number, and is 
defined according to the weight of the animal. The standard weight is 125 kg. Hence the weight 
for each livestock type included is as follows: cattle = 1, sheep = 0.3 and goat = 0.3 (Kaliba et al. 
1997). It was expected the TLU to have a positive impact on the compliance with water 
management laws.  Households that had more livestock were more likely to comply with water 
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laws because the demand for water for livestock makes livestock keepers comply. The roof type 
for the main house was represented by a dummy variable where the roof type is “0” if the roof 
was corrugated iron sheets and “1” if the roof was non-corrugated iron (grass or mud).  It was 
expected that the type of roof would have a positive relationship with compliance with water 
management laws. 
 Financial capital (FC) refers to the financial resources that provide people with different 
livelihood options (Carney 1998:7). In this research, membership in the informal financial 
institutions (credit association) that offer group lending schemes is an indicator of financial 
capital.  The codes are “0” if respondent doesn’t belong to credit association and “1” if belong to 
credit association. It was expected that there would be a positive association between financial 
capital and compliance with both customary and statutory laws. 
Social capital (SC) refers to productive assets embodied in social relationships, 
membership of groups and networks that can improve the efficiency of a society and coordinate 
actions (Carney 1998:7; Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993). It facilitates interaction and helps people 
connect with other people through information and resource sharing and other benefits that may 
not be available to those outside the social network. Resnick (2004) points out that social capital 
can help communities overcome the problem of free-riders and the overuse of resources that may 
lead to a “tragedy of the commons.”  Social capital variables used in this research included 
membership in mutual support and water management associations, and security and religious 
groups.  The codes for each variable were “0”  if the respondent  didn’t belong to mutual support, 
water management, security group and whether the respondent was non-Christian; and “1” if  the 
respondent  belonged to mutual support, water management, security group and whether the 
respondent was a Christian.  It was expected that membership in associations would  have a 
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positive relationship with compliance with water management laws because in the associations, 
people share knowledge that influence their decision-making process, and create a sense of well 
being and household welfare. 
Livelihood strategies refer to activities required for a means of living (Ellis 2000). This 
includes the primary sources of income and livelihood in general. In this research, a livelihood 
strategy was measured as the primary source of income for the household. The codes were “1” if 
the major source of income for the household was livestock keeping and agriculture (excluding 
cash crop) and “0” if the major source of household income was non-farming activities.  
Livelihood strategies (LS) have an effect on the way community members participate in 
collective action to manage their resources (Ostrom 1999).  It was expected that there would be a 
positive relationship between farmers and compliance with customary laws and a negative 
relationship with compliance with statutory laws.  The compliance of respondents whose major 
source of income was non-farm was expected to be negative for customary laws and positive for 
statutory laws. This was because people who engage in non-farm activities are likely to travel 
more and blend with people of different backgrounds, so they will tend to be oriented more 
towards statutory laws. 
Market access (MKT) was represented by distance to the district headquarters town in 
kilometers. Access of the village to markets, infrastructure, and services affects the value of 
agricultural products by affecting local prices or access to information (e.g., access to roads, 
transportation, harvesting technology, and extension services). Better market access decreases 
the incentive of people to comply with customary laws because it provides greater exit options to 
people who fail to comply with customary regulations and restrictions (Bardhan 1993; Baland 
and Platteau 1996; Poteete and Ostrom 2003). On the other hand, better market access increases 
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compliance with statutory laws because people who live closer to the market have more access to 
information and interaction with the statutory laws than those who live far from markets. Those 
who live far are expected to comply with customary laws because enforcement of statutory laws 
in remote areas is very weak and because law enforcement agents also use the same means of 
transportation and communication, which is limited in remote areas (Nkonya et al. 2005). 
The group size (POP) was represented by the population in the village sampled.  It was 
expected that smaller groups would have a positive association with compliance with both 
customary and statutory laws. This is because smaller groups have more opportunities to interact, 
which facilitates mutual monitoring, and helps to reduce free-riders and non-compliance (Poteete 
and Ostrom 2004). Table 4.4 shows a summary of the expected relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables explained above. 
Multivariate logistic regression models were used to test the hypotheses using STATA 
program.  This model was chosen because the dependent variables are categorical, with two 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories, that is “1” if the respondent complied and “0” if 
the respondent did not comply (Janzen and Stern 1998; Long 1997).   It is important to highlight 
some of the advantages of logistic regression over Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression for 
categorical dependent variables. The logistic regression is much more relaxed and flexible in its 
assumptions than the OLS analysis. Unlike OLS analysis, the logistic regression does not have 
the requirements of the dependent variables to be normally distributed, linearly related to the 
independent variables, or have equal variance within each group (Tabachnick and Fidell 1996).   
Table 4.5 presents a summary of the definitions of all the variables (both dependent and 
independent) used in the empirical model for analyzing the determinants of compliance with 
customary and statutory water management laws. 
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Table 4. 4: A Summary Table Showing the Expected Relationship between Independent 
and Dependent Variables 
 
   
 
Expected Relationship with Dependent 
Variables 
Independent Variables Customary Law Statutory Laws 
   
Market access Negative Positive 
Religion Positive Positive 
Roof type Positive Positive 
Income from  livestock and food 
production Positive Negative 
Family size Positive Positive 
Security association Positive Positive 
Support association Positive Positive 
Credit  association Positive Positive 
Water association Positive Positive 
Age Positive Negative 
Gender Positive Positive 
Education Negative Ambiguous 
Farm size Negative Negative 
Tropical livestock unit Positive Positive 
Sick days Positive Positive 
Group size Negative Negative 
   
 
 
107
Table 4. 5: Definition of Variables included in the Empirical Model for Compliance with 
Water Management Laws 
                              Variables  Definition 
Dependent Variables 
  
Household washes clothes or bathes at the 
drinking water source20 0=No, 1=Yes 
Household  has a toilet  0=No, 1=Yes 
Crop plots  located > 30m from water sources 0=No, 1=Yes 
Independent Variables 
 
Human Capital (HC)  
Education (years) Continuous variable 
Family size Continuous variable 
Age Continuous variable 
Gender 0= Female,1=Male 
Sick days Continuous variable 
 
Natural Capital (NC): Farm size Continuous variable 
Physical Capital (PC)   
Roof type for the main house 0= Non-corrugated iron sheets,  
1= Corrugated iron sheets 
Number of livestock units owned Continuous variable 
 
Financial Capital (FC)   
Belong to credit  association 0=No, 1=Yes 
 
Social Capital(SC)  
Belong to mutual support association 0=No, 1=Yes 
Belong to water management association 0=No, 1=Yes 
Belong to security association 0=No, 1=Yes 
Religion 0= Non-Christian,  1=Christian 
 
Livelihood Strategies(LS)  
Livestock keeping and food production 
the major source of income? 
0=No, 1=Yes 
 
 
Market Access (MKT)  
Distance  from district headquarters (km) Continuous variable 
 
Group Size (POP)  
Village population Continuous variable 
                                                 
20  This is the only customary law analysed in the regression models. The rest are statutory laws. 
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In the logistic regression model, the dependent variable is a logit, which is the natural log of the 
odds. Thus, the model to estimate the determinants of the probability of compliance with 
customary and statutory institutions can be defined as follows: 
Logit (P) =  
P
P
−1log  = b0 + b1 X1 + b2 X2 + b3 X3 + …………bk Xk 
Where: 
P= the probability of complying to water management laws 
X0, X1, X2, X3 ……..  Xk  = attributes of the household head 
b0, b1, b2, b3 …….. …… bk  =  the estimated parameters 
 
The multivariate logistic regression is defined thus: 
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Where:  
P(Y=1) = the probability of compliance to customary or statutory institution 
e = the antilogarithm of the fitted value of the dependent variable 
 ∝=constant 
β1, β2, β3……… β8 = the estimated parameters.  
X0, X1, X2, X3 ……..  X8  =  the attributes of the household head  
 
The attributes of the household head are: 
X1 = Human capital (HC), X2 = Physical capital (PC), X3 =Financial capital (FC) 
X4 = Natural capital (NC), X5  = Group size (POP),  X6  = Social capital(SC), 
X7 =Market access (MKT) and X8 = Livelihood strategies (LS) 
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(ii) Role of gender in water management and how institutions affect such role   
 In many African countries, water for domestic use is the main responsibility of women. 
Women are responsible for collecting and storing water, caring for children, cooking, cleaning, 
and maintaining sanitation. An average household in developing countries uses 40-60 liters of 
water per day for drinking, cleaning, and personal hygiene. In rural areas, where water supplies 
are very poor, women and children have to make several trips to collect water. Some of the trips 
are long and take hours to make (Rathgeber 1996). With growing water scarcity, women and 
girls must travel longer distances to obtain water, a chore that often occupies several hours of 
the day. For example in rural Africa, women walk five miles or more everyday to collect water, 
involving a total of ten miles for one trip (Water Aid 2000). The starting point is to reflect on 
the fact that customary laws of many African societies are generally unfavorable for women. 
Although statutory institutions try to promote gender concerns in water management, it was not 
clear that they do. 
  The perception of gender roles are strongly rooted in society’s customs and traditions. In 
many African customs, women are perceived as helpers of their husbands (with the exceptions of 
female-headed households), and men tend to dominate decision-making with regard to water 
management. As for irrigation, it is generally assumed that irrigation is practiced only by men 
(Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen 1998). But the reality is that using water is not confined to men 
only, women do use water for domestic and productive purposes. Women also provide labor in 
production activities like agriculture (Zwarteveen 1994).  So the role of gender and the potential 
opportunities for participation by women decision-making in management of water resources 
must be understood in a broader context of culture and the social construction of gender roles.  
This research also explored how statutory and customary institutions reflect gender equality and 
 
110
provide opportunities for equal gender participation in decision-making on water resource 
management. I expected that customary laws have greater influence on gender relations and 
property rights. This influence affects how men and women perceive themselves, and how they 
participate in local decision-making processes. 
 
(iii) Effectiveness of customary and statutory institutions  
 The effectiveness of institutions was judged using the following criteria:  
(a) Conflict resolution of resource use and access  
Effective conflict resolution occurs when there is no delay on resolving the conflict and when 
each side’s needs, and interests are adequately addressed, so that everyone is satisfied with the 
outcome.  This research identified two major types of conflicts over resources in Bariadi district: 
water- related and land-related conflicts. I expected that customary institutions are preferred over 
statutory institutions by rural people in solving local water and land conflicts because the 
government lacks sufficient resources to enforce its laws efficiently. 
 
 (b) The extent of community participation in decision-making 
  This included whether water institutions create opportunities for all community members 
to actively contribute to, and influence water development and management processes in their 
communities, and to receive equal benefits of the fruits of their participation. I expected that 
customary institutions provide a better opportunity for community participation in decision-
making than statutory institutions because community members enact their own laws that suit 
their local needs, but community members are not involved in making statutory laws. 
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(c) How effective institutions were in achieving gender sensitive goals.  
 This included whether or not customary and statutory institutions reflect gender needs 
and priorities of water users. Gender concerns in water management are very crucial in achieving 
efficiency, effectiveness and equity in water sector. The major concern was whether water 
management planning considered gender differences in terms of power, needs, opportunities and 
interests (Matiza 1994; UNDP 2003; Woroniuk et al. 1996).  Although I expected customary 
institutions to provide better opportunities for community participation, I also expected that 
statutory institutions are more gender sensitive than customary institutions because most African 
customary laws tend to discriminate against women. Therefore, I expected men to make most of 
the decisions about local water management. 
 
(iv) Strengths and weaknesses of customary and statutory institutions  
 This research investigated the strengths and weaknesses of customary and statutory 
institutions with a goal of determining how their strengths complemented each other and how 
their weaknesses might be strengthened. For example, some studies have suggested that statutory 
land rights have disadvantaged women’s property rights (e.g. Khadiagala 2002), while other 
studies have shown that some customary laws work against women’s access to productive 
resources (Fall 1997; Gray and Kevane 1999; Mwagiru 1998). The question of the cost of 
enforcing statutory and customary institutions also showed the strengths and weaknesses of these 
institutions. Under these criteria, I investigated whether statutory institutions enhanced or 
damaged the cooperative behavior promoted by customary institutions. I expected both 
institutions to interact and co-exist because Tanzania is a country of legal pluralism.   
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The weaknesses of statutory institutions may be complemented by the strengths of customary 
institutions and vice versa. 
 
(v) Roles of customary and statutory institutions in  water access for different water use 
  As noted in the second objective, water for domestic use is typically the responsibility of 
women. On the other hand, Sukuma traditions dictate that livestock grazing and watering is 
typically done by men. At the same time, the irrigation of paddy rice, the most common irrigated 
crop in the Sukuma area, is jointly managed by men, who prepare the flood basins, and women, 
who do the more delicate but back-bending job of seeding. I asked whether water management 
institutions, which are strongly gendered, have different roles in the different uses of water. This 
question will help to draw implications on whether or not there is need of clearly recognizing the 
need for different institutions for each type of water use since the current institutions appear not 
to recognize such potential difference. This objective was also answered by investigating how 
different groups in a community obtain access to water. The groups include female versus males, 
irrigators versus non irrigators, livestock keepers versus non-livestock keepers, those with main 
house roofed with corrugated iron sheets versus those without them, and those who own farm 
land versus those who don’t. 
  Access to water was measured by the quantity of water extracted by each group. Access 
was also measured by the quality of water for domestic use. The quality of water was determined 
by collecting data on the incidence of water-borne diseases in the community at each sampled 
household. Water-borne diseases are those diseases caused by water that has been contaminated 
by human, animal, or chemical wastes (Hinrichsen et al. 1997). Holding other factors constant, I 
expected that the lower the incidence of water-borne diseases in a community, the higher the 
quality of water for domestic use. 
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  I also expected that customary laws are more used than statutory laws to regulate access to 
water for different use and for different groups of people. This expectation is supported by the 
moral economy theory which argues that most people in rural areas behave according to social 
norms and traditions, and have more awareness and strong allegiance to customary laws. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. CUSTOMARY INSTITUTIONS AND WATER RESOURCES IN BARIADI DISRICT 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of customary institutions and water resources 
in Bariadi district. The chapter examines how Sukuma traditional beliefs affect the way people 
interact with natural resources. The chapter also provides an analysis of institutional 
arrangements that affect access to different types of water resources, namely private and 
communal water sources. A detailed analysis of customary institutions affecting water 
management, together with an explanation of their hierarchy of authority and decision-making 
process is also provided. 
5.2. The Sukuma Traditional Belief 
The Sukuma people believe that the world was created by a supreme being, referred as 
the Creator God (Liwelelo or Seba). The Creator God shines on the earth, provides life, and 
watches people through ancestral spirits. In an interview with a chief, he said that the Sukuma 
believe that the living and the dead are a continuous line, so that when people die, their spirits 
continue to live in another world.  The ancestral spirits usually referred to as “batale” or elders, 
have no tangible characteristics, and cannot be seen except on a few occasions soon after their 
death (Tanner 1958). The spirits are believed to be very close to the Creator God and continue to 
watch their descendants to make sure that they abide by the traditions. The Sukuma try to 
practice good conduct to avoid the consequences of offending their ancestral spirits (Cory 1970).   
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The Sukuma believe that ancestral spirits punish those who fail to follow their customs 
and traditions. All forms of misfortunes (e.g. death, illness, drought, famine, infertility, poverty, 
etc) are the results of sinful acts that occur when people turn away from customary norms 
(Drangert 1993; Tanner 1958).  In focus group discussions, villagers said that most people 
consult magicians when they experience misfortunes. The magicians, popularly known as witch-
doctors (bafumu), are believed to have divine power from ancestors. They can communicate 
directly with ancestral sprits and know what is happening.  
The witch-doctors have to constantly pay attention to the ancestors or else they lose their 
power (Tanner 1958).  One witch-doctor said in an interview that witch-doctors are supposed to 
respect, worship, and offer sacrifices to the ancestral spirits.  They also have to make sure they 
sweep and clean the dwelling place for the spirits (Figure 5.1). Each spirit has preferences and 
some rules that have to be followed. This includes wearing certain kind of outfits with special 
designs and colors, making certain kinds of sacrifices, or bringing certain items when consulting 
them. Figure 5.2 shows a witch-doctor getting ready to consult one of her spirits. This particular 
spirits requires the witch-doctor to dress in red.  The spirit is believed to be of Maasai descent. 
The Maasai consider red as a sacred color.  In some cases, a witch-doctor may dress in a 
particular kind of animal skin, such as lion or leopard, and wear shell necklaces and bangles. On 
the head, the witch-doctor may wear a long hat made of colored beads and hold rattles (Figure 
5.2). The rattle consist of gourd that are filled with small stones and sand (Tanner 1958). When 
consulting the spirits, the witch-doctor shakes the rattles to provide a noise that will awaken the 
spirits.  When the spirits are awakened, they will start speaking to the witch-doctor, each with a 
different voice. 
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Figure 5. 1: The witch-doctor posing between two of her many spirits. 
Each pile of stone in the photo is a residence for one spirit. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 2: The witch-doctor ready to consult her ancestral spirits 
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The following is a story from a key informant about a man who was punished by the spirits for 
not abiding to customary laws: 
He was one of the richest men in our village. He had a lot of cattle and three wives. All of 
a sudden his cattle were affected by a disease which no one could explain. He tried every 
medicine but nothing worked. Then his cattle stopped reproducing, the male cattle 
wouldn’t even come close to females. Later on, the cattle started dying one after another. 
As time went by, one of his wives passed away during childbirth. The man decided to 
consult the magician to find out what was happening. He was told that the spirits are 
angry at him because he has left the correct path.  He had to apologize and offer sacrifice 
to the ancestral spirits. Since then, his cattle have continued to reproduce and the disease 
was cured.  
The above story illustrates that it is very important for the Sukuma people to follow their 
customs. It is believed that the man was punished because he didn’t protect his cattle. He gave 
them dirty water and didn’t care much about them. Maintaining a good relationship with the 
ancestral spirit is very important for the Sukuma because it frees them from misfortunes.  Once 
an individual recognizes his or her wrong doings, then he or she has to apologize to the spirits by 
offering sacrifices and stopping undesirable behaviors.  In focus group discussions, livestock 
keepers explained how they offer sacrifices to the ancestral spirits: 
You take milk, butter and cow dung. Then you go to the grave where your ancestors are 
buried. Once you reach there, you take a sip of milk and spit to all direction, north, south, 
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east, west and lastly you spit on the stone that is on the grave (lisigo).21 While spiting on 
the grave, you ask for forgiveness, you tell the ancestor that you are sorry for what you 
did and promise to follow the norms. Then you put butter, milk and cow dung on the 
grave stone. You spread the cow dung on the side of the stone, and oil on top of the stone. 
The milk is also poured on the stone. Immediately after all these actions, the stone will 
shine indicating that the spirit is pleased and you have been forgiven. 
In some instances, ancestral spirits may punish livestock keepers for placing the cowshed 
gate (mita) in a wrong direction. Each clan has a specific direction for facing the cowshed gate 
(north, east, south or west), depending on what has been passed down from their ancestors 
(Figure 5.3). The livestock keeper who has placed the gate in the wrong direction may 
experience a series of misfortunes affecting both their family and their cattle. After consulting 
the witch-doctor, livestock keepers will be told the cause of misfortunes.  He or she may be 
required to change the direction of the cowshed gate.  A ceremony to change the direction of a 
cowshed requires the affected individual to invite ten senior elders, two junior elders, and two 
young men to his house. The senior elders are the witnesses, the junior elders will perform the 
ritual, and the young men will bring five poles for making the new cowshed gate. 
The ritual for opening a new cowshed gate requires the sacrifice of a special sheep. This 
is a male sheep with two colors, black and white (ng’holo ya matema abelei), long horns, and 
long ears.  The sheep to be sacrificed is not supposed to be slaughtered. Instead, one of the junior 
elders covers the sheep’s nose until it suffocates and dies. When the sheep dies, a small cut is 
made on its nose using a knife which is sharp in both sides. The dead sheep is placed upside 
                                                 
21 The Sukuma normally put a stone on top of the grave. 
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down so the blood can flow from the nose to a small pot. This blood is later cooked together with 
the intestines and the liver. The meat is supposed to be cooked by one of the junior elders. 
Women are not allowed to cook this meat. The meat will be eaten together with stiff porridge 
(ugali), which is cooked by a woman who is a neighbor. The mother of the house is not supposed 
to cook.  Then the food is eaten at the door, not inside the house. Everybody will gather at the 
door to eat, and move to the cowshed area after eating. One of the son-in laws in that particular 
clan will go to the bush and cut a branch from a thorn tree. This branch should come from a 
specific thorn tree called “nyougouyou.” Then the poles are placed and the thorn branches are 
used to close the new gate. The left over meat is then distributed among the men who were 
invited for the ceremony. The sheep’s skin is sliced in to small pieces for each one to take home 
and hang it at their door.22 After this ritual is completed, it is believed that all the misfortunes 
will vanish and that the spirits will bless the family with more wealth, health, children, and cattle.  
Figure 5. 3: A cowshed with a gate facing east 
 
                                                 
22 Hanging the skins at the door is believed to bring the family closer to their ancestors. 
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Traditionally, the Sukuma conceive land as a spiritual entity, which cannot be owned by 
an individual. Land is regarded as the property of their ancestors, who exert power over the land 
and over the community after their death. People get land rights through inheritance and can 
establish their land rights by tracing their descent to an ancestor known to have farmed the land 
before them. Their right to farm in a particular place is conferred by their kinship with their 
ancestors. Once an individual secures the land, it remains in his family as long as they cultivate 
it. Among the Sukuma, the land tenure principle is that a man will own land as long as he 
occupies it effectively. They believe that land belongs to the whole family, so it cannot be sold, 
or pledged (Cory 1970). Instead, land is passed from one generation to another through 
inheritance.  
The Sukuma people are patrilinear, so they trace their descent through a male line. A 
study conducted by Cory (1970) provides a good picture of a patrilinear system of inheritance in 
Sukumaland.  According to Cory (1970:153-156), the Sukuma regard the oldest son (nkuluwabo) 
as a living link between the previous generation (the ancestors who have become spirits), and his 
generation, or the siblings who are still living. It is believed that the oldest son cannot be 
deprived of his position in the family because doing so will destroy the connection between the 
family and the ancestral spirits. In a polygamous family, the oldest son of the first wife is 
regarded as nkuluwabo regardless of his age. If the first wife has no sons, then it will be the 
eldest son of a second wife. In a situation where there are no sons, then the oldest daughter will 
be nkuluwabo. If there are no children, then the husband’s eldest brother will be the first heir. In 
a situation where nkuluwabo dies before his father, nkuluwabo’s children are not entitled to 
inherit the share of their grandfather’s property which would have been inherited by their father. 
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Instead, they will be entitled to inherit some properties as minor heirs after all their paternal 
uncles and aunts (Cory 1970:156). 
Newcomers in a village need to ask traditional village elders for permission to obtain a 
piece of land. Once the elders agree, then the newcomer will approach the village chief for a land 
allocation. Newcomers are granted rights to land if the village elders regard them as people of 
good character. Before the newcomer is granted land rights, the village elders make inquiries 
about the reason for newcomer’s immigration and his or her character in his or her former village 
(Cory 1970:118). Discussion with members of customary institutions revealed that they 
sometimes send spies to the village to find out about the newcomer’s character. With regard to 
water rights, when a newcomer is allocated a piece of land with a water source already in public 
use, they cannot deny other people  access to the water, and  they cannot close a path leading to a 
water source and keep the water source only for the use of their own cattle. Newcomer’s cattle 
must have a path to the water source, so there is no excuse for closing the path on the grounds of 
crop damage (Cory 1970:133).  
With regard to grazing land, village elders said in an interview that everyone has right to 
all uncultivated land, including fields that have been harvested.  People have free access 
regardless of whether they are Sukuma or non-Sukuma, or whether they are from this village or 
another.  Because of the shortage of pastures during dry season, the Sukuma developed a 
traditional natural resource management system called Ngitili, a Sukuma term meaning 
“enclosure.”  Ngitili is an area within the village that is closed off at the beginning of the rainy 
season and opened during the dry season for grazing cattle. In focus group discussions, livestock 
keepers said that there are two types of enclosures. First, there are enclosures owned by 
individuals or families, and second, there are communal enclosures owned and managed by the 
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community. The two types of enclosures were developed in response to severe shortages of 
animal feed due to drought, the loss of grazing land to crops, and declining land productivity. 
Private ngitili can cover an area up to 12 acres, and communal ngitili can cover up to 124 acres 
(Barrow and Mlenge 2003; Maro 1995).  
Members of customary institutions said in focus group discussions that every community 
member has a right to graze common enclosures. Private enclosures are developed on private 
lands by individuals or families. Non-family members have no rights to graze their animals on 
private enclosures. Customary institutions enact and enforce rules to protect the ngitili, and 
impose sanctions on individuals caught breaking ngitili management rules, such as grazing 
livestock on land set aside for regeneration (Monela et al. 2004:98-99). 
5.3. Water Resources in the Bariadi District 
Water sources in the Bariadi district can be grouped into two: community and private 
water sources.  I observed that community water sources include deep wells, springs, rivers, 
dams, and ponds. Private water sources include sources developed by individuals and water-user 
groups. Shallow wells are the only major private water source in Bariadi district. Water rights 
can be achieved by inheritance of land or water sources from a family member or by developing 
a water sources (in the case of private water sources), or by being a member of the community 
(in the case of communal water sources). Moreover, one may obtain water from neighbors  who 
have a private water source. 
 Table 5.1 shows that more than one third of the sampled households extracted drinking 
water from developed sources, which are mainly shallow wells. The main sources of domestic 
water supply for rural households in Bariadi district are developed wells (71 percent), streams 
and rivers (6 percent), springs (13 percent), and ponds (10 percent). Bariadi district is semi-arid 
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so most of households rely on developed wells mostly shallow wells and a few depend on deep 
wells.  This is because most natural water sources are seasonal. They dry up during dry season. 
Table 5. 1: Sources of Domestic Water Supply in the Bariadi District 
 
Source of water  
Percentage  of           
households 
 
Developed wells 71.0 
Springs 13.0 
Rivers 6.3 
Ponds 9.7 
Total 100.0 
 
Table 5.2 shows that more than 50 percent of rural populations in Tanzania have to walk 
more than one kilometer to get drinking water in the dry season. In the Bariadi district, about 19 
percent of household live within one kilometer to drinking water sources in the dry season, 
compared to 49 percent of other rural areas. This suggests that the Bariadi district is one of the 
water-deficit areas in Tanzania. Table 5.2 shows that 36 percent of people in the Bariadi district 
walk from two to three kilometers to get drinking water in the dry season, though in most rural 
areas, only 9 percent walk this distance. 
Table 5. 2: Distance to Drinking Water Sources in Dry Season in Tanzania  
 
 Percentage of Population 
Distance to drinking water 
sources (km) 
Tanzania 
mainland Rural  Tanzania 
Bariadi district 
sample 
Less than 1 kilometer 54.9 48.9 18.5 
1-1.9 18.8 22.8 23.2 
2-2.9 8.5 9.4 36.6 
3-3.9 7.8 8.8 9.7 
4-5.9 3.2 3.6 11.1 
6+ 6.9 8.2 0.93 
Source: URT 2002 and Household Survey in Bariadi. 
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Water resources in Bariadi district have multiple uses with different management systems 
that allow or deny people access to water. Water access and use in Bariadi depends on the 
following factors: individual’s ability to pay membership fees and contributions to water-user 
groups; ability to pay for the extraction of water; participation in water development; and 
membership in a village. Restrictions regarding access and use of water are regulated by 
customary and statutory institutions. 
5.3.1. Community-Owned Water Sources 
5.3.1.1. Deep Wells 
Of the 20 villages sampled, only one village (Zanzui village) had a deep well. The deep 
well is 62.5 meters deep and was built in 1995 with a help of donors from Holland, and is now 
protected by the village water committee. Water is pumped, using a generator that creates 
electricity for the pump to lift water into water tanks, and then fed into a tap, where people 
collect water. Villagers use the water from the deep well for domestic needs and livestock 
watering. 
 There are two water collection points. One point is for domestic water and the other is 
for livestock watering. Water from the deep well is not free. Villagers have to pay 20 Tanzania 
shillings (about US$ 0.02) per bucket from a domestic watering point.  The same applies to 
livestock, users are charged per animal, 20 Tanzania shillings per cow (about US$ 0.02), and 10 
Tanzania shillings per sheep or goat (about US$ 0.01). The deep well has plenty of water during 
both dry and wet season. The money is used to meet maintenance costs and to buy fuel for the 
generator that pumps the water. 
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Zanzui village depends on one deep well for most of its water needs. The few shallow 
wells that exist in the village are dry for most part of the year because the water table in Zanzui is 
very low. The situation is better during the wet season because villagers buy water from the deep 
well for drinking purposes only. They obtain water for other domestic needs and livestock from 
streams, springs, and ponds. Those who have bigger family sizes and many livestock suffer more 
because it is expensive to buy enough water if you have many livestock or a large family. In 
focus group discussions, women explained the difference the deep well has made in their lives: 
We thank the donors for the deep well. Before we got the deep well, the situation was 
terrible. We used to bathe once per month in dry season because water was so scarce. 
Some people could even stay for months without bathing. Household sanitation was very 
poor because we had to keep the water we use for washing hands before we eat and reuse 
it as many times as possible. The water table in Zanzui is very low, even those who have 
private well, had to dig from 70 to 100 feet down and still these wells are seasonal. In the 
dry season, all the nearby springs and wells dried out. Before we got the deep well, we 
used to wake up at 5.00 am to fetch water in another village, a distance of eight hours for 
a return trip. Imagine you walk for that long and bring only one bucket home!  
 
The women in this village can tell you better about water than the men. Having   a deep 
well in our village has changed our life a lot. In the past, there used to be no reliable 
water supply in this village. We used to get diarrhea and worms most of the time because 
of water scarcity. We also had to walk for hours with our babies on our backs to fetch 
water in other villages. Even if you are sick, you still have to walk and look for water. It 
was a horrible situation one can ever imagine. 
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Although the deep well has water throughout the year, water is still a problem because 
people have to buy water. The livestock keepers have to water their livestock from 11 am to 5.00 
pm, a time when the water is pumped in to the watering point. Livestock keepers explained how 
difficult it is to have only one watering point for all the livestock in the village.  
We water our livestock at the deep well. We have constructed a watering point and built 
a basin for watering cattle. Watering cattle is a lot of hassle. You have to line up your 
livestock and wait for your turn. At the same time you have to watch your livestock so 
they don’t mix up or fight with other people’s livestock.  Few livestock are watered at a 
time and you have to pay for each livestock. Sometimes you stay in a queue for a long 
time, a factor that shortens grazing time for the livestock since you will still need to walk 
for a long distance to search for grazing land. 
 The deep well is managed and controlled by the village council. The village council has 
enacted laws to manage the deep well. Moreover, every villager is responsible for maintaining 
the water source because it is the “eye” of the village. Anyone caught spilling, polluting or 
fighting at the water source is severely punished. Punishment can range from a fine to exclusion 
from drawing water. The village council has elected a water committee that is in charge of the 
smooth running of the deep well. There are always two guards on duty at both the domestic and 
animal watering point. The first guard on duty runs the generator and the second one collects the 
fees and makes sure that no one gets water without paying. The guards on duty are paid some 
allowance for each day they are on duty. The amount of allowance varies each day, depending on 
that day’s water sales.  If water sales are low on that day, then the guard receives no allowance.  
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 I visited the deep well and the water guard on duty that day said: 
You must get enough money for the fuel you use to pump water. The amount set by the 
village council is 1,600 Tanzania shillings per liter of petrol. One liter of petrol can 
pump up to 1,600 liters of water. You have to use 200 liters for cleaning the water 
sources.  If the water sale is low on that day, you can guard the whole day and you don’t 
get paid even a cent for your lunch. You stay hungry. 
5.3.1.2. Rivers 
Rivers are mainly used for livestock watering, though some few rivers are also used for 
irrigation and domestic use. In Sukumaland, livestock are traditionally watered in small pools of 
rainwater, rivers, and dug ponds (Drangert 1993). Water from rivers is free for community 
members. The choice to use a particular river is generally a factor of distance and land 
ownership. Those who own or rent land by the river can establish small gardens and irrigate 
them using the water from the river. Other community members can only use the river for 
livestock watering.  If an individual builds a water source like a well, they obtain exclusive rights 
to the water. Other people who need to use a private water source to water their cattle must get 
permission from the well owner (Cory 1970; Huggins 2000).  
Most of the rivers in Bariadi district are seasonal. They dry out during dry season. In 
focus groups discussions, livestock keepers said that they are forced to walk long distances in 
search for water for their animals, or have to dig-up wells along the river valleys to get water for 
their livestock. These wells are traditionally called longobesi (Figure 5.4).  
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Figure 5. 4: A well dug on the river bed (longobesi) 
 
 
 
A longobesi is regarded as a private water source even if it has been dug on public land.  I 
observed that livestock watering using longobesi is a difficult task. An individual is supposed to 
lift the water from the well by hand and pour it into a small basin when livestock drink the water 
(Figure 5.5).  I also tried to water livestock at the longobesi, and I felt tired just after lifting few 
buckets. I was afraid that cattle were going to knock me because they were thirsty and 
scrambling for water as I poured the water in a little basin as shown in figure 5.6. I learnt that 
cattle watering using longobesi take a lot of energy and time, especially if an individual has a lot 
of livestock. 
 
129
Figure 5. 5: Livestock watering in dry season is a difficult task. One must hand lift water 
from a well and water livestock one by one 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 6: The author watering cattle at the longobesi  
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5.3.1.3. Springs 
Springs represent a unique natural supply of water in Bariadi district. They are generally 
believed to have excellent-quality water and have been used to supply potable water from time 
immemorial.  Traditionally, most springs are sacred because they are thought to be the dwelling 
place of supernatural beings (ancestral spirits). Key informants and members of focus groups 
said that in most cases, the spring has acquired sacredness through connection with ancestral 
spirits, who will be identified through a significant or miraculous event that occurs at the spring.  
Spring water is mainly used for domestic use like drinking, cooking, cleaning, bathing, laundry, 
and washing dishes.  In focus group discussions with village elders, they explained that springs 
are owned by ancestral spirits. Sometimes springs can hide in rocks, caves, or under big trees. 
Springs talk to people and provide water anytime and anywhere the spirits want. As one village 
elder explained: 
 Springs used to have “owners” who were ancestral sprits.  When I was a young boy, my 
major job was to take care of livestock. One day I took the cattle for grazing where I met 
with an old man who was also grazing his livestock. As we walked with our cattle, we 
came across a big rock. Then a voice greeted us and asked “can you please come and 
help uncover me so I can give my kids some water to drink?”  I did not understand but 
the old man understood. He went by the rock with a stick and dips a stick down. I was 
shocked to see a big pool of water flowing from underground. Then the voice told us to 
water our livestock there, and we did, we could hear voices of people from the water. 
When I went back home, I told my mom about what happened that day, my mom told me 
to go and show her the place. When we reached there, the water greeted my mom; we 
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could   hear happy sounds and drums from the water.  Then we came back home. The 
water from that place never dried. 
Springs are natural water sources, and hence are regarded as public property. I observed 
that some of the springs are seasonal, with little water flow in the dry season. Village elders said 
that in the past, most springs had water throughout the year. They attributed the seasonality of 
springs to the improper management of springs which has made the ancestral sprits angry. They 
believe that the ancestral spirits are making some of the springs dry out, hide in caves or move to 
other villages. 
I visited one spring which has just “come back” from the cave. The village chairman and 
the chief said that the spring ceased to provide water few years ago.  They said it moved to the 
nearby cave because people polluted it.  The chief said leaders of customary institutions had to 
consult a witch-doctor. The witch-doctor said the spring hid in the nearby cave, and the ancestral 
spirits demanded villagers to sacrifice a black fat cow, which they did. After the sacrifice, the 
spring came back.  Since then, customary institutions have been strict on those who fail to follow 
customary laws. I observed people removing their shoes before they enter the spring to draw 
water.  One girl who was drawing water at the spring said she was told by her mom that the 
spring will “swallow” her if she pollutes the water. Other women said that it happened in the past 
where people who polluted the water were swallowed by the spring.  
5.3.1.4. Charco-Dams 
Charco-dams refer to dug out ponds in flat areas for harvesting and storing water. In the 
Bariadi district, charco-dams are built to water livestock and they are communally owned. After 
independence in 1961, the central government developed charco-dams in some villages in 
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Bariadi as a better alternative for livestock water. Of the 20 sampled villages, only 7 of them had 
a charco-dam. But most of these dams have been heavily polluted and some have silted up 
completely because of poor operation and maintenance (Mahoo et al. 2003). This decreased the 
volume of water for livestock watering. 
Currently, the government has been promoting and supporting the construction of charco- 
dams in Bariadi district.  One district water engineer said that villagers are supposed to share the 
cost (20 percent of the total cost) of de-silting the existing dam or building a new one. Some 
villagers have contributed some money for the construction of new dams, and in some places, the 
construction of new dams have begun. Figure 5.7 shows a group of livestock keepers that I 
observed getting together to discuss the possibility of building a new charco-dam.  
 
Figure 5. 7: Livestock keepers discussing the construction of a charco-dam  
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5.3.1.5. Ponds 
A pond is a small body of water.  In the Bariadi district,  ponds provide water for 
domestic use and  irrigation. Some bigger ponds  can include  livestock watering. Because water 
from ponds is used for all kinds of activities, it is normally not suitable for  human drinking.  
In focus group discussions, villagers said that there is no private ownership of dams, 
springs, ponds, and rivers.  Riparian ownership is not allowed. Those who own land by these 
water sources do not own the water source adjacent to their land. Instead, the water source 
belongs to the whole community and each community member has access to these water sources.  
The management of these water sources is guided by customary laws and each community 
member is responsible for preventing pollution. There is no water committee for these water 
sources, so enforcement of rules for managing common water sources is done by customary 
institutions.  Villagers acknowledged that most people follow these rules because of three major 
reasons. First, most people understand it is important to protect the water source and maintain a 
continued supply of reliable and clean water. Second, most people have a fear that the ancestral 
spirits would punish them if they fail to manage their water properly, and finally, customary 
institutions impose severe sanctions such as ostracism which discourages non-compliance with 
customary laws. 
5.3.2. Private-Owned Water Sources 
5.3.2.1. Shallow Wells 
 Private water sources are those developed by individual households or groups of people 
who use their own labor, hire someone to dig the well for them, or mobilize neighbors or 
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relatives to help dig a well.  These water sources are used for irrigation, livestock watering, and 
domestic water uses. Most private-owned water sources in Bariadi are shallow wells, which can 
be individual-owned or group-owned. Group-owned private wells are dug by groups of people. 
Group-owned wells can range from those owned by two individuals to those owned by water-
user groups. In Bariadi, water-user groups have been established in each village. Villagers were 
required by the district water office to organize themselves into groups of 25-50 households. 
Each domestic water-user group has a water committee which comprised of a chairperson, 
treasurer, secretary, and members. The water-user groups are required to be registered at the 
district water office and open a bank account of  not less than Tanzania shillings 60,000 (about 
US$60). After the account is opened, each water-user group is required to dig a shallow well and 
inform the water officer once they reach the water table. The district water office provides and 
installs the water pump.   
Shallow wells managed by water-user groups are used only for domestic purposes.  No 
irrigation or livestock watering is allowed in these shallow wells. Other group-owned wells are 
developed for irrigation and livestock purposes.  These wells are also used for other domestic 
needs like bathing, washing clothes, and cleaning, but not drinking. Normally people will 
organize themselves in to a group of 2 to 5 individuals and develop a well (longobesi) for their 
own use.  I observed that these groups do not use pumps.  
In some cases individuals dig their own wells for irrigation, livestock watering, and 
domestic purposes. Most of individual private wells for domestic uses are located close to the 
households, while most of wells for livestock watering are located in the river bed. These wells 
are normally dug during dry season when the river dries up. In the wet season, these wells are 
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washed away by the river. Wells for irrigation purposes are normally located on crop field and 
vegetable gardens. I observed that wells for irrigation purposes were rarely used for livestock 
watering because livestock could feed or destroy the nearby irrigated crops. But people used 
these wells to draw water for domestic use (except drinking). Wells that were located close to the 
households were mainly used for domestic water needs.  In rare cases, I observed livestock 
watering on wells close to households. But this was mainly done by well-owners who drew water 
and water their livestock at a distance from their wells.  Villagers who drew water from their 
neighbor’s wells were only allowed to draw water for domestic use.  
5.4. Customary Water Management Laws among the Sukuma 
Discussion with customary leaders revealed that water is a gift from God. The Sukuma 
customary law regards water as a common pool resource. No one can be excluded from using a 
water source for domestic use, regardless of the water source. It doesn’t matter whether the water 
is from a natural or developed source, or whether the water source is situated in a private or 
public land. Due to this custom, water vending among the Sukuma is not a common practice 
(Cory 1970; Drangert 1993).  Table 5.3 presents the different types of water rights found in 
Bariadi district. These types of water rights were obtained from focus group discussions with 
villagers. Every community member has access to natural water sources such as rivers, streams 
and ponds. Water sources that are developed either by individuals or groups are privately owned. 
Dams are also owned in common by all community members. 
Although the statutory law stipulates that the state owns all the water sources in the 
country, it does not mean that people are not allowed to access water freely. The customary law 
in Bariadi district allows free access to all natural water sources by all community members.  
Developed water sources are owned by the developers whether individuals or groups.  This 
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tradition applies to all water sources for different water uses.   The connection of water rights to 
land rights applies to developed water sources only.  Community members will have right to 
natural water sources even if the water source falls on someone’s private land. The owner of the 
land cannot claim rights to natural water source on his/her land.  Livestock keepers and irrigators 
said that the idea is “natural water comes from God, and it belongs to us all.” 
 
Table 5. 3: Categories of Water Rights in Bariadi District 
 Water source Property holder Water rights 
 
Rivers, streams and ponds  Community members Common ownership 
Springs Community members Common ownership 
Shallow/ deep wells 
 
Water-user groups/association 
Individuals 
Private ownership 
Private ownership 
Dams Community members Common ownership 
 
Although in theory it is understood that developed water sources are owned by the 
developers, in practice the developers have the obligation to share their water with other 
community members. For example, water-user groups have the obligation to share water with 
poor members of the community who cannot afford the membership fee, but live in close 
proximity with the water sources. Likewise, individual private well owners have the obligation to 
share their water with other members of the social network. A social network refers to a set of 
individuals who are linked by specific social relations or ties. Members of social networks 
include neighbors, friends and relatives. 
 The Sukuma people live in corporate groups. Fischer (1977:12) defines a corporate group as 
a group in which the needs and interests of individuals are subordinate to the needs and interests 
of the collective. Individuals in a corporate group feel a strong sense of loyalty and obligation to 
 
137
the group (Gusfield 1975). Because community members are dependent on one another, their full 
participation in the corporate group is a rational choice. It is the custom of Sukuma people to 
share water with members of social network. The way that an individual relates to other people 
has a big impact on their livelihood. Individuals always count on members of social networks for 
help in times of need. Although reciprocal obligation ensures people that they can access private 
water, free water access to private sources by this social network is normally limited to water for 
human consumption. If members of social network need additional water for animals, building, 
irrigation, or other uses, they are expected to pay for the water or go to public sources.  Water 
shortage is among the reasons that have made this requirement which somehow goes against the 
Sukuma belief that water is “free” for everyone.  There are some rules that limit access to private 
water sources. 
The owner of the land has private rights to the land, but not to natural water source that is 
found on the land. It is the custom of the Sukuma people to share water so even those who have 
private wells are expected to share water with their neighbors, friends, and relatives. Land 
owners cannot prevent anybody from using a water source for human consumption, regardless of 
whether the water source is private or public (Huggins 2000). As a woman key informant 
explained: 
 How can you deny your neighbors water? You got it from God and you need to share. If 
you are selfish, who will help you in times of need? Will your water help you? 
 
Although neighbors, friends and relatives are granted access to water most of the time, they 
are also required to abide by customary laws regarding access to private water sources. They 
always have to ask for permission from the owner before they can draw water. Some private well 
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owners will grant access to water for “essential” domestic needs like cooking, drinking, and 
washing. Water owners may also require people to pay if they need water for non-domestic water 
use or for domestic use that are not “essential.” Other villagers who are not neighbors or relatives 
may be asked to pay for water. Occasionally, they may be allowed to draw free water if they ask 
and explain that they don’t have money on that day and are in need of water. However, free 
water is limited only to drinking water. No free water is given for other uses. 
The rule of hospitality is a sensitive issue among the Sukuma. Any deviation from 
community norms is met with negative social sanctions.  Any crisis affecting a neighbor is 
thought to affect the entire neighborhood or social network.  This is similar to moral economist’s 
idea that people behave according to their norms.  People have a moral obligation to help each 
other in times of need. In focus group discussions, villagers said that everyone is expected to 
help other members of social network in times of water shortage, weddings, sickness, disease, or 
death. People who don’t help are sanctioned. For example, private water owners who fail to 
render water assistance to members of social network are regarded as selfish, and will be 
“disowned” by other members of the social network. It is also believed that the ancestral spirits 
will punish the “selfish” well owners who deny water access to others. Punishment may take the 
form of “bad luck” (mikosi) such as disease, sickness, infertility, miscarriage, death, reduction of 
water flow, or the collapse of the well walls. The neighborhood or social network council 
(Nzengo) has the power to invoke negative sanctions, ranging from fine, to exclusion from being 
helped by members of the network.  
Private well owners have developed rules for accessing their water sources. The 
following customary laws of the Sukuma were identified: 
1. No one is allowed to access private water without permission of the owner/owners; 
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2. Neighbors and relatives can get free water only if the water is for drinking, cooking   
   and washing. If water is needed for other uses, the people need to pay for it. Free water        
    is limited to no more than 5 buckets only; 
3. No dirty containers are allowed at the water source; 
4. No washing clothes, face, hands, or watering animals at the drinking water sources 
5. Those that belong to Seventh Day Adventist Church (SDA) religion do no work on     
  the Sabbath (from Friday when the sun goes down to Saturday when the sun goes down). At 
this time, no one is allowed to draw water because it is a day to rest for SDA people. 
With regard to private wells for irrigation and animal watering, the rule of asking for 
permission does apply. Those who ask for water for animals or irrigation are required to wait 
until the owner/owners have finished watering their livestock or irrigating their fields then he/she 
can be given permission to use the water.  Individuals will identify a private well to draw water 
depending on the distance from house to draw water as compared to the distance to public water 
source, relationship with the well owner. Normally people prefer to go to a person with whom 
they have a close relationship, and who is approachable and friendly. For the case of private 
wells owned by domestic water-user groups, individual membership to the group grants access to 
water. Thus, strong ties and interpersonal relationships are important factors for accessing private 
water sources.  
Networks that originate from blood relationships are the strongest and most important 
social networks.  Those who live with extended family members in the same village have greater 
social networks and a more complex form of network. Blood relatives may have their friends or 
neighbors who will also be included in the network to access private water sources. This makes 
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the network more dense and complex because even distant relationships are highly respected and 
valued among the Sukuma.  Private well owners who live away from blood relatives may have 
few members of social networks since most of the members of social networks will be close 
neighbors. Moreover, people who live in isolated villages may have a simple network because of 
fewer close friends or neighbors compared to those who live in closely built villages who may 
have a lot of close friends and neighbors around. Similar results were observed by Anderton and 
Emigh (1989) who found out that the density and centralization of social network determine the 
type of network. The higher the average number of ties in the network, the larger and more 
complex the network is.  
A simple social network is presented in figure 5.8.23 Figure 5.8 show that Mr. Mayanzi, 
who is the private well owner, moved to the village from another area.24 He lives in an isolated 
village with no blood relatives near him, but he has a network of neighbors who uses his well. 
Figure 5.9 explains a more complicated social network. Mr. Shagembe, who is a private well 
owner, was born in the village where he resides. He has a network of blood relatives such as a 
sister and other members of extended family who live in the same village and use his private 
well. In the Sukuma culture, even distant relatives like Holo who is a sister to well-owner’s 
uncle, are highly valued. 
                                                 
23  The idea on how to draw social networks was obtained from Nemarundwe (2003). 
24 Common Sukuma names were used. 
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Figure 5. 8: Simple Social Network for Accessing Private Water Sources 
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Figure 5. 9: Complex Social Network for Accessing Private Water Sources 
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Private well owners in the study area have a reciprocal obligation to share their water 
with others. By sharing their water, private well owners in return expect to receive some benefits 
from water users. First, a private well owner is assured that the water will be “safe” because they 
believe that if private well owners share water, other people will have no motive to pollute, put 
poison in the well, or bewitch the private well owner. One key informant pointed out that if 
private well owners are “selfish,” other people may try to make sure the “selfish” well owner 
doesn’t enjoy his/ her water. They may put poison or trash in the well, or use witchcraft to punish 
him or her. One example was given by the key informant that a “selfish” well owner found a 
dead cat by his well. The next day the well owner got very sick. It was believed that he was 
possessed by demons. He had to go to the witch-doctor to get the demons removed. The witch-
doctor told him he would die if he continued to be “selfish” because his neighbors were not 
happy with him, and they had planned to send very tough demons to strangle him.  From that 
day, the key informant said, the well owner stopped being “selfish,” and he shared his water with 
his neighbors. The principle of reciprocity and the fear of being harmed through poison or 
witchcraft, forces private well owners to share their water. This ensures equitable access to 
water, but may discourage the development of private water sources because it assures access of 
private water to those in a social network. 
Secondly, a private well owner who shares his/her water is assured of help in times of 
need. They may be assisted by those who draw water in times of weeding, harvest, funerals, and 
wedding ceremonies (Figure 5.10). Those who own wells for livestock watering may be assisted 
by members of social network to water or graze their cattle when they are sick or have other 
emergencies. Sharing water with other livestock keepers creates a strong tie with other livestock 
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keepers who may share information about cattle prices in the market, available grazing land, and 
traditional medicines for treating cattle diseases and infertility.  
 
Figure 5. 10: Women helping their neighbor cooking food for the wedding 
 
 
 
Moreover, private well owners who share their water may be assisted through a 
traditional mutual help system called lubili.  Lubili is a term used to refer to a group of people 
who exchange their labor to help each other when more labor is needed. A person or household 
that needs more labor for plowing their land, weeding, or harvesting their crops will ask other 
members of a social network to come in and help on a specific day. It was observed that a 
household that needs help has to prepare a special meal for the lubili team on the day when labor 
is being offered.  No payment is made for the labor offered by lubili team. 
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Thirdly, irrigators who share their water with others may get information about a better 
market, traditional medicines for treating pests and diseases, medicine to increase productivity, 
attract customers, and prevent bad people from bewitching well owners’ crops. This is consistent 
with Kohleret al. (2001), who observed that a social network provides opportunity for exchange 
of information that can help people get the knowledge they need to engage in a variety of 
innovations and livelihood strategies. It is also consistent with the social capital objective and 
benefits of reciprocity. Although the well owner may not ask for these benefits, water users 
understand that they have a reciprocal obligation “to pay back” for the favors they receive from 
the well owner (Nemarundwe 2003). 
 The fact that water is a common pool resource encourages communities to manage their 
water sources.  As explained earlier, the Sukuma believe that if they don’t manage their water 
correctly, the ancestral spirits will punish them. Punishment can take the form of disasters such 
as drought or destructive storms (Drangert 1993), infertility, death, famine, disease, and 
miscarriage. A key informant explained: 
 Last year, we had watched it rain at different times in various villages around us but 
nothing in our own village. We started asking ourselves why this is happening to us. Who 
is the cause of all these? Then we remembered that there were three women who died in 
childbirth and nothing was done about it.  The rains skirt around our village because our 
ancestors are disappointed with us for not doing what we were supposed to do: remove 
the curse and throw it in to the lake. So we had to organize ourselves and run a 
“pumbulu.” After the “pumbulu,” we had plenty of rains and we got plenty of food. 
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The “pumbulu” is a local traditional practice done by the Sukuma to remove a curse or 
bad luck in the community. If a woman dies in childbirth, some of the older women may call for 
a "pumbulu."  They pick up some of the dirty or broken articles from the woman’s house (the 
one who died during child birth) and then, as a mob, take them to the next village and dump 
them there.  When the next village finds them, they will, in turn, take them on to another village, 
and so on until they reach Lake Victoria where they throw the dirty junk into the lake.  All 
women in the pumbulu must carry sticks and if any men get in their way they hit them with their 
sticks. Most men know that they are supposed to give a pumbulu a wide berth when they 
encounter them.  It is against the Sukuma tradition for men to fight or interfere with the women 
in the pumbulu, and they can be fined a cow for doing so. All women in the village are expected 
to participate in the pumbulu. Those who don’t are sanctioned by customary institutions. One 
villager explained: 
We don't mind the unusually hot weather but the lack of rain is depressing and 
scary.  This part of Sukumaland has always been the first to get rains, but not this year.  I 
can only remember the past 45 years, but during that time I have never experienced the 
year coming to an end without enough rain to cultivate.  There are areas where they have 
corn growing but it is drying up. I told you about "pumbulu" when 100's of women from a 
village try to cleanse their village of the evil of a woman dying in childbirth along with 
the child.  It is still continuing due to the lack of rain. The people with traditional religion 
are trying to find who the cause of the drought is.  We now have 3 villages where the 
"dagashida” consisting of all of the men in the village, have decreed that all households 
where people have refused to join with them in the “pumbulu” are to be shunned.   
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No one can go to their home nor can they go to other homes nor can they receive 
help of any kind. They pay "rainmakers" but haven't found the right one yet. 
 
Sometimes villagers through customary institutions need to consult with witch-doctors 
(bafumu) to be able to find out what made the water source to dry out or what made the rain stay 
away.  In focus group discussion with members of customary institutions, they said that every 
year, customary leaders get together and try to determine whether the year will be good or bad. If 
they see signs of drought or other calamity, they ask villagers to contribute money for a witch-
doctor. The witch-doctor will consult with the ancestral spirits (batale) to find out what has 
brought bad luck to the village. The batale have special connection with God (Liwelelo) and are 
regarded as guardians of this World. The batale will tell the witch-doctor through a dream what 
is wrong and what needs to be done. If a water source is drying out, villagers might be asked to 
go to the water source and “apologize” to the ancestral spirits. They must bring a dark-colored 
cow and sacrifice it at the water source. 
If the witch-doctor finds out that the upcoming year will be full of misfortunes such as 
infertility, famine, or droughts, he/she may communicate with the spirits and ask for their 
protection. Villagers will be assured of protection if a miraculous sign such as a miraculous 
animal or human being appears in the village (ndagou).  If the sign is a human being, then he or 
she will look like a mentally retarded person. If this person appears in the village, and goes to 
one of the households in the village, villagers will be required to bring food to that household. If 
the (ndagou) is an animal, a wild animal will appear in the village. Villagers are not supposed to 
kill it, but let it go.  
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In focus group discussions with customary leaders they explained: 
In 2003, we predicted to have a bad year. So we had to turn to our traditional practices. 
Everyone in the village had to give millet or money for our customary leaders to consult 
a witchdoctor. Those who didn’t contribute faced a heavy fine, ostracism, or both.  The 
witchdoctor told us that our village had bad luck and were given a lady as “ndagou.” 
The witch-doctor had told us that once we see this lady, we should give her black clothes, 
and we did. The lady stayed in our village for three days and after that she disappeared.  
That year was a blessed year. We had plenty of food, lots of babies were born, and fewer 
diseases. 
 
5.5. Customary Institutions for Water Management 
5.5.1. Sungusungu 
Sungusungu emerged among the Sukuma in 1982 as a local level institution, with the 
major aim of protecting property and enforcing customary laws. The major factor that 
contributed to the formation of the Sungusungu was the increase in number of cattle rustlers in 
Sukumaland.  The war with neighboring Uganda in 1979 had caused an increase in lawlessness 
and crime in Tanzania.  At the same time, the justice system was seen as “too corrupt” and 
unable to control crime and protect the communities (Abrahams 1987; Bukurura 1994:5). After 
the war with Uganda ended, there were an influx of young and unemployed males, and a lot of 
guns around. By the early 1980s, there were frequent cattle raids in Sukumaland (the most prized 
possession among the Sukuma).  Armed cattle theft had caused a lot of fear and anxiety that 
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prompted the Sukuma to design a justice institution to protect their cattle, and other property 
(Abraham 1987; Bukurura 1994).  
Sungusungu is a Swahili25 word for a species of an aggressive, large black biting ant. Just 
like the black aunt, when established, Sungusungu were very aggressive in controlling cattle 
rustlers. They used poison arrows with swift and severe punishments (Paciotti and Hadley 2004). 
Among the Sukuma, the word Sungusungu relates to Sukuma word “busungu” which means 
poison or labor pain.26 The use of word Sungusungu has been associated with poison-tipped 
arrows that are used by the Sungusungu soldiers (Bukurura 1996).  In Sukuma language, 
Sungusungu groups are often referred to as basalama, meaning “the people of peace” who 
represent “the army of ancestors.”  
Although Sungusungu was initially a security institutions targeted on combating cattle 
rustling, it was eventually adapted to deal with enforcement of customary laws, and to handle all 
kinds of disputes including marriage and divorce, witch trials, debts, land and water disputes, and 
mediate other kinds of disputes. In the case of water management, Sungusungu members said in 
focus group discussions that they punish those who break the rules adopted to develop and 
manage water resources. They also work hand in hand with the existing customary institution 
(such as Dagashida) to enact and enforce customary laws.  Sungusungu was able to spread 
rapidly throughout the country, and within a year of its establishment, Sungusungu had 
transformed into a large-scale system, and was an ethnic duty among the Sukuma (Paciotti and 
Hadley 2004:119).  
                                                 
25 Swahili is Tanzania’s national language. 
26 Other studies observed that it is possible that the “biting power” of  the Sungusungu is combined with a reference 
to black clothes which are sometimes won by pastoralists in Sukumaland (Abrahams 1987). 
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The Sungusungu a have hierarchy of leadership starting with the chief (Ntemi), who is a 
chairman of  the Sungusungu. The  Sungusungu chairman is usually a charismatic leader who is 
in charge of all Sungusungu activities, leads meetings, and makes final decisions based on the 
views of majority. He is also the first person to be notified whenever there is a problem in the 
village. The assistant chief (Ntwale), works hand in hand with a chief and presides when the 
chief is absent. The secretary (Katibu) is in charge of documenting and keeping records of all  
Sungusungu activities, including writing names of those who attend  the meeting, taking minutes,  
and documenting  the details of the cases discussed and the punishment given.  
The chief commander (Kamanda mkuu) is responsible for organizing the secret policing 
operation of Sungusungu. He arrests offenders in the village, prosecutes them, and leads trials at 
the Sungusungu meetings. There are also assistant commanders (Makamanda wasaidizi), 
advisors of the chief (Banamhala ba Ntemi), advisors of the sub-chief (Banamhala ba Ntwale) 
and the Sungusungu council itself (Bunge la Sungusungu). The council comprises of ordinary 
members of Sungusungu. The ordinary members of the Sungusungu, especially those who are 
younger, are often referred to as askari, a Swahili word for soldiers (Abraham 1987).  The askari 
are in charge with the responsibility of tracking down those who break customary laws, 
patrolling the community, investigating offences, and finding witnesses for ongoing cases. 
Figure 5.11 presents Sungusungu’s hierarchy of leadership as explained above. All members of 
Sungusungu  are to take an oath not to reveal the secrets of Sungusungu to anyone. And the 
leaders of Sungusungu are “immunized” by traditional medicines to make them strong, fearless, 
and to protect them (Heald 2002).  
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 Figure 5. 11: Sungusungu Hierarchy of Leadership 
 
 
 
 Traditionally, the Sungusungu chief has the divine power to stop calamities in the 
community by communicating with ancestral spirits. For example, in a situations where public 
water sources cease to produce water, or if there is a reduction in the flow of water, Sungusungu, 
with instructions from the chief (after consulting with the  ancestral spirits), may put traditional 
medicine into the water source.  As they use the medicine, they are supposed to say “we have 
locked all the bad winds that pushes away water and clouds, and we are asking for water” 
(eleloyaga elyaboubi  dolilugalaga, dolelomba dopandeke minzei).  
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After doing this, the water source should produce more water. But Sungusungu members said 
that they never put traditional medicines in private wells because it was against state law. They 
said “you may be sent to jail for doing so.” If the chief and Sungusungu’s efforts doesn’t solve 
the problem, then Sungusungu may decide to consult witch-doctors for “expert” help. One 
Sungusungu chief said“it works like a referral hospital, if one hospital cannot treat your disease, 
then you may be referred to another hospital.”  
 Punishments imposed by Sungusungu range from fines to ostracism, and to eviction from 
the village. Offenders, who are brought to Sungusungu, plead guilty, and confess their wrong 
doings, are fined. Those who refuse to confess or pay the fine face ostracism. Sungusungu uses 
ostracism for two major reasons: first to punish the offender and second to make the offender 
confess and change his or her behavior to conform to customary norms.  Once Sungusungu 
decides to ostracize an individual, they have to write a letter to the Village Executive Officer 
(VEO) to ask for his/her permission. The VEO will then discuss the issue with the village 
council and decide whether to grant Sungusungu`s request. If they approve the decision to 
ostracize an individual, the Sungusungu commanders will blow a gourd-stem whistle (kalulu) 
early in the morning so everyone in the community can hear. Then the Chief Commander will 
announce the name of the individual to be ostracized. From that moment, all community 
members are forbidden to interact or cooperate with the offender or his/her family. Those who 
continue to interact with the offender are reported to Sungusungu and they too may become 
ostracized. As one water-user group member explained in focus group discussion: 
A drunken man was seen by one of the villagers urinating by the drinking water source 
on his way from drinking local beer. The man was reported to Sungusungu. He denied 
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the charges and refused to pay the fine. The next day the man and his family were 
ostracized. No one in the village would talk to him, visit his house, or offer any help to 
him. He was completely isolated. He had to beg for forgiveness and pay the fine. 
  
The story of a drunken man indicates that ostracism is a powerful sanction.  I observed 
that most of people in the Bariadi district depend on mutual service for their livelihood, so it is 
almost impossible for them to live in isolation.  Moreover, ostracism is effective because most of 
villagers cooperate with Sungusungu, a factor that persuades many ostracized individuals to 
confess and pay their fine. Sungusungu group members explained that they try to protect people 
from false accusation by checking the validity of accusations. This is done through spying and 
gathering information from different community members who had witnessed the accused 
breaking the law. As one Sungusungu member explained in focus group discussion: 
We live in small communities where almost everybody knows each other.  In most cases, 
whatever an individual does, is seen by other people around him or her. Once we receive 
an accusation about a particular individual, we check to make sure that an individual is 
not falsely accused of committing an offence. We gather information from witnesses and 
investigate the case. It is not possible for ten or twenty people in the village to wrongly 
accuse the same person for the same wrong doing. 
 
A Sungusungu commander said in an interview that Sungusungu protect the anonymity of 
people who report the offender, and those who make judgments about the offence. They do so 
because the offender cannot single out who is the accuser or judge, therefore it is not possible 
for the accused to revenge or take action against anybody. 
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 Normally, Sungusungu use the phrase “the world has seen you” (obonagwa se) meaning 
that “everybody saw you breaking the rule” (without mentioning the name of the accuser).  In 
this way, everyone is protected from revenge.  
The members of Sungusungu pointed out that the most important thing to them is not the 
fine paid by offenders, it is the offenders’ personal confession that they have done something 
wrong. If the offender doesn’t want to confess, but wants to pay the fine, Sungusungu will not 
accept this payment but will ostracize them until they confess. Once the ostracized individual 
confesses and agrees to pay the fine, the commanders blows the gourd-stem whistle (kalulu) 
again to notify community members that the ostracized individual has now become “a man of 
peace” (nsalama).  
Enactment of new laws by Sungusungu can occur if there is a new problem that cannot be 
addressed by existing laws. After Sungusungu have proposed a new law, they send it to the 
Village Executive Officer (VEO) for approval.  One VEO said in an interview that it is against 
state law for the Sungusungu to make and implement laws without permission from local 
government officials.27 After the law is approved by the VEO, Sungusungu can call a general 
village meeting and announce the new law and its penalty. 
 
5.5.2. Dagashida 
While Sungusungu is often referred to as a community army or “the army of ancestors,” 
Dagashida is a local village assembly or “a village parliament.” It is a powerful customary 
                                                 
27 Although Sungusungu is legally recognized by the government, most of its activities must be approved by the 
local the government. 
 
155
institution that regulates access to and control of natural resources. As a very important and 
respected village assembly (Ibanza lya jadi), it is in charge of enacting and enforcing customary 
laws including those addressing environmental protection, adultery, gossip, and behavioral 
norms. The following is a list of some of Dagashida’s responsibilities as explained by 
Dagashida members in focus group discussions: 
1. Mobilizing development activities in the villages, such as digging wells and cleaning up 
dams; 
2.  Supervising environmental  protection activities such as  planting trees; 
3. Working with Sungusungu to provide security in the village; 
4. Punishing those who go against  traditional norms; 
5. Solving different types of conflicts e.g. marriage, water, land, etc.  
6. Enacting and enforcing customary laws. 
 
One Dagashida  chairman said in an interview that Dagashida is open to all men in the 
village. As with Sungusungu, women are not allowed to join Dagashida. Dagashida’s hierarchy 
of authority is organized according to the age-set of village men (Figure 5.12). The Gedabouka, 
is held by the oldest man, 80 years and older. He is regarded as a man of wisdom because he has 
lots of experience. The Gedabouka does not always attend Dagashida meeting because of his 
age, but he is consulted for advice by other members of Dagashida whenever there is a problem 
or issue they can’t resolve. The advice given by the Gedabouka is taken to be the right one and is 
always followed. The chairman (Nyangogo), is usually between the ages of  70 to 80 years.28  
                                                 
28 This is approximate ages of members of each age-set as reported by Dagashida members. The average age in each 
age-set depends on the availability of people in that particular age set. In some cases,   one age set may need to get 
members from a lower age set. 
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His primary function is to make democratic decisions, chair Dagashida meetings and 
supervise all Dagashida activities in the village.  
The position of Basumba batale and  Lutala  are held by men ranging from 60 to 70 years 
old. The Lutala is chosen from Basumba batale, and  he is a facilitator during Dagashida 
meetings. He starts the meeting by announcing the agenda to Dagashida members. Then 
discussion starts where each member is free to contribute to discussions so long as he follows the 
rules. The Lutala makes sure that meeting rules are followed by all the members. For example, 
every member is required to focus on the subject of the meeting for that day, and deviations from 
the subjects are not allowed.  Basumba batale are regarded as the police of the whole group. 
They are the one who read cases and work with the Lutala to make sure that the meeting goes on 
smoothly and everyone has a chance to contribute. They take lead in the implementation of 
Dagashida resolutions and decisions. The group of junior elders (Banamhala) range in age from 
50 to 60 years old. Junior elders act as consultants on what and when to meet, and they give 
directions to the youngest age-set, adult (Bayanda) with ages ranging from 18 to 50 years old. 
The youngest age set implements Dagashida resolutions and enforces customary laws because 
they are younger and energetic. 
Dagashida meetings are normally conducted in an open area or in a partially enclosed 
area.  The village elder or chief calls the Dagashida meeting (Mlenge 2002).  Members of 
Dagashida said that all male village members are allowed to attend and discuss important village 
affairs. Everyone is allowed to speak and give his views before a final decision is made by the 
senior elder based on the views of the majority. This is an opportunity for villagers to express 
their views and formulate rules for managing their water resource such as banning people from  
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doing laundry by the boreholes. During a time of water scarcity, communities reinvigorate rules 
that regulate the amount of water collected and people are not allowed to use the water for their 
gardens. 
 
Figure 5. 12: Dagashida  Hierarchy of Leadership 
. 
Decision making within Dagashida starts with the youngest age-set (Bayanda) who 
discuss an issue until they reach a consensus about what to do and give their joint 
recommendation to junior elders. Junior elders then discuss the issue and pass their 
recommendation to the upper age-set. The same procedure continues to elders. Then the elder 
coordinator will pass the issue to senior elders to who will analyze the different views and 
Most senior elder (Gedabouka) 
Elders (Basumba  batale) 
Junior Elders (Banamhala)  
Adults (Bayanda)  
Senior elders (Nyangogo)
Elder coordinator (Lutala)
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recommendations from different age sets and give their final conclusion based on the view of the 
majority. If the decision is about a new law, then the elders (Basumba batale) are responsible for 
informing villagers about the new law. They can do so through a village meeting where all 
villagers are required to attend, or they can blow a gourd-stem whistle (kalulu) early in the 
morning so everyone in the village can hear about the new law. 
Villagers said that most people in the community cooperate with their elders to monitor 
those who break the rules. The Dagashida is also responsible for enforcing customary laws and 
ruling the cases for offenders. Moreover, the Dagashida plays a crucial role in organizing 
communal work for water management. One example is cleaning of the water source, an 
obligation for all the water users. Each user is expected to take help clean once or several times a 
year, depending on the number of users per water source. Those who don’t take part are fined. In 
some villages, the village council appoints a person to look after peoples’ behavior at the water 
source and report any wrong doing (Drangert 1993). 
Dagashida members said in focus group discussions that they have enacted a number of 
laws to protect the environment. For example, Dagashida forbids people from cutting down 
trees near water sources, prohibits agricultural activities close to sources of water, and prohibits 
burning. Offenders pay a fine of one cow for breaking these rules. Dagashida allocates specific 
areas to be used for grazing and watering livestock.  
Laws for managing common water sources are made by both Sungusungu and 
Dagashida. These laws ban people from bathing or washing clothes by a water source, having 
sexual activities near water sources, or send the livestock to drink water in the water source used 
for home consumption (Dungumaro and Madulu 2002). These laws are closely monitored. 
Violations are regarded as serious offences that are severely punished by a beating or a fine. In 
 
159
the dry season, when water is scarce, communities practice water rationing for each household. 
Dagashida make the decisions regarding water management rules and then the villagers or the 
owners of private wells are in charged with monitoring the water source and making sure that 
the applicable rules are followed. Dagashida may restrict the hours when drawing water  from 
common sources is permitted. The rules for managing private water sources are made by private 
water owners. But these rules are supposed to be in line with customary laws.  Private well 
owners report people to customary institutions for punishment if they fail to follow their rules. 
5.5.3. Clan (Bakaya) 
In Sukumaland, as in many other regions in Tanzania, the clan is made up of members of 
extended family, including cousins, aunts, uncles, sisters, brothers, grandparents and in-laws. 
Each clan (bakaya) is responsible for ensuring that its members follow the customs.  This is 
because an individual’s non-compliance with customary laws may affect the whole family or 
clan. For example, if an individual is fined a cow for his wrong doings in the community, it 
means the individual uses the family’s wealth to pay the fine. If an individual is ostracized, the 
whole household is also ostracized.  Therefore, each clan has devised ways to punish those who 
bring ‘bad luck” or embarrassment to the clan. In addition to customary laws, the clan set their 
own laws that are specific to the needs of the clan. 
A clan meeting is led by clan elders who are in charge of all matters affecting the clan.  
Clan elders are normally the oldest members of the clan. If they call a meeting, each member of 
the clan is supposed to attend. Those who fail to attend without permission are fined. Clan 
members work together to resolve disputes that arise in the clan. They also share different life 
experiences, and work together to enforce customary laws. Wrong doers are punished at the clan 
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meeting. During the meeting, clan elders will stand up, say the names of the offending member, 
and explain their case (Figure 5.13 and 5.14). The rest of the clan members decide the 
appropriate punishment to give. The common forms of punishment include fines (money, cow, 
or goat), strokes,29 or ostracism. 
The decision about the kind of punishment to be given depends on the type of offence, 
the age of the offender, whether it is a repeated offence, and whether an offender confesses his or 
her wrong doings. Younger offenders who don’t have the means to pay fines normally get 
strokes. Repeat offenders get both strokes and fines. Strokes are administered by strong men 
chosen by clan elders. These men are supposed to give very strong strokes because every one 
will be watching to see whether they are being sympathetic by not beating offenders hard.  If the 
beaters are too sympathetic and not beating hard enough, clan elders may order other men in the 
clan to “teach the beaters” how to beat by beating them first. Figure 5.15 and 5.16 shows wrong 
doers being publicly beaten at the clan meeting in front of other clan members. Offenders who 
deny the charges or decline the punishment are ostracized by the clan. They will not be allowed 
to visit, or seek help from other clan members.  An ostracized individual will be excluded from 
the clan until he or she pays a heavy fine and apologizes to the clan. But ostracism from the clan 
does not mean ostracism from the community. An individual who is ostracized by the clan is still 
free to interact with non-clan members.  
 
  
                                                 
29 Strokes in this context refer to beating with a cane. 
 
 
161
Figure 5. 13: A clan elder presiding at the clan meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 14: A clan elder confronting wrong doers 
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Figure 5. 15: A clan meeting discussing cases of wrong doers. The two wrong doers are 
lying down on the floor when their cases are being discussed by the clan. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 16: Wrong doers punished (receiving strokes) at the clan meeting 
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Unlike Sungusungu and Dagashida, Bakaya allow women to attend clan meeting and 
participate in clan activities. However, most of the decisions in the clan meetings are made by 
men. In most cases, women sit and listen while men speak and confront offenders. This was also 
observed by Agarwal (2001), who found that women in India hesitate to oppose males in public, 
or speak up in meetings especially when senior family males are present. 
Although ostracism is widely used by customary institutions, it is worth noting some of 
its shortcomings. Ostracizing an individual hurts not just the outcast, but also his or her family, 
and other community members who interact with him or her.  The fact that people live together 
in community and are dependent on each other, indicate some advantage to grouping, which 
would be reduced by ostracizing a community member. Community members gain from each 
other through social interaction, networking and mutual support externalities, trade, as well as 
productive technology (Hirshleifer and Rasmusen 1989). Moreover, research on ostracism has 
found significant emotional distress among ostracized individuals (Williams et al. 2000). Those 
who are excluded from social groups might experience anxiety, or other forms of emotional 
distress that could cause a short-term impairment of cognitive functioning (Baumeister et al. 
2002). This research observed that ostracism has been very effective to enforce desired social 
behavior. The advantages of using ostracism compensate for its weaknesses explained above.  
Moreover, this research observed that although Dagashida, Sungusungu and Bakaya are separate 
institutions, they are interconnected, and complement each other. As explained earlier, 
Dagashida is made up of all men in the village while Sungusungu is made up of only a few men 
in the village. Likewise Bakaya is made up of clan members whose men may be in the 
Sungusungu and Dagashida. Members of Sungusungu are also members of Dagashida. 
Sungusungu is more into security, policing, patrolling, and guarding to make sure community 
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members are safe, and customary laws are followed. Dagashida is more into monitoring and 
enforcing expected cultural patterns of behavior. Bakaya is more focused on issues within the 
clan only as opposed to Sungusungu and Dagashida which are focused on issued in the whole 
community. The three institutions have one goal in common: ensuring customary laws are 
followed by all community members. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. WATER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS:  COMPLIANCE AND ROLE IN WATER 
ACCESS AND MANAGEMENT 
6.1. Introduction 
The water management laws found in Bariadi district can be divided into three main 
categories: equitable water access laws, prevention of water pollution and abuse laws, and water 
source development laws. This chapter discusses each category of water management laws in 
detail, and presents some statistics about enactment, awareness, compliance with water 
management laws, and the role of statutory and customary institution in water access for 
different types of water use. As discussed in chapter five, laws for managing water resources in 
Bariadi district can be enacted by customary institutions, statutory institutions, and water-user 
groups. Each of these institutions is likely to have strong orientation to some types of laws which 
will be interesting to analyze.  
6. 2. Equitable Water Access Laws 
  According to Fisher (1989), the concept of equity involves getting a “fair share,” not 
necessarily an “equal share.” What is regarded as a “fair share” varies according to different 
situations (and different cultures). This definition has two implications. First, the concept of 
equity in resource access entails differences in the benefits received from the resources by 
different groups of people. This difference can be due to differences in people’s contribution and 
efforts in the development and management of the resource. If the distribution of benefits from 
the resource is perceived to be “fair,” then it may be regarded as equitable access. Second, this 
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definition suggests that measuring equity should incorporate the society’s customs, norms, and 
values. However, some values, customs, and norms tend to discriminate against some groups in 
the society.  Therefore, although this research will draw on this definition, it will depart from it 
in different ways as explained below.  
In this research, equitable water access refers to fair and just water access among the 
population. Equitable water access is achieved when there is non-discriminatory access to water 
for all, though water users assume certain responsibility as a condition of use. Through equitable 
water access, community members are not restricted to access water on the basis of gender, race, 
ethnicity, or socio-economic status. Important to the issue of equity in resource allocation is the 
representation of marginal groups in resource management and access, as well as opportunities 
for these groups to actually influence decision making (Agarwal 2001; Sarin 1998). This 
research found that both customary and statutory institutions are concerned with the need of 
every community member to have access to water. In the case of developed water sources, 
water-user groups reported that each member who participated in the development of the water 
sources was entitled to an equal share of the benefits from the water source. 
6. 2.1. Equitable Access to Domestic Water  
Developed water sources managed by water-user groups allow every member of water-
user group to have access to water. Each member of water-user groups is required to pay a one-
time membership fee, plus an annual maintenance fee.  The amount of membership and annual 
fees varies from one water-user groups to another, depending on the number of households in the 
water-user group and the maintenance needs of the water source. The average membership fee is 
5,000 Tanzania shillings (about US$5) and the annual maintenance fee is about Tanzania 
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shillings 200(US$ 0.2) per household. These fees are deposited in a bank account and the money 
is used for repairing the water pump and treating the water whenever need arises. In some 
instances, households are required to contribute additional money if a major repair is needed and 
the money in the bank account is insufficient. 
              The only local government by-law related to the equitable access of water require 
members of water-user groups to grant access to water for marginalized individuals who live 
close to the well. Punishment for those who don’t follow this rule is up to 5,000 Tanzania 
shillings (US$5), or up to six months of jail time or both. Many  water-user groups reported 
granting “free” access to  household that are the  poorest, disabled, and elderly who cant afford 
the membership and annual  fee, or  non-financial contributions to the water-user group. 
Likewise, customary law provides for those who are unable to participate in the development of 
water sources because of age, disability, or sicknesses. Individuals like these are put through a 
critical scrutiny before they are granted free access to developed water sources. The water-user 
group will call a meeting and discuss whether an individual qualifies for free water or not. In 
some situations, those who are unable to give financial contributions because of severe poverty 
are asked to give contributions in kind, such as sweeping the area by the water source.30  
In the dry season, there is a significant reduction in water flow from most of the wells.  
At this time of the year, water-user groups can decide that each household will receive an equal 
number of buckets31 regardless of the household size, status, gender, or income. The water guard 
on duty is charged with ensuring that every household gets water. Those who have bigger 
                                                 
30 This is consistent with Thoms et al. (2003) who observed that successful resource management requires the 
capacity for effective exclusion, otherwise a resource can become open access with little or no control on rates of 
resource extraction. 
31 A bucket is a twenty liter container. 
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household size are advised to join more than one water-user group. The number of buckets 
depends on the amount of water a well can produce each day and the number of households in 
that water-user group.   
In focus group discussions, water-user group members said that during severe water 
shortages, the average number of buckets entitled to each household in dry season ranged from 
two to five buckets per household, equivalent to 40 to 100 liters per day per household. One of 
the drawbacks of the equal distribution of domestic water is large household get equal share with 
those with small household size. On the other hand, having an equal amount of water for every 
household ensures that every one will reap the fruits of their labor regardless of gender, income, 
household size or status because they all contribute equally in terms of financial contribution, 
time, and energy. They all dug the well, they all pay the same amount of membership and 
maintenance fee, and they all work together to manage their water sources. So they are all 
entitled to equal share of the benefits. 
Moreover, everyone is required to stand in queue and wait for their turn to draw water or 
water their livestock if the water source is public.  Standing in queue creates order and prevents a 
scramble for water, which may lead to spilling.  Figure 6.1 shows women and girls standing in 
queue waiting for other members of water-user group to come so they can distribute water 
equally among member households.  I observed women queue their buckets at the well 
depending on who came first. Discussion with water-user groups, customary institutions, local 
government officials, ministry of water officials, and village elders revealed that laws made by 
water-user groups are also customary laws, because water-user groups use their customs and 
norms to enact their laws. These laws are also consistent with customary laws enacted by 
customary institutions.  
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Figure 6. 1: Women standing in queue waiting for other members of water-user     
                      group to come so they can distribute water equally 
 
 
Table 6.1 reports equitable water access laws that are specific for domestic water use 
obtained from the household survey.  The table shows that customary laws related to equitable 
water access are mainly for natural and undeveloped sources of water. This research expected to 
find this because the development of water sources came after natural water sources. Key 
informants reported that most water sources were developed after independence in 1961. Before 
that, most people relied on natural water sources for their water needs. The increase of human 
and livestock population pressure stressed natural water sources, a factor that necessitated 
community members developing water sources.  
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Table 6. 1: Equitable Access to Domestic Water Laws  
 
Regulations Who enacted regulation (percent) 
 
Statutory 
institutions 
Customary  
institutions 
Water-user 
groups 
 
Every member of water-user group has access to 
water. Non-members are excluded 
0.0 25.1 74.9 
Every one need to stand in queue and wait for their  
turn to draw water 0.0 35.8 64.2 
Equal number of 20 liter buckets for each household 0.0 17.0 83.0 
Equal access to natural water sources for all 
community members  0.0 90.7 9.3 
Household that are so poor, sick or old and can’t 
afford money contribution to  water-user group are 
granted free water access by the water-user group 
0.0 92.0 8.0 
Equal access to private water source as long as you  
ask for permission from well owner 
 
0.0 100.0 0.0 
 
In an interview with a district water engineer, he said that the establishment of water-user 
groups and the development of shallow wells by water-user groups in Bariadi district started in 
the 1990’s. Before that, community members relied on a few shallow wells that were developed 
by the central government after independence. In focus groups, women said that most of these 
shallow wells were not properly managed and maintained, so most of them ceased to work. 
Local government officials explained that after independence, the government was responsible 
for developing and managing water resources in the country. But due to the Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of 1980s, the government was forced to reduce its expenditure on 
water infrastructure. At the same time, community members continued thinking that provision of 
water was the responsibility of the central government. Hence most shallow wells ceased to work 
because of lack of proper maintenance and money to manage them. Moreover, table 6.1 shows 
that most laws are enacted by customary institutions and water-user groups. Respondents were 
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not aware of any equitable domestic water access law enacted by statutory institutions.  
Six major equitable water access laws for domestic water uses were identified from 
household survey as shown in table 6.1. First, is the law that requires water-user group members 
to have equal access to water. About 25 percent of respondents said this law was enacted by 
customary institutions, and 75 percent said the law was enacted by water-user groups. Second, is 
the law that requires every one to stand in queue and wait for their turn to draw water. About 36 
percent of respondents said this law was enacted by customary institutions, and 64 percent said 
the law was enacted by water-user groups.  Third, is the law that requires each household to 
extract equal number buckets per day. About 17 percent of respondents said this law was enacted 
by customary institutions, and 83 percent said the law was enacted by water-user groups. This 
was expected because discussion with water-user groups revealed that they make most of laws 
about how water is distributed. Fourth, is the law that allows community members equal access 
to natural water sources like rivers, springs, and ponds. The majority of respondents (90.7 
percent) said this law was enacted by customary institutions, and only 9.3 percent said the law 
was enacted by water-user groups. This result is consistent with information from focus group 
discussion, participant observations, and key informants. Fifth, is the law that requires water-user 
groups to grant “free” water access to households that are very poor, sick, or old, and can’t afford 
financial contribution to water-user groups. The majority of respondents (92 percent) said this 
law was enacted by customary institutions. Only 8 percent said the law was enacted by water-
user groups. Discussion with local government officials, district water engineers, and secondary 
data about by-laws obtained from the district water offices shows that  this law was also enacted 
by the local government to ensure that every community member have access to safe  drinking 
water. However, this research observed that this by-law exist on paper only because none of the 
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respondents said that this law was enacted by the local government as table 6.1 shows. Local 
government officials acknowledged that it is hard for them to create awareness and enforce most 
of the by-laws they enact because of lack of financial and human resources.  
Six, is the law that require private well- owners to share their water with other 
community members, if community members ask for permission.  All the respondents said that 
this law was enacted by customary institutions. This research expected to find this because 
similar information was revealed from focus groups discussions, key informant interviews, and 
participant observations. Also during field work, I was able to draw water occasionally from a 
private well owned by one of my church members.  I asked for permission, and the well owner 
allowed me to draw two buckets because the well didn’t produce much water. Details on why 
private well owners were expected to share their water were provided in chapter five.   
This result implies customary institutions are strong in laws related to water access from 
natural sources, while water-user groups are strong on ensuring equitable access to water from 
developed sources. The result also shows that local government has weak laws relating to the 
equitable water allocation in rural areas. Access to private water sources for domestic use is 
mediated by customary law where private well owners are expected to share their water to 
community members, and where community members are also required to ask for permission 
before drawing water. 
6.2.1.1. Quantity of Drinking Water Extracted by Households 
Access to safe water for domestic use (both quality and quantity) is essential for human 
health. This section investigates how different groups of people obtain access to water in dry 
season.  
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These groups include female versus males, irrigators versus non irrigators, livestock 
keepers versus non-livestock keepers, those with main house roofed with corrugated iron sheets 
versus those without, and those who own farm land versus those who don’t.  Access to water was 
measured by the quantity and quality of water extracted by each group in dry season. This 
section deals with the quantity of water. The quality of water is analyzed in section 6.1.1.2.  
Rural communities in Bariadi district often struggle to gain access to water for domestic 
use in dry season because there is a reduction of water flow in most of water sources.  Table 6.2 
presents data from household survey which shows the quantity of water extracted in the dry 
season for domestic use per day, from all water sources, and by different groups of people. The 
table indicates that customary institutions have been successful in allocating water among 
different groups of people. Access to domestic water among households is fairly equal.  
The majority of households in all categories extract 6 to 10 buckets of water per day in 
the dry season. This includes male-headed households (42.2 percent) and female-headed 
households (44.7 percent), those who irrigate (46.1 percent) and those who don’t (42.9 percent), 
those who own land (43 percent) and those who don’t own land (44. 8 percent),   livestock 
keepers (47.5 percent) and non-livestock keepers (38.6 percent), those with corrugated iron 
sheets on their main house (46 percent) and those without (36 percent). In all the above 
categories, fewer households extract more than 15 buckets per day. 
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Table 6. 2: Quantity of Water Extracted in the Dry Season for Domestic Use per Day from 
All Water Sources by Different Groups of People 
 
Characteristics 
 
 
Number of  buckets extracted per household per day in the dry 
season (percentages) 
 
 2 -5 6 -10 11 -15 16 -20 21 - 25 26 -30 Total 
 
Gender        
Males 38.4 42.2 15.2 0.0 2.1 2.1 100.0 
Females 26.5 44.7 20.2 2.3 3.7 3.0 100.0 
Total 29.3 44.0 18.8 1.7 3.3 2.8 100.0 
 
Do you irrigate?        
No 34.2 42.9 15.1 2.3 2.3 3.1 100.0 
Yes 17.6 46.1 28.5 0.0 5.9 1.9 100.0 
Total 29.4 43.8 18.9 1.7 3.4 2.8 100.0 
 
Do you own farm land?        
No 50.0 44.8 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Yes 29.7 43.4 18.4 2.1 3.4 3.0 100.0 
Total 31.3 43.5 17.4 1.9 3.2 2.7 100.0 
 
Do you own livestock?        
No 54.2 38.6 6.3 1.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Yes 17.2 47.5 24.6 1.6 4.9 4.0 100.0 
Total 33.5 43.5 16.5 1.4 2.8 2.3 100.0 
 
Type of roof for the 
main house        
Grass or earth 46.6 36.2 12.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Corrugated iron sheets 28.8 46.3 18.1 1.25 3.1 2.5 100.0 
Total 33.5 43.6 16.5 1.48 2.8 2.3 100.0 
                
 
6.2.1.2. Quality of Drinking Water Extracted by Households 
 
The lack of safe drinking water poses a health risk to all societies. Many people in 
Tanzania have little water to use especially in the dry season and some use contaminated water. 
This contributes a lot to the increase in water-borne diseases.  
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It is estimated that 15 million out of 34.5 million Tanzanians currently lack access to safe 
drinking water (Malangalila 2003). Likewise, access of safe drinking water supply in the Bariadi 
district is still a major problem. For example, figure 6.2 and 6.3 shows women drawing water 
from polluted springs. One woman said in an interview that sometimes people are forced to use 
unsafe water for drinking because safe drinking water sources do not produce enough water in 
dry season.  This section analyzes the quality of water accessed by rural households in Bariadi 
district. The quality of water was determined by collecting data on the incidence of water-borne 
diseases in the community at each sampled household. The secondary data obtained from the 
regional water office (Shinyanga region) shows that only 50.6 percent of the total population of 
Bariadi district has access to safe drinking water supply (Table 6.3). 
 
Table 6. 3:  Safe Drinking Water Supply Coverage in Bariadi District 
 
Bariadi district Population 
Population served 
with water 
Percent 
coverage 
Rural 576,810 295,784 51.3 
Urban   28,599   10,500 36.7 
Total 605,409 306,284 50.6 
 
Source: Shinyanga Regional Water Office 2005. 
 
 
This research was conducted during the dry season when some safe drinking water 
sources supplied less supply due to reduction of water flow. I observed people waiting for hours 
at the shallow wells and springs just to extract one bucket of water. This forces many people to 
use unsafe water, or use less water than needed for sanitation. The household survey conducted 
by this research indicates that that 6 percent of all adult members of sampled households (15 
years and above) have suffered from water-borne disease, such as cholera, diarrhea, and typhoid 
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during the previous three months. About 10 percent of other family members in the sampled 
households have suffered from water borne disease during the previous three months.  
 
Figure 6. 2: A woman drawing water from a spring 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 3: A woman drawing water from a spring 
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Thus, efforts also need to be directed at developing water supply in rural areas where 
people have less access to water. Efforts to develop more shallow wells, deep wells and 
boreholes to tape underground water are a pragmatic strategy that is likely to increase the 
availability of safe water in Bariadi district. To achieve this grand task, the government needs to 
have more effective governance processes, improved capacity and adequate financing 
(Malangalila 2003). Additionally, greater attention to the rural water supply is needed. Rural 
development policies should focus on reducing poverty and improving access to safe drinking 
water.  At the village level, support for water-user groups and customary institutions can 
contribute to water security.  
6.2.2. Equitable Access to Livestock Water  
 In focus group discussions villagers said that every community member has the right to 
use natural water sources for irrigation and livestock watering. If an individual or group develops 
the water source, then they will have the right to exclude others who did not participate in its 
development. But, the principle of reciprocity among the Sukuma forces private well owners to 
share water with their neighbors and relatives. Access to water for livestock is regulated either by 
customary institutions, or by rules made by livestock keepers. Table 6.4 shows that equal access 
to natural water sources is granted to all community members. About 69 percent of respondents 
reported that the laws were enacted by customary institutions and 31 percent by livestock 
keepers themselves. Respect for each livestock keeper is another important aspect of livestock 
watering, especially in the dry season when water supplies are limited. Livestock keepers are 
required to queue their animals and take turns watering them. This reduces the incidence of 
fighting among animals and mixing up of animals.  Also about 77 percent of respondents 
reported that the laws regarding queuing were enacted by customary institutions, and 23 percent 
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by livestock keepers themselves. As is the case with domestic water use, access to private water 
sources for livestock watering is mediated by customary law where private well owners are 
expected to share their water with other livestock keepers so long as they ask for permission 
from well owners. The weakness of statutory law for livestock water allocation is seen here 
because no one was aware of them. This was also revealed through discussion with livestock 
keepers who reported that  access and management of water for livestock watering is regulated 
by customary laws and rules made by livestock keepers themselves.  Moreover, discussion with 
village executive officers revealed that villagers observe customary laws. 
Table 6. 4: Equitable Access to Livestock Water Laws 
 
Regulations Who enacted regulation (percent) 
  
Statutory  
institutions 
Customary  
institutions 
Water 
users 
Every community member have equal access to 
natural water sources for animal watering 0.0 69.0 31.0 
Livestock keepers need to queue their animals 
and take turns to water them 0.0 77.0 23.0 
Equal access to private water source as long as 
you ask for permission from well owner 0.0 100.0 0.0 
 
6.2.3. Equitable Access to Irrigation Water  
 Irrigation in the Bariadi district is mainly a small-scale traditional system. Surface 
irrigation is a predominant type of irrigation where the majority of irrigators use flood irrigation 
or rainwater harvesting especially for paddy rice. Rainwater harvesting is defined as methods of 
collecting, storing, and conserving rainwater and local surface runoff for agriculture or domestic 
use (Boers and Ben-Asher 1982; Kunze 2000).  This research observed that a few small-scale 
irrigators use river diversion, and some use mechanized/treadle pumps that can pump water from 
a depth of eight meters (Figure 6.4). I also observed that the majority of small-scale irrigators 
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who grow fruits and vegetables use hand-lifted buckets as shown in (Figure 6.5) because 
mechanized pumps are expensive.  
Figure 6. 4: The author standing by a mechanized pump used to irrigate corn.  
                    Water is pumped from a well by pedaling the pump. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 5: Irrigation by the use of hand-lifted buckets  
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  As is the case for all natural water sources, natural sources of irrigation water are free for 
everyone.  In focus group discussions with irrigators, they said that rain water that falls on one’s 
paddy belongs to the owner of that paddy, and other people are not allowed or “steal” water from 
one’s own paddy. Rain water is supposed to flow naturally to the paddy, no one is allowed to 
block or re-direct the flow of water. Those whose paddy is located away from flowing water are 
required to seek permission from upstream paddy owners before they can redirect the flow of 
rain water. Household survey data in Table 6.5 shows that all the laws for equitable access to 
irrigation water were enacted by customary institutions. Those who have private shallow wells 
for irrigation have the exclusive right to the water. This indicates the strength of customary 
institutions in the management of irrigation water. Statutory laws may exist on paper, but local 
community members are not aware of them. 
Table 6. 5: Equitable Access to Irrigation Water Laws 
 
Regulations 
Who enacted regulation 
(percent) 
  
Statutory 
institutions 
Customary  
institutions 
Every community member have equal access to natural 
water sources used for irrigation 0.0 100.0 
Rain water that enters in  ones paddy belongs to the owner of 
that paddy, don’t steal 0.0 100.0 
Not to block the natural flow of water to  other peoples 
paddy 0.0 100.0 
Equal access to private water source as long as you ask for 
permission from well owner 0.0 100.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
181
6.2.4. Compliance with Equitable Water Access Laws 
Table 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8 uses data from household survey to report the compliance with 
equitable water access laws for domestic, livestock and irrigation water respectively. Compliance 
with customary and water-user groups laws is high in all three water uses because respondents 
reported that the majority or all community members complied with these laws. This research 
observed through participant observation and photographing that most people comply with these 
laws.  It is difficult for people not to comply because most shallow wells have a guard, and also 
community members watch each other.  
I also observed that people knew that they were supposed to queue and wait until every 
member of water-user group come so they can distribute water equally. This suggests that when 
community members participate to enact the law, they are more likely to comply as observed by 
Ostrom (1990). The difference in the level of compliance between customary laws and those 
enacted by water-user groups is not significant. This suggests that water-user groups and 
customary laws are effective in ensuring equitable water access to community members. The 
results also show that water-user groups are prominent in the management of domestic water. 
They have a limited role in managing irrigation water as shown in table 6.8.  
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Table 6. 6: Compliance with Equitable Access to Domestic Water  Laws  
 
Water access law and legislature Level of compliance 
(percent comply) 
 None Some Majority All 
Only members of water-user groups have access to 
water 
  
  
                                            Customary institutions 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
                                             Water-user groups 0.0 0.0 9.1 90.9 
 Every one needs to stand in the queue and wait for 
their  turn to draw water     
                                             Customary institutions   0.0 2.9 60.0 37.1 
                                             Water- user groups 0.0 0.0 60.7 39.3 
 Equal access to natural water sources for all 
community members     
                                             Customary institutions 0.0 0.0 3.1 96.9 
                                             Water-user groups 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Equal number of 20 liter buckets for each household     
                                             Customary institutions 0.0 0.0 12.5 87.5 
                                             Water- user groups 0.0 9.4 15.1 75.5 
Household that are so poor, sick or old and cant afford 
money contribution to  water-user group should be  
granted free water access      
                                            Customary institutions 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
                                            Water-user groups 0.0 0.0 25.0 75.0 
 
 
Table 6. 7: Compliance with Equitable Access to Livestock Water Laws 
 
Water access law and legislature Level of compliance 
(percent comply) 
  None Some Majority All 
 
Livestock keepers need to queue their animals 
and take turns to water them 
    
    
                           Customary institutions 0.0 18.2 60.0 24.9 
                           Water-user groups 0.0   0.0 49.5 50.5 
 
Every community member have equal access to 
natural water sources  for animal watering  
 
  
                           Customary institutions 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
                           Water-user groups 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
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Table 6. 8: Compliance with Equitable Access to Irrigation Water Laws 
Water access law and legislature Level of compliance 
(percent comply) 
  None Some Majority All 
 
Every community member has equal access to 
natural water sources used for irrigation 
    
    
                  Customary institutions 
 
0.0 0.0 7.9 
 
92.1 
 
 
Rain water that enters in  one’s paddy belongs 
to the owner of that paddy, don’t steal it  
 
  
                  Customary institutions 
 
0.0 0.0 93.9 
 
6.1 
 
 
Not to block the natural flow of water to  other 
peoples paddy farms     
                 Customary institutions 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
 
 
 
6.3. Prevention of Water Pollution and Abuse Laws 
 Water pollution refers to the degradation of water quality or its contamination by harmful 
wastes.  The degradation of water has a big impact on public health.  The causes of water 
pollution can be both direct and indirect. Direct water pollution occurs when people dump 
effluent into water sources. This includes effluent outfalls from factories, refineries, waste 
treatment plants, and domestic wastes that are dumped directly into water sources. Indirect water 
pollution occurs when waste from soils or groundwater systems and from the atmosphere (via 
rain water) finds its way into water sources. Soil and groundwater may be contaminated by 
agricultural practices (fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides), or by sewage and industrial waste. 
Emissions from automobiles or factories can also cause water contamination (Ng 1989).  On the 
other hand, water abuse refers to the unlawful or wrongful use of water. Water abuse may 
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include unneccessary spilling of water, or the improper use of water, such as watering livestock 
at a drinking water source.   
6.3.1. Prevention of Domestic Water Pollution and Abuse Laws 
To prevent pollution, each person is required to remove their shoes at the entrance of the 
water source, which is always surrounded by a live fence (linala) with an entrance (Figure 6.6). 
Shoes are believed to be dirty because people may step on things that may contaminate the 
water. Although there are some few people in Bariadi who don’t have shoes, people believe that 
bare feet are cleaner than shoes because  people who walk bare footed clean their feet if they 
happen to step on  a dirty substance. Table 6.9 shows that about 57 percent of households 
reported this law was enacted by water-user groups and 42 percent reported the law was enacted 
by customary institutions. No household reported that the law was enacted by statutory 
institutions. But, discussion with district water engineers, and secondary data obtained from the 
district water office shows that this is one of the local government by-laws. This shows that the 
local government by-laws are not well known by rural people. This is the same case for the other 
laws related to prevention of domestic water pollution and abuse reported in table 6.9. 
Table 6. 9: Prevention of Domestic Water Pollution and Abuse 
  
Regulations Who enacted regulation (percent) 
 
Statutory 
institutions 
Customary 
institutions 
Water-user 
groups 
No shoes at the water source 0.0 42.9 57.1 
No washing or bathing at the water source 0.0 32.4 67.6 
No animal grazing or  watering around the water 
source 0.0 23.5 76.5 
No children less than 10 years at the water 
source 0.0 9.7 90.3 
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To avoid pump damage and pollution at the water source, no children under ten years of 
age are allowed at the water source, unless accompanied by adults.  Data from the household 
survey, participant observation, and water-user groups shows that the water pump is too high for 
children. Children may also play, fight, spill water, or urinate or defecate at the water source.   In 
the household survey, respondents explained that while this law helps to extend the life of the 
water pump, it has some drawbacks: 
     “Children will grow up lazy without knowing how to fetch water, it is bad for girls” 
     “It is a burden to women who need the help from children” 
     “It reduces household labor to fetch water and affects household sanitation” 
     “If you are sick, you have to ask a neighbor to accompany your children to the well” 
 
This is consistent with information obtained from focus group discussion with women. 
Women said that this law has put more work on them. They have to either have to find an adult 
to accompany their children to the water sources, go with their children to draw water, or draw 
water by themselves. Table 6.9 shows that about a third of respondents reported the existence of 
this law. The majority (90 percent) reported that the law was enacted by water-user group 
members, and only 10 percent reported that the law was enacted by a customary institution. No 
respondent reported that the law was enacted by statutory institutions. 
Animal watering, washing or bathing at the water source is also prohibited. Animal 
watering is supposed to be done at rivers (figure 6.7), ponds, dams, or private wells. This law 
aims at preventing the pollution of water by livestock faeces and the potential damage that can be 
done to water pumps and live fences by animals.   
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Likewise, washing and bathing at the water source is prohibited because it attracts flies, 
and soapy water can kill the live fences surrounding the water source. In the household survey, 
respondents reported that this law had some disadvantages: 
“It is tiresome to fetch water that will be enough for washing clothes at home,           
  some people live far from water source;” 
“You waste a lot of time and energy to fetch water for washing clothes at home  
  because you need a lot of water;” 
“Large families find it difficult to get enough water for everyone to shower at  
  home and get  enough water for washing clothes.” 
 
In focus group discussions, women said that they have to draw water and wash at home, a 
factor that increases their work. But, women agree that their huge burden for domestic water 
supply is less important than water pollution issues. They said it is worth for them to work more 
and provide clean water for their families, than to work less and get unclean water that may 
cause diseases and even deaths to their children. As in the case for other laws, data from the 
household survey in table 6.9 shows that laws related to water pollution and abuse were enacted 
predominantly by water-user groups who manage group-developed water sources. Customary 
institutions have also enacted laws prohibiting washing, bathing and watering animals at wells 
for drinking.  
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Figure 6. 6: No shoes are allowed at the drinking water source.  
                    Everyone have to remove their shoes when entering the water source area 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 7: Cattle drinking water in a river 
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6.3.2. Prevention of Livestock Water Pollution and Abuse Laws  
Household survey data in table 6.10 shows that most of the laws adopted to prevent 
pollution and abuse of livestock water sources were enacted by customary institutions.  
Discussion with livestock keepers revealed that the major sources for livestock water are public 
water sources, which are regulated by customary institutions. Other sources such as private wells 
are mainly used during the dry season when water from public sources is not enough. Data from 
the household survey shows that customary laws prohibit dumping trash, bathing, or washing 
clothes, urinating, and defecating by the water source. All these activities could contaminate the 
water and affect the health of livestock. Table 6.10 shows that respondents were not aware of any 
regulation from statutory institutions. 
 
Table 6. 10: Prevention of Livestock Water Pollution and Abuse Laws  
 
 Who enacted regulation (percent) 
 Regulations 
Statutory 
institutions 
Customary  
n institutions Water users 
Don’t urinate or defecate by the water source 0.0 92.0 8.0 
No dumping trash at the animal drinking water 
source 0.0 100.0 0.0 
No bathing or washing at the animal water source 0.0 43.0 57.0 
 
6.3.3. Prevention of Irrigation Water Pollution and Abuse Laws  
 Data from the household survey show that most irrigators in the Bariadi district (72 
percent) are rice growers who use rainwater. The remaining 28 percent use water from rivers, 
ponds and shallow wells. Those who use rain water reported that there is no any law to prevent 
the pollution of rainwater. Data from household survey on table 6.11 shows that irrigators who 
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use water from surface or underground water reported two laws to prevent the pollution and 
abuse of irrigation water. First, customary laws require up-stream irrigators not to use chemicals 
because the chemicals may be washed downstream and affect other water users. The second law 
prohibits people from dumping trash in the water because it will pollute the water used to irrigate 
fruits and vegetables, which may affect the health of people who eat them. These laws were 
enacted by customary institutions.  No respondent was aware of statutory law for prevention of 
pollution and abuse of irrigation water sources.  
Table 6. 11: Prevention of Irrigation Water Pollution and Abuse Laws 
 
 
 
 
6.3.4. Compliance with Prevention of Water Pollution and Abuse Laws  
  Household survey data in table 6.12 reports the level of compliance with the prevention 
of pollution and abuse of domestic water sources. Compliance with customary and water-user 
groups laws is high. The level of compliance with laws related to water pollution and abuse is 
similar with those for equitable water allocation. The high level of compliance may be due to the 
participation of the local communities in enacting and enforcing customary laws. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Regulations 
Statutory  
institutions 
Customary  
institutions
No chemicals fertilizers, herbicides or pesticides  in 
upstream lands 0.0 100.0 
No dumping at  the water source 0.0 100.0 
 
190
Table 6. 12: Compliance with Prevention of Domestic Water Pollution and Abuse  
 
Compliance with laws related to the prevention of livestock water pollution and abuse 
was obtained from household survey data as reported in table 6.13. Compliance with livestock 
water law is generally high because table 6.13 shows that majority of people complied with these 
laws.  Although customary laws forbids the use of chemicals by water sources,  irrigators said in 
focus group discussion that high compliance with this law is due to the fact most of them use 
manures and traditional herbicides rather than chemicals because chemicals are expensive and 
also pollute water. Table 6.14 shows that the majority of people complied with prevention of 
pollution and abuse of irrigation water.  
 
Prevention of domestic water pollution and 
abuse  law  and legislature 
Level of compliance 
(percent comply) 
 None Some Majority All 
 
No shoes at the water source     
                Customary institutions 2.0 6.0 45.0 47.0 
               Water-user groups 0.0 8.0 44.0 48.0 
 
No washing or bathing at the water source     
                Customary institutions 0.0 2.0 48.0 50.0 
                Water-user groups 0.0 5.0 50.0 45.0 
 
No animal grazing or  watering around the 
water source     
                Customary institutions 0.0 2.0 58.0 37.0 
                Water-user groups 0.0 5.0 48.0 50.0 
 
No children less than 10 years old at the 
water source     
                Customary institutions 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 
                Water-user groups 0.0 1.8 41.1 57.1 
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Table 6. 13: Compliance with Prevention of Livestock Water Pollution and Abuse Laws 
Prevention of livestock water pollution and abuse  
law  and legislature  Level of compliance 
(percent comply) 
  None Some Majority All 
      
No urinating or defecating by the water source     
                  Customary institutions 0.0 15.4 69.2 15.4
 
No dumping trash at the animal drinking water 
source     
                  Customary institutions 0.0 4.8 76.2 19.1
 
No bathing or washing at the animal water source     
                  Customary institutions 0.0 16.7 50.0 33.3
                  Water users 0.0 0.0 42.9 57.1
 
 
Table 6. 14: Compliance with Prevention of Irrigation Water Pollution and Abuse Laws 
Prevention of irrigation water pollution and 
abuse  law  and legislature  
Level of compliance 
(percent comply) 
  None  Some  Majority  All  
 
No chemicals fertilizers, herbicides or 
pesticides  in upstream lands     
                  Customary institutions 0.0 20.0 80.0 0.0 
 
No dumping at  the water source     
                  Customary institutions 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
 
6.4. Development of Water Sources 
The development of water sources refers to the act of establishing, improving or 
maintaining the water source by expanding, enlarging, or refining in order to ensure a continuous 
supply of quality water. Examples of water development activities include digging a new well, 
repairing a broken water pump, and treating the water source. 
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6.4.1. Development of Domestic Water Sources  
Water for domestic use can be obtained from natural and developed water sources. Water 
sources developed by water-user groups have rules to ensure a continuous supply of water. Data 
from the household survey and participant observation shows that each household member 
belonging to water-user group is supposed to participate in the rotational guarding of the water 
source.  The major responsibility of the guard is to make sure that non-members do not get 
access to water, that the water source is kept clean, that the water pump is used properly, that 
water is not abused, and that all the rules are followed. In times of water shortage, the guard is 
responsible to make sure that each household gets an equal number of buckets.  
In focus group discussions, water-user group members said that the decision about how 
much water to be extracted by each household is made by the water-user group. The guard 
counts the number of buckets extracted by each household to make sure that no one exceeds the 
number of buckets set by the water-user group. I also observed that most shallow well have locks 
and need to be locked and unlocked at specific times.  In focus group discussion, water-user 
groups said that the guard on duty unlocks the pump from 7.00 am to 12.00 pm, and from 3.00 
pm to 6.00 pm. The rest of the time the water source is locked and no one can draw water. This 
was consistent with the information obtained from participant observation.  There was no one at 
the well drawing water from 12.00 pm to 3.00 pm and after 6.00 pm. Most shallow wells 
observed at this time were locked. Only guards were present at the well during 12.00 pm to 3.00 
pm, after they had taken their lunch.  Water-user groups, village executive officers, district water 
engineers, and  household survey respondents said that the major reason for this law is to let the 
water pump to rest,  so it is not over used, to allow the guard time to get lunch and rest, and so 
the well can accumulate more water.  Water-user groups said that the key for the water sources 
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circulates among member household. When a household gets the key, they keep it for three days, 
while guarding, cleaning, and unlocking the water source at the time specified by the water-user 
group. After three days, the key is passed to another household, and the circle continues. The 
guard reports any offender to the water committee.  
Data from the household survey in table 6.15 shows different laws for development of 
drinking water sources. The table indicates that 94 percent of respondents reported that the law 
that require water-user group members to participate in rotational guarding of  water sources was 
enacted by water-user groups, and 6 percent said it was enacted by customary institutions.  This 
shows the strength of water-user groups in protecting their water sources. Data from the district 
water office shows that the local government bylaw requires water-user groups to take steps to 
protect their water source from theft and damage. The water-user groups decide what laws to 
enact and how to protect and develop their water sources.  In focus group discussions, villagers 
said that they were not aware of this local government by-law. However, household survey data 
shows that 95.8 percent of respondents reported that water-user group has enacted a law that 
requires each member household to contribute some money for maintenance and treatment of the 
water source. In focus group discussion, water-user groups reported that those who don’t 
contribute are prohibited to draw water and risk to lose their membership.  
To ensure that the water-user groups  always has money for maintenance of the water 
source, household  survey respondents reported that each water-user group is required by the 
local government  to open a bank account with an initial deposit of no less than Tanzania 
shillings 60,000 ( about  US$ 60) and maintain the bank account with monthly deposit.  In focus 
group discussion, most of water-user groups reported that they contributed 100 to 200 Tanzanian 
shillings (about US$ 0.1 to 0.2) per month per member household. In addition to this monthly 
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contribution, members of water-user groups are required to contribute some money whenever a 
major repair or water treatment is needed, and the amount of money in bank is not sufficient. 
Water-user groups members decide how much money to deposit in the bank account every 
month. They also decide how much money each household needs to contribute, depending on the 
cost of water treatment or maintenance. Data from household survey on table 6.15 shows that 
100 percent of respondents reported that the law that require water-user groups to open a bank 
account was enacted by the local government. Similar reports were obtained from discussion 
with key informants, from water-user groups, village executive officers, and district water 
engineers 
Table 6. 15: Development of Domestic Water Source Laws 
Regulations Who enacted regulation (percent) 
  
Statutory 
institutions 
Customary 
institutions 
Water-user 
groups 
Every household must participate to guard the 
water source by a system of rotation 0.0 5.8 94.2 
Every household must contribute some money for 
maintenance  or treatment of the water source 1.7 2.5 95.8 
Every water-user group must  open a bank 
account  and maintain it  100.0 0.0 0.0 
Every water source must be fenced with  live 
fence  100.0 0.0 0.0 
Every water-user group must have a land right to 
the water source area 100.0 0.0 0.0 
 
   Other water development laws reported by household survey respondents include the law 
that required water-user group to plant a live fence around the water source. All the respondents 
(100 percent) reported that this law was enacted by the local government in Bariadi district. This 
research observed shallow wells managed by water-user groups were surrounded by live fence as 
shown in figure 6.8 and 6.9.  
 
195
Figure 6. 8: A water pump with a live fence around it 
 
 
 
Figure 6. 9:Women pumping water fom a shallow well. Note the live fence 
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Water-user groups and village executive officers said the live fence protects the water 
source from strong winds and animals that may destroy the pump, and creates a boundary and a 
land tenure mark for the area owned by water-user group. They also said that they would lose the 
water pump if the district water officers find out that there is no live fence surrounding the 
shallow well. Moreover, household survey data show that every water-user group is required to 
obtain a land right to the area around the water source. In focus group discussions with water-
user groups, and in interviews with a district water engineers, they said that once a formal land 
right has been obtained, water-user groups become legal owners of the water source and the area 
surrounding the water source from 6 to 10 meters from the water source. Water-user groups 
acknowledged the importance of having a formal right to the area around the water source 
because most of the wells were dug on the land donated by villagers. In a focus group discussion, 
one member of a water-user group explained: 
Once we identify a suitable place to dig a well. We ask the owner of the land to donate 
his land to us.32 Once we get the land then we dig up a well. But without formal right, we 
will always be worried what if the land owner changes his mind and decides that he want 
his land back? With a land title, the land owner signs and surrenders his land to us, it 
becomes our property. There is no way he can change his mind. 
 
The above explanation shows that land rights provide formal ownership and security of 
tenure to water-user groups. Secure tenure refers to assurance that a person's rights to land or 
water resources will be recognized and protected against challenges from individuals or the state. 
                                                 
32 Respondents used “his” without “her” because most of the land is owned by men. Traditionally women cannot 
own land. 
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This assurance provides an incentive to make long-term investments in maintaining or enhancing 
the productivity of the resource. Insecure tenure discourages people from engaging in costly or 
long-term investment because they are uncertain as to whether they will benefit from their 
investments (Bruce1998).  But, water-user groups reported that acquiring a land title was a long 
and costly process. This remains one of the problems facing statutory institutions. Household 
survey data on table 6.15 indicates the strength of local government by-laws in water 
development. It also signifies the importance of local government in the development of 
domestic water sources. Customary institutions are weak in the development of water sources 
because most of the laws were enacted by statutory institutions (local government). 
 The Sukuma people use their indigenous knowledge which they have accumulated over 
the years to identify suitable places where underground water can be found. Village elders and 
customary leaders said one indicator of underground aquifer is the presence of ficus trees. This 
common sense knowledge works well among the Sukuma. Its success rate to locate underground 
aquifers is higher than using modern survey equipments (Drangert 1993).   
 
6.4.2. Development of Irrigation Water Sources 
As indicated in section 6.2.3, 72 percent of irrigation in the Bariadi district is rain fed. 
The remaining 28 percent of irrigators use natural and developed water sources. Household 
survey data show that respondents were not aware of any law for development of irrigation water 
from common water sources.  In focus group discussion, irrigators who use private wells 
reported that they made their own laws of de-silting their wells at least once every two weeks. 
This is shows that both customary and statutory institutions are weak in developing water 
sources for irrigation in rural areas. 
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6.4.3. Development of Livestock Water Sources 
The household survey data on table 6.16 show laws for the development of livestock 
water sources. First, community members are prohibited from cutting trees near water sources. 
The table shows that 100 percent of respondents said this law was enacted by customary 
institutions. In focus group discussion, Dagashida and Sungusungu members said they enacted 
this law to protect the soil from erosion, and to prevent silting of livestock water sources. The 
major sources of water for livestock in Bariadi district are charco-dams, ponds, rivers and 
shallow wells.  Some of these water sources are seasonal, so livestock keepers are forced to walk 
long distances to get water for their livestock or use underground water like shallow wells 
(longobesi).  
I observed that few villages in Bariadi district had charco-dams. Most of these dams were 
constructed by the government after independence, and had silted up because of poor 
management. The silting up of charco-dams has caused shortage of water for livestock. District 
water engineers said that the current government policy to rehabilitate old charco-dams and to 
construct new ones requires a financial contribution from villagers to cover 20 percent of the 
total cost.  This research observed that old charco-dams were de-silted in some villages, and 
construction was still going on in a few others.  Customary institutions members in these villages 
said they are putting more effort to making sure the charco-dams are well managed.  They said: 
 The government constructed the charo-dams for us, and we thought it would manage 
them too, but it didn’t. Now we have realized that it is our responsibility. When the 
charco- dam is polluted and silted, we suffer getting water for our livestock. 
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In focus group discussions with livestock keepers, it was revealed that some villagers 
were not aware of the current arrangements for de-silting or constructing a new charco-dam. But, 
they said they are willing to make their financial contribution to get a new charco-dam or 
rehabilitate the old one.  The district water engineers said that the government efforts to 
rehabilitate and construct charco-dams has been slow due to inadequate awareness about this 
arrangement by most people, lack of expertise and dam construction equipment, and high cost of 
dam rehabilitation and construction. 
Table 6. 16: Development of Livestock Water Source Laws 
 
The second law for livestock water development shown in table 6.16 states that every 
community member is responsible for making sure that water sources for livestock watering are 
not polluted. The majority of household survey respondents (79 percent) reported this law was 
enacted by customary institutions, and 21 percent said the law was enacted by water-user groups.  
Livestock keepers reported that one of the causes of livestock water shortage is the 
mismanagement of charco-dams. Currently community members watch each other, and report 
water polluters to customary institutions.  
Third, is the law that requires each household to contribute some money whenever there 
is a need to develop or rehabilitate livestock water source.  Table 6.16 shows that 83.3 percent 
Regulations Who enacted regulation (percent) 
  
Statutory 
institutions
Customary 
institutions 
Water-user 
groups 
No cutting trees by the water source 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Every community member is responsible for making sure 
that livestock water sources are not polluted 0.0 79.0 21.1 
Each household needs to contribute some  
money whenever there is a need to maintain the water 
source   0.0 16.7 83.3 
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respondents said this law was enacted by livestock water users and 16.7 said it was enacted by 
customary institutions. This research expected this because most livestock keepers are men who 
are also members of customary institutions.  Although the Ministry of Water Development 
requires financial contributions from villagers, table 6.16 shows that none of the respondents 
mentioned this. Key informants said the reason is that the government does not force villagers to 
rehabilitate or get a new charco-dam. Once villagers decide that they need a charco-dam 
rehabilitated or constructed, the requirement of financial contribution does apply. But, the force 
to contribute and how much to be contributed by each household comes from customary law or 
livestock water users. In focus group discussions with livestock keepers in a village that had a 
charco-dam construction in process, they said that every household was required to give financial 
contributions.  Livestock keepers said every household in the village contributed some money, 
otherwise they were going to be fined or ostracized. Livestock keepers explained in a focus 
group discussion: 
Every household has to contribute money for the construction of a new dam.  It didn’t 
matter whether a household have livestock or not. Household without livestock today may 
have livestock in the future. Their daughters may get married, so they will get livestock 
from the bride price. Their sons may grow up and be livestock keepers. 
6.4.4. Compliance with Water Development Laws 
Table 6.17 and 6.18 show the household survey data that reports the level of compliance 
with the laws for development of domestic and livestock water respectively.The two tables show 
that compliance with these laws is generally high. Respondents did not report any law for 
development of irrigation water. But, data from discussion with irrigators indicate that some of 
them use private wells to irrigate their farms.  
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  Table 6.17 shows that most of the laws for development of domestic water were enacted 
by statutory institution (local government in Bariadi district). The table also shows that 50 
percent of respondents who mentioned that the law that require every household to contribute 
some money for maintenance or treatment of the water source as enacted by statutory 
institutions, said villagers do not comply with this law.  Those who said this law was enacted by 
water-user groups did not provide the level of compliance.  Discussion with domestic water-user 
groups showed that most water-user group members comply with this law. 
Table 6. 17: Compliance with Development of Domestic Water Source Laws 
 
Water development  law and legislature 
Level of compliance 
(percent comply) 
 None Some Majority   All 
Every household must participate to guard the water 
source by a system of rotation     
     
                                 Customary institutions 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
                                 Water-user groups 0.0 0.0 22.2 77.8
Every household must contribute some money for 
maintenance  or treatment of the water source     
                                 Statutory institutions 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0
                                 Water-user groups 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
                                 Customary institutions 0.0 0.0    66.7 33.3
Every water-user group must  open a bank account 
and maintain it     
                                  Statutory institutions 0.0 0.0 49.1 50.9
Every water source must be fenced with a live fence     
                                   Statutory institutions 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0
Every water-user group must have a land right to the 
water source area33     
                                   Statutory institutions 0.0 0.0 89.5 10.5
                                                 
33 Although respondents said it is very hard to have a formal land title, water-user group members said that the 
majority of water-user group members complied with this law because their groups will not be registered by the 
district water office, and they will run at a risk of losing water rights and water pump. Moreover, because the 
development of water source was a costly investment, water-user groups needed to have secure land and water rights 
(which are usually formal rights). 
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In focus group discussion, water-user groups said that community members who fail to 
comply with water management laws are punished. In the case of water-user groups, punishment 
of the offenders is done by the water committee. Punishment can be in form of a fine or removal 
of the offender from the water-user group. Each water-user group allows one membership for 
each household. The removal of an offender from the water-user group means that the whole 
household is removed from the water-user group.  
Table 6. 18: Compliance with Development of Livestock Water Source Laws 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The decision on the amount of fine or whether an individual should be removed from the 
group is done by the whole group. Fines can range from Tanzania shillings 500 (US$ 0. 05) to a 
cow, depending on the type of offence. If the offender does not comply with the punishment, the 
water committee will refer him or her to customary institutions If the offense is serious, 
  
Water development  law and legislature 
Level of compliance 
(percent comply) 
     
  None Some Majority  All 
No cutting trees by the water source      
Customary institutions 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
 
Every community member is responsible for 
ensuring that livestock water sources are not 
polluted 
    
                       Customary institutions  0.0 0.0 80.0 20.0 
                       Water-user groups 0.0 0.0   Q0.0 100.0 
 
Each household needs to contribute some  
money whenever there is a need to maintain the 
water source   
    
                      Customary institutions 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
                      Water-user groups 0.0 0.0 20.0 80.0 
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customary institutions requires severe punishments such as heavy fine or ostracism.  The 
offender may also be punished by the clan (bakaya). 
Generally, villagers said in focus group discussions that they prefer to use customary 
institutions and only refer complicated cases to local government officials like the Village 
Executive Officer (VEO) after exhausting customary institutions. Villagers reported that most 
cases are settled by water committees or customary institutions. Once caught, most offenders are 
willing to settle the case with the water committee because if they are taken to customary 
institutions, the fine doubles, and if a case is taken to the VEO, the fine triples. Moreover, in 
focus group discussion with customary institutions,  and from an interview with key informants, 
people claim that sometimes they do not get satisfactory service from statutory institutions 
because of corruption. Some of the offenders can get away with their offences by bribing local 
government or court officials. Additionally, statutory institutions take a long time to punish the 
offender. Proceedings in the court can take years before a ruling is made. Therefore villagers 
prefer to punish the offenders and solve most problems by themselves. 
 Water-user groups and customary institution members said that monitoring of offenders 
is easy because in villages people know each other and everyone is responsible for watching 
each other. If one sees an offender in a different water-user group the person will report to that 
water-user group. Moreover, each well has a guard most of daytime and there are always people 
collecting water when the well is open. Although a free rider problem exists among the Sukuma. 
There are many organized sanctions to deal with them.  
Thus, there is a difference between customary and statutory institutions in the 
management of water sources for different uses. For example, statutory institutions appear to be 
strong in regulations related to water development such as opening a bank account, planting a 
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live fence around the water source, securing formal land rights, and the maximum number of 
households in each water-user group. Customary laws appear to be strong in issues related to 
prevention of water pollution and equitable allocation of water. The research also shows that the 
participation of water-user groups is mainly with respect to domestic water sources and almost 
absent with respect to irrigation water. These results underscore the importance of analyzing 
water management issues for different water uses. 
 
6.5. Determinants of Compliance with Water Management Laws 
As explained in chapter four, information about whether or not a household complies 
with customary and statutory laws are very sensitive. Asking direct questions may not give true 
information since most people may not want to admit that they break the law. Therefore in this 
research, sensitive information was collected by asking indirect questions or through 
observation. I was able to collect data from the household survey as to whether or not a 
household complies with two statutory laws and one customary law.  The customary law 
analyzed in this research is the law prohibiting bathing or washing clothes at the drinking water 
source. Statutory laws analyzed in this research included the law that requires each household to 
have a latrine, and the law that prohibits agricultural activities at a distance less than 30 meters 
from water sources.   More details on how information about these laws was collected, was given 
in chapter four. 
6.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Before presenting the findings of hypothesis testing for compliance with both statutory 
and customary laws, it is better to start by presenting the descriptive statistics of the sampled 
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household heads. The descriptive statistics in table 6.19 provide an understanding of relationship 
between compliance with water management laws and the attributes of the household heads. 
 
Table 6. 19:  A Summary Table of Descriptive Statistics (for continuous variables) 
 
 Variable Median Mean Minimum Maximum
Education in years 4 4 0 14
Family size in numbers 7 8.9 1 34
Age in years 50 51.4 22 105
Sick days in numbers 7 14 0 90
Farm size in acres 5 7.2 0 60
Tropical livestock unit 4 9 0 107
Market access in km 33 36.7 10 61
Group size in numbers 6376 5975 2354 8046
 
 
 (i) Education: the average education level is four years of formal education. The minimum level 
of education is zero years (no formal education) and the maximum level is 14 years of formal 
education. Education level is normally distributed among the respondents. 
(ii) Family size: the average family size is seven people. The smallest household size is one 
person, these are the people who are single, don’t have children, and don’t live with any 
relatives. The largest household size is 34 people. Large family sizes are very common in the 
Bariadi district, where children are highly valued because they offer family labor and because 
they take care of their parents when they get old. People prefer to have many children. Another 
cause of the larger family size is polygamy. It was observed that the Sukuma culture allows for 
polygamy and in some cases, multiple wives reside in one household (each wife with separate 
rooms or house but in the same compound). Customary leaders said that one of the reasons that 
makes a husband get a second or more wives is to get more labor from wives and their children. 
Therefore most polygamous husbands prefer to keep their wives as close to each other as 
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possible. Also wives may need to reside together because they share the family land for farming, 
share cattle for milk (owned by their husband) or if the husband cannot afford to build a separate 
house for each wife.  
(iii) Age: the average age of respondents is 51 years. The minimum age is 22 and the maximum 
age is 105 years old.  
(iv) Sick days: the average number of days which the head of the household could not work in the 
past three months due to sickness in the family is 14 days. The minimum is 0 and the maximum 
is 90 days. This indicates that there are households where the head of the household did not lose 
any work days because of sickness, and there are some households where during the previous 
three months, the head of the household could not work because of illness in the family.  
(v) Farm size: the average farm size is 7.2 acres.   The minimum farm size is zero. This is 
because there are some people who don’t own any land, but instead borrow or rent land for 
agriculture production. The maximum farm size is 60 acres. 
(vi) Tropical livestock unit (TLU): the average livestock unit in a household is nine animals. The 
minimum TLU is zero because there are those who don’t own livestock and others own a lot of 
livestock amounting to as much as 107. 
(vii) Market access: the mean distance to the district headquarters is 36.7 kilometers. The 
minimum distance is 10 and the maximum distance is 61 kilometers.  
(viii) Group size:  the average population in each sampled village is 5,975 people. The minimum 
population is 2,354 and the maximum is 8,046 people.  
Table 6. 20 shows percent distribution of dummy variables obtained from household 
survey. About 18 percent of sampled household reported that they don’t have a toilet in their 
households; they relieved themselves in the bush. Most of the respondents (97 percent) complied 
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with the customary law that forbids people to wash their clothes or bath by the drinking water 
source.  However, about 3 percent of sampled households indicated that they do not comply with 
this law, reporting that they washed and bathed at the drinking water sources. About 41 percent 
of sampled households reported that they do not comply with the law that prohibits agricultural 
activities at a distance less than 30 meters from water sources. Only 59.2 percent of respondents 
said they complied with this law. 
Table 6. 20: Percent Distribution of Dummy Variables 
 
  Percent  reporting
                              Variables  Definition 0 1
Household  have a toilet   0=No, 1=Yes 17.5 82.5
Household wash clothes or bath at the 
drinking water source 0=No, 1=Yes 3.0 97.0
Crop plots  located > 30meters from water 
sources 0=No, 1=Yes 40.8 59.2
Gender 0= Female     1=Male 27.8 72.2
Roof type for the main house 
 
0=Non-corrugated       
      iron sheets 
 1= corrugated       
      iron sheets 
27.4 
 
72.6 
Belong to credit  association 0=No, 1=Yes 73.9 26.1
Belong to mutual support association 0=No, 1=Yes 60.9 39.1
Belong to water management association 0=No, 1=Yes 18.8 81.2
Belong to security association 0=No, 1=Yes 81.2 18.8
Religion 
0= Non-Christian  
1=Christian 52.9 47.1
Livestock keeping and food production the 
major source of income? 0=No, 1=Yes 58.7 41.3
 
Female-headed household made up 28 percent of the total sample, and most households 
(73 percent) have corrugated iron sheets on the roof of their main house. Participation in credit, 
security and mutual support association is low, with only 26 percent in credit, 19 percent in 
security, and 39 percent in mutual support associations. But, the majority of villagers (81 
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percent) said they belonged to a water management association such as a water-user group. Over 
half of the sampled households (53 percent) are non- Christians. About 41 percent of sampled 
households reported that food crop production and livestock keeping are their major sources of 
income. The rest (59 percent) reported cash crop production (mainly cotton), and other non-farm 
activities, as their major source of income. 
6.5.2. Multivariate Logistic Regression Results 
Multivariate results of the determinants of compliance with water management laws are 
described in two sections, the first section deals with compliance with customary laws and the 
second section deals with compliance with statutory laws. 
 
6.5.2.1. Determinants of Compliance with Customary Law 
 A. Law that Prohibit Bathing /Washing Clothes at the Drinking Water Source 
 Table 6.21 reports the determinants of compliance with customary law that prohibit 
bathing or washing clothes at the drinking water source. The F-statistic is statistically significant 
at Prob > F= 0.028. This implies that the regressors jointly have a statistically significant impact 
on the probability of a compliance with customary laws that prohibit washing of clothes or 
bathing at the drinking water source. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected with 95 percent 
confidence, which means that at least one independent variable has a non-zero effect on the 
probability of compliance with customary water management laws. 
 Contrary to expectations, market access has a significant, positive impact on compliance 
with the customary law that prohibits community members from taking a shower and wash 
clothes around the drinking water source. This could be due to the fact that households with high 
market access are more aware about the benefit of keeping the water sources safe from 
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pollutants. But, the results also indicate that households in remote areas are not likely to comply 
with customary laws. This may be due to a lack of knowledge about the harmful effects of 
pollution for households living in remote areas.  
 Controlling for market access and other variables, belonging to water association 
significantly increases the probability that a villager will comply with customary law that 
prohibits households from taking a shower and washing clothes near drinking water sources. 
This could be due to the fact that water-user groups have strict rules for members who belong to 
the group. For example in focus group discussions, members of water-user groups said that they 
expel or fine members who do not follow  laws set for management of water resources.  They 
also said that if a person has been expelled from another group, that person may have hard time 
finding another group to join because he or she will be required to provide a “recommendations” 
from the  previous group. This supports Hayami (1998:2) theory that customary laws work better 
because they are enforced through social interactions where misconduct can easily be identified. 
  Older respondents were also more likely to comply with customary laws that prohibit 
households from taking a shower and washing clothes near drinking water sources. This was also 
revealed in an interview with village elders who said that members of younger generation tend to 
think that customary laws and practices are “outdated.” Therefore older members have more 
allegiance to customary laws than younger respondents. 
  Better-educated respondents were less likely to comply with customary laws prohibiting 
them from taking a shower or washing clothes near drinking water sources. This could be due to 
a lack of sensitivity to customary laws that better educated respondents seem to have.  Formal 
education in Tanzania was introduced by colonialists. It neglected African culture and traditions  
as it “was geared to support, enhance, and perpetuate European colonial exploitation and 
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domination of African people” (Johnson  1987: 266). Even after independence, Tanzania adopted  
the colonial education system that was already in place. This system of education continue to 
exist today and continue to produce “elites” who are alienated from their customs and traditions. 
Therefore, a radical transformation in the system of education  is needed to incorporate African 
culture and traditions which existed long before colonialism. 
 
Table 6. 21:  Logistic Regression Results for Determinants of Compliance with Customary 
Law Prohibit Bathing /Washing Clothes near Drinking Water Sources 
 
Independent variables Coefficients Standard. Error P>t 
Market access 0.04391 0.01973 0.027** 
Religion 0.24184 0.57547 0.675 
Roof type -0.31827 0.70267 0.651 
Major income  from  livestock 
and food production -0.95763 0.71187 0.18 
Family size -0.09438 0.04567 0.04** 
Security association -0.68337 0.65704 0.3 
Support association -0.40796 0.58528 0.487 
Credit  association -0.26993 0.48178 0.576 
Water association 0.79354 0.45019 0.079** 
Age 0.10042 0.03506 0.005*** 
Gender 0.23606 0.75443 0.755 
Education -0.12823 0.06899 0.065** 
Farm size 0.17818 0.06916 0.011** 
Tropical livestock unit -0.07768 0.02831 0.007*** 
Sick days 0.07624 0.03719 0.042** 
Group size -0.00102 0.00034 0.003*** 
Constant 4.11230 2.36075 0.083 
Number of observation =       209   
Number of strata =         4  
Prob > F =    0.028**  
 
Significance levels: 
*P<0.10;  **P<0.05;   ***P<0.01   
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 In focus group discussions, villagers said that getting away with customary laws is harder 
for uneducated people than it is for educated ones.  Villagers also said that better educated 
members of the communities may have ways to get around the customary laws.  This is because 
better educated people may have “connections” or social networks with corrupt people who can 
help them get away with customary laws.  They may also have financial means to bribe and 
bargain power. But, the level of education does not appear to have a significant impact on the 
other regulations reported in this section.  This is also supported by political economists who 
believe that individuals are rational economic actors. They would like to free-ride if they have 
ways to get away with their actions.  But, members of customary institutions said that they enact 
laws that make the social cost of free-riding very high in order to discourage free-riding.  
 Contrary to expectations, the size of the farm owned by household had a significant, 
positive association to compliance with customary laws that prohibits households from taking a 
shower and washing clothes near drinking water sources. This suggests that households with a 
larger farm size are more likely to comply with customary laws than those with smaller farms. I 
observed that households with larger farm size have a tendency of having bigger family size. 
Moreover, larger farm size means that a household need more labor to work in the farm. A 
higher percent of farm labor are women, who are major collectors of water.  Therefore, 
household with larger farm size may have more labor to collect water for domestic use. So they 
may not bathe or wash clothes near drinking water sources.  In an interview with one Dagashida 
chairman, he said that he had four wives.  He said one of the reasons is that he needs more labor 
for his farm. He said he has a big farm, and one wife could not handle it.  He said “more wives 
mean more children, bigger family size, more family labor, and more prosperity.” But, 
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households with larger tropical livestock unit (TLU) are less likely to comply with this law.  This 
was observed in focus group discussion with livestock keepers that livestock grazing and 
watering is mainly done by men. Households with larger TLU may have more men than women, 
hence less labor to draw water for washing and bathing at home.  
  Group size is also negatively associated with compliance with customary laws that 
prohibit households from taking a shower and washing clothes near drinking water sources. This 
is likely due to the fact that at very high population densities, there is a negative incentive to 
comply with customary laws due to the potential diversity problem that tend to undermine 
customary norms and rules.  This result is consistent with Olson (1971) who observed that in 
small groups, people are more likely to engage in collective action to manage their resources 
than people in larger groups. This is because smaller groups reduce chances of free-riding. 
Similar findings are observed by Baland and Plateau (1999) and Tang (1992), who pointed out 
that smaller groups perform better than larger ones because they are more likely to engage in 
collective action than larger groups.   
 The number of sick days is positively related to compliance with customary laws that 
prohibits households from taking a shower and washing clothes near drinking water sources.  A 
district water engineer said in an interview that households with poor health are also likely to be 
poor, and have a tendency to comply with customary laws. This view is supported by moral 
economists who argue that individuals in a community have strong ties, and rely on communal 
property and social networks for their subsistence. Therefore, compliance with customary laws is 
their best rational choice. The rest of the independent variables have no significant relationship 
with compliance with customary laws that prohibit people from taking a shower or washing 
clothes closer to drinking water sources.   
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6.5.2.2. Determinants of Compliance with Statutory Law  
A. The Law Requiring Each Household to Have a Latrine 
  Tanzania has a law that requires every household to have a toilet facility. This 
requirement has a strong impact on health because human waste can pollute drinking water and 
cause disease. In addition to improved health, toilet facilities provide people with privacy. Those 
who release themselves in the fields or bushes may feel embarrassed and humiliated if caught in 
the process. It also reduces incidences of snake bites and being pricked by thorns in the bushes.  
 Table 6.22 reports the compliance with the statutory law requiring each household to 
have a latrine. The F-statistic is statistically significant at Prob > F= 0.0271. This implies that the 
regressors jointly have a statistically significant impact on the probability of a compliance with 
statutory laws that require each household to have a latrine or toilet facilities. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is rejected with 95 percent confidence, concluding that at least one independent 
variable has a non-zero effect on the probability of compliance with statutory water management 
laws. As shown in table 6.20 most respondents have a pit latrine as required by the local 
government. But there are still 18 percent of households in the Bariadi district that don’t have a 
toilet facility. 
 Christian households and those belonging to security organizations are more likely to 
comply with the requirement of having pit latrines.  This is because some Christian 
denominations stress health teaching. For example, the Seventh Day Adventist church, which is 
one of the common denominations in Bariadi district, teaches church members about healthy 
living.  Also those who belong to security organization such as Sungusungu members are 
supposed to be leaders and role models in the community.  In focus group discussions, 
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Sungusungu members said that they are supposed to set an example to other villagers.  They said 
“how can we enforce compliance to laws if we don’t comply ourselves?”  
 
Table 6. 22:  Logistic Regression Results for Determinants of Compliance with Statutory 
Law Requiring Each Household to Have a Latrine 
 
Independent Variables Coefficients Standard. Error P>t 
      
Market access -0.00754 0.01054 0.475 
Religion 0.70314 0.26821 0.009*** 
Roof type 0.63693 0.23684 0.008*** 
Income from  livestock 
and food production -0.11916 0.21923 0.587 
Family size 0.02663 0.02699 0.325 
Security association 1.06192 0.38372 0.006*** 
Support association -0.04689 0.24944 0.851 
Credit  association -0.10788 0.27501 0.695 
Water association 0.41933 0.26830 0.12 
Age -0.0044 0.00857 0.608 
Gender -0.25285 0.27398 0.357 
Education 0.00144 0.03342 0.966 
Farm size -0.01369 0.02519 0.587 
Tropical livestock unit 0.04103 0.01729 0.018** 
Sick days 0.00123 0.00367 0.737 
Group size -0.00003 0.00008 0.74 
Constant 0.27169 0.94906 0.775 
Number of observation =       223  
Number of strata =         4  
 Prob > F 
 
=  0.0271** 
  
 
Significance levels: 
*P<0.10; **P<0.05;   ***P<0.01   
 
 
 Households having a roof made of corrugated iron sheets for their main house, and those 
having greater number of tropical livestock unit(TLU), are more likely to comply with the pit 
latrine requirement than those with other roof types and households that have fewer TLU.  
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 This indicates that wealthy households are more likely to comply with the requirement of having 
toilet facilities. One village executive officer said in an interview that one of the reasons why 
people do not have toilet facility in their household is that they cannot afford the cost of 
constructing a new pit latrine, or constructing another one when the existing one is full.  
 
B. The Law Prohibiting  any Agricultural Activities at a Distance Less Than 
30 Meters from Water Sources 
 
Table 6.23 presents a second statutory law that requires households not to have any 
agricultural activities within a radius of 30 meters from a water source. The F-statistic is 
statistically significant at Prob > F= 0.0190. This implies that the regressors jointly have a 
statistically significant impact on the probability of a household not to practice any agricultural 
activities at a distance less than 30 meters from a water source. Thus, the null hypothesis is 
rejected with 95 percent confidence, concluding that at least one independent variable has a non-
zero effect on the probability of compliance with this statutory water management law. 
 
 Table 6.23 indicates that Christians are more likely to comply with the statutory law 
prohibiting agricultural activities near water sources.  This was expected because Christianity 
promotes compliance with laws in their teaching.  One woman said in an interview that she 
believes that God ordained the government to rule human beings and to restrain evils.  She said 
that human beings were created by a God of order, so they have the responsibility to seek order 
through statutory institutions.  She also said that although Christians are supposed to serve, obey, 
and submit to civil authority, their first submission must be to God.  There may be times when 
they may be forced to disobey the state if it is against God.  This supports the moral economists’ 
idea that human action is controlled by social norms and traditions.  
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 The above story of a Christian woman indicates that she behaves according to Christian 
norms. This shows that Christians have the obligation to conduct their activities according to 
their beliefs of what is right and what is wrong. But in focus group discussions, as theorized by 
political economists, villagers indicated that free-riders (both Christians and non-Christians) do 
exist, and they are mainly sanctioned by customary institutions. The preference of using 
customary institutions to sanction free-riders is supported by the “evil-market” view that 
customary institutions works better than statutory institutions.   
 Households belonging to a security institution (Sungusungu) and those belonging to 
mutual support organizations are more likely to comply with the statutory law requiring them not 
to engage in agricultural production within a distance of 30 meters from a drinking water source.  
The reason is similar to section 6.4.2.2(A) above that Sungusungu members are expected to show 
an example to other villagers.   
Contrary to expectations, households belonging to water-user groups are less likely to 
comply with the requirement of not having agricultural activities within 30 meters from a 
drinking water source.  Also older heads of households are less likely to comply with this law.  
This is because older respondents are every much into customary laws than younger people.  
This was also the case with customary laws that prohibit households from taking a shower and 
washing clothes near drinking water sources where older people were more likely to comply than 
younger people. In an interview, customary leaders said that they farm on the land that they 
inherited from their ancestors. Some of the land is located close to water sources. They would 
have no where else to farm if they don’t farm on their land. As they explained: 
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They tell us not to farm by the water sources. But they don’t give us new land to farm. If 
our land is close to water sources where should we farm?  How will we irrigate our 
crops if we farm away from water sources? 
 
Table 6. 23: Logistic Regression Results for Determinants of Compliance with Statutory 
Law that Prohibits Agricultural Activities Close to Water Sources 
 
Independent variables Coefficients Standard. Error P>t 
     
Market access -0.01169 0.00803 0.147 
Religion 0.42972 0.21787 0.050** 
Roof type -0.06223 0.21046 0.768 
Income from  livestock and food 
production 0.10301 0.21152 0.627 
Family size 0.01420 0.01923 0.461 
Security association 0.58294 0.26576 0.029** 
Support association 0.41704 0.20546 0.044** 
Credit  association 0.03344 0.22059 0.880 
Water association -0.83278 0.24122 0.001*** 
Age -0.01796 0.00767 0.020** 
Gender -0.02303 0.22763 0.920 
Education -0.01848 0.02992 0.537 
Farm size -0.01780 0.01474 0.229 
Tropical livestock unit 0.00739 0.00905 0.415 
Sick days -0.00392 0.00238 0.100* 
Group size -0.00003 0.00006 0.595 
Constant 2.06911 0.75854 0.007 
    
Number of observations = 223  
Number of strata =  4  
Prob > F = 0.0190**  
  
Significance levels: 
*P<0.10; **P<0.05;   ***P<0.01   
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The number of sick days is negatively related to compliance with the statutory 
requirement of not having agricultural activities within 30 meters from a drinking water source.  
This means that household with poor health are less likely to comply with this statutory 
requirement.   This support the above findings in the customary laws that prohibit households 
from taking a shower and washing clothes near drinking water sources, where people with poor 
health   have a tendency to comply with customary laws. One chief said in an interview that poor 
people are desperate. They may have a short term perspective as they struggle to survive and 
make their ends meet. Their major goal is today’s subsistence, and not tomorrow.  So prohibiting 
them to farm near a water source may limit their means of subsistence because they may have no 
where else to farm. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7. GENDER,   INSTITUTIONS, AND WATER MANAGEMENT 
 
The truth is that in the villages women work very hard. At times they work for twelve or 
fourteen hours. They work even on Sundays and public holidays. Women who live in the 
villages work harder than everybody else in Tanzania. But men who live in the village are 
on leave for half of their lives (Late Julius K. Nyerere, President of Tanzania in 1961-
1985).34 
 
Women play a central role in the use, management and protection of water resources and 
thus should be involved fully in the decision making process (URT 2002a:22). 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Chapter six indicated that most laws for equitable water access and prevention of water 
pollution and abuse were enacted by customary institutions and water-user groups. Statutory 
institutions were stronger in water development laws, but weak in water access and prevention of 
water pollution and abuse laws.   Although customary laws   are important in the management of 
water resources, they are also problematic as they tend to discriminate against women.  This 
chapter analyses the relationship between gender and water management institutions, and show 
how this relationship affects men and women’s participation in the management of water 
resources.   
                                                 
34 Julius K. Nyerere. 1968. Freedom and Socialism/Uhuru na Ujamaa: A Selection from Writing and Speeches, 
1965-1967, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. Pp 245. 
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The participation of women in relation to water management is important for a number of 
reasons. Women are the traditional custodians of natural resources and family health in rural 
areas. They also suffer most from the degradation of water and other natural resources. In rural 
areas of Tanzania, women spend long hours fetching water for their families. They are most 
often the collectors, users, and managers of water in the household as well as farmers of irrigated 
and rain fed crops. Women and children provide nearly all the water for households in rural 
areas. Domestic water is used for processing and preparing food; for drinking, bathing and 
washing, for irrigating home gardens, and watering livestock.  
Women are viewed as the key to the success of water resource development and 
irrigation policies and programs (FAO 2005). They have taken the lead in promoting an 
environmental ethic and reducing resource degradation by reusing and recycling resources to 
minimize waste and excessive consumption. At the local level, women are knowledgeable about 
ecological health and ecosystem management. In places where the rate of rural-urban migration 
is high, and migrants are mostly men, women are left behind to safeguard the natural 
environment and ensure adequate and sustainable resource allocation within the household and 
the community. Women know the location, reliability, and quality of local water resources. They 
collect water, store it, and control its use and sanitation.  Because of these social roles, women 
have considerable knowledge about water resources, including quality and reliability, 
restrictions, and acceptable storage methods. 
Recent debates on natural resource management have pointed out the importance of 
women having access to and control over natural resources. Beginning in the 1980s, there was a 
growing awareness on the part of government officials that gender relations were central to 
implementation and formulation of resource-management policies. This awareness was granted 
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by scientists studying women and development, who discovered that many development policies 
impoverished and discriminated against women (Booth and Friedman 1996; Chant and Radcliffe 
1992). 
A variety of approaches can be used to explain the relationship between gender and the 
management of water resources. One of the approaches is ecological feminism or 
“ecofeminism,” which connects the environmentalist and the feminist movements.  The word 
"ecofeminism" was coined in 1974 by Francoise d'Eaubonne, a French feminist, who wanted to 
bring attention to women’s potential role in bringing about an ecological revolution (Warren 
1996). Like feminism itself, ecofeminism is a diverse ideology containing a variety of 
contradictory viewpoints (Molyneux and Steinberg 1995; Warren 1996).  One may be a social 
ecofeminist, cultural ecofeminist, radical ecofeminist, or ecowomanist.  
Despite their differences, ecofeminists share the viewpoint that there are connections 
between the domination of nature and the domination of women in contemporary society 
(Warren 1996). The basic principle of ecofeminism is that patriarchal philosophies are harmful to 
women, children, and other living things. These philosophies identify women as being closer to 
nature and men being closer to culture. Nature is seen as inferior to culture, meaning that women 
are also inferior to men (Agarwal 1992).  Thus, ecofeminism seeks to strengthen the relationship 
between women and nature by critiquing their oppression (Alaimo 1994). As Ruether (1975:204) 
wrote: 
Women must see that there can be no liberation for them and no solution to the 
ecological crisis within a society whose fundamental model of relationships continues to 
be one of domination. They must unite the demands of the women's movement with those 
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of the ecological movement to envision a radical reshaping of the basic socioeconomic 
relations and the underlying values of this [modern industrial] society. 
Ecofeminists agree that the domination of women and the domination of nature are 
fundamentally connected, and that they should work toward their simultaneous liberation.  
Ecofeminists believe that an understanding of these connections is crucial to end the domination 
of women (Marshall 1993; Somma and Tolleson-Rinehart 1997; Warren 1987). But, 
ecofeminists differ as to “why” and "how” the domination of women can be ended.  
Ecofeminist has been criticized by other people and by ecofeminists themselves.  
Feminist environmentalists criticize ecofeminists’ idea that women are linked with nature, and 
that women cannot be separated from nature. According to this view, ecofeminists ignore the 
social construction of gender and nature (Agarwal 1992).  Critics argue that women do not have 
an exclusive relation with to nature, but that men too have a relationship with nature. Research 
on Africa reveals that women and men perform different activities as a result of the traditional 
gender division of labor, but all activities contribute to the well-being of the household (Leach 
1994; Schroeder 1999). Ecofeminists are criticized for overlooking the material sources of 
domination, such as economic advantages and political power (Shiva 1989). Critics argue that 
ecofeminists need to consider both men and women so that everyone can take responsibility for 
managing natural resources (Agarwal 1992). Women in Tanzania and other developing countries 
are dependent on nature for the sustenance of themselves and their families. The destruction of 
nature means that women’s sources of survival are destroyed. Consequently, women are more 
likely to suffer the ill-effects of environmental degradation and environmentally unsafe practices.  
For example, the mismanagement of drinking water sources means that women have to walk 
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longer distances to get safe drinking water for their families as shown in figure 7.1.  Women 
have to fight not only against ecological degradation, but also against traditional power structures 
and customary laws that subordinate their needs (Suliman 1991).  More discussion on this will be 
given in the following sections. 
 Figure 7. 1: Women walking long distances to get safe water 
 
7.2. The Status of Women in Tanzania 
 Women in Tanzania account for 70 percent of agricultural labor force. Of all the women 
in Tanzania, 90 percent are employed in agriculture. They are the major producers of food and 
cash crops (The World Bank 2002).They produce 60 to 70 percent of all the food that is 
consumed in Tanzania. They are the primary producer of food crops and significant producers of 
cash crops such as cotton, sisal, coffee, tea and tobacco. Moreover, women head about 25 
percent of all households in Tanzania, a number that is increasing due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
(URT 2002).  
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They have the sole responsibility of child rearing, caring for the elderly and sick, fetch 
fuel and water, and tend small livestock (UNDP 2003). Compared to men, women work longer 
hours. They often start their domestic chores before dawn and work until dark. Most women 
work more hours per week than men. Women work 80 hours compared to 44 working hours for 
men who are employed in the formal sector (Lundqvist 1999). Women represent only 10 percent 
of the total wage-earning labor force in all sectors, most of these women are engaged in primary 
school teaching and nursing (Mbilinyi 1972). The low number of women in the formal sector is 
attributed to their low education and discriminatory hiring practices (Tripp 1994).  
In terms of education, Tanzanian women are worse off compared to men.  Women 
receive less education at all levels, and women are about twice as likely as men to have no 
education. The problem is more acute in rural areas, where 41 percent of women are unable to 
read or write (URT 2002).  Table 7.1 shows that the literacy rate for women is 69.2 percent 
compared to 85 percent for males. Of the 4.5 million illiterate adults in Tanzania, 75 percent or 
3.1 million of illiterate adults are female. The gender bias against the education of females 
begins in the home. The reason for low education achievement for women includes the 
traditional expectation that mothers should stay home and take care of the children, and the 
general male attitude that women are less intelligent and less responsible than men, early 
marriage, and high school drop out rate due to pregnancy and parent’s preferences to educate 
male children rather than female children (Made and Whande 1989; Mbilinyi 1972). Heavy 
household workloads and strict gender roles greatly hinder girls’ participation in school. But 
studies have shown that improving education for women improves their literacy and job skills, 
raises their earning capacity because educated women are more likely to participate in the labor 
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force which may provide bigger economic benefits. This may improve women’s lives and their 
families in general (Garrett and Ruel 1999; Levin et al. 1999).  
Table 7. 1: Literacy Rate in Tanzania 2000-2004. 
  Male Female Total 
Adult literacy rate (percent) 85.2 69.2 77.1 
Youth literacy rate (percent) 93.8 89.4 91.6 
Adult illiterate population(000) 1,437 3,119 4,556 
Youth  illiterate population(000)    237    405     642 
        
Source: UNESCO 2004. 
 
7.3. Gender Relations and Property Rights  
As explained in chapter two, property rights are critically important for economic 
development and livelihood of the people. Most people in Tanzania live in rural areas and 
depend on agriculture for their economic development. Land is regarded as a source of wealth, 
social status, and power (Strickland 2004). The relation between property rights and natural 
resources is an important factor in the effective management of natural resources.  Secure 
property rights are a fundamental cornerstone upon which the local community builds their 
participation in the management of their natural resources. When people have secure property 
rights, they are more likely to invest in land, protect the environment, and build social harmony. 
This idea is supported by new institutional theorists who argue that community members have 
the capability to manage their resources. They will be willing to participate in the management of 
their resources if they are sure that they will benefit from their investments (Bromley et al. 1992; 
Ostrom 1990; Mccay and Acheson 1990). Similar findings were reported by Mendelsohn (1994) 
who observed that lack of secured property rights is one of the causes of wasteful deforestation 
of tropical forests in Brazil. About 95 percent of people in rural Tanzania acquire land under 
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customary laws or through inheritance. Most women settle on and use land that they obtain 
through family ties. Under customary laws, the acquisition and ownership of land is 
monopolized by male family members. The acquisition of land right through statutory 
institutions requires formal title to the land. Land titling affects women because they often have 
less access to money, political connections, or other resources that may help them acquire title to 
the land. One policy implication is that women need better access to credit so they can acquire 
land (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997). 
   The constitution of Tanzania upholds the principle of equality and equal opportunities to 
its people. It states that “subject to provision of relevant laws of land, every person is entitled to 
own property, and has the right to protection of his property held in accordance with the law” 
(URT 1998:25). The use of word “protection of his property” here implies that the right to 
protection of property is granted to men only. The constitution doesn’t ensure that women’s 
rights to property will be protected.  Moreover, the constitution requires all state authorities and 
institutions, in undertaking their activities to ensure:  
Equal opportunities to all citizens, men and women alike, without regard to their color, 
tribe, religion or status in life;  
That human dignity and other human rights are respected and cherished;  
That all forms of injustice, intimidation, discrimination, corruption, oppression or 
favoritism are eradicated.  (URT 1998:18). 
Additionally, both the Village Land Act and the Land Act recognizes women’s right to 
land, protects women’s right to land, and prohibits discrimination against women with regard to 
land rights (Benschop 2002; ILO 2002). For example the sub-section 20(2) of the Village Land 
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Act, 1999 prohibits the use of customary law in determining the right of occupancy, if the law 
discriminates against, inter alia, women:  
Any rule of customary law and any decision taken in respect of land held under 
customary tenure, whether in respect of land held individually or communally, shall have 
regard to the custom, traditions, and practices of the community concerned and the rule 
of customary law or any such decision in respect of land held under customary tenure 
shall be void and inoperative and shall not be given effect to by any village council or 
village assembly or any person or body of persons exercising any authority over village 
land or in respect of any court or other body, to the extent to which it denies women, 
children or persons with disability lawful access to ownership, occupation or use of any 
such land.(URT 1999a: 95-96). 
The Land Act   recognizes the right of every person to acquire, hold, use and deal with 
land without any restrictions on the basis of gender.  There are two types of land ownership: 
“personal occupancy” and “co-occupancy.”  Personal occupancy refers to land occupation held 
by one person through right of occupancy or lease. Co-occupancy is defined as “the occupation 
of land held for a right of occupancy or lease by two or undivided shares” (URT 1999b ss 
159(1)). There are two types of co-occupancy: “occupancy in common” and “joint occupancy.”  
Occupancy in common is where any land, lease or mortgage is occupied in common, that is, each 
occupier has the right to undivided share of the property. In the case of the death of one of the 
co-owners, his /her share goes to his/her heirs (URT 1999b ss 159(3)).  
Joint occupancy is land ownership where land is occupied jointly. None of the occupiers 
is entitled to any separate share of the land. In the case of the death of one co-owner, the other 
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party has the right of survivorship, meaning that the property goes to the surviving occupier or 
occupiers (URT 1999b ss 159(4)). The Land Act protects the family land by a presumption of 
co- occupancy, which recognizes both spouses’ rights to the land (URT 1999b, ss. 161-164).  
Under the Land Act, married men are not supposed to dispose land through mortgages, sales, 
leases, and any other means without their wife’s consent regardless of whose name is on the title 
deed (URT 1999b s. 112(3)).  
Although the constitution and the Land Act advocates equal rights for women and men, 
they do not ensure these rights in practice. The actual implementation of gender equality is still a 
major problem.  For example, lack of resources to enforce these regulations and the acceptance 
of the customary institutions seem to determine the failure of statutory laws on equality of 
women and men in land ownership. Although statutory law is considered supreme, in practice, 
customary laws tend to prevail, particularly in disputes over marriage, divorce, and property 
rights (Nzomo 1994). In focus group discussion, and during interviews with key informants, 
most people said customary laws affect their life the most.  
The Marriage Act of 1971 recognizes equal rights to property rights among married 
couples.  It says in section 56: 
A married woman shall have the same right as has a man to acquire, hold, and dispose 
property, whether movable or immovable, and the same right to contract, the same right 
to sue, and the same liability to be sued in contract or in tort or otherwise. (URT 1971: 
25). 
But, section 60 of the Marriage Act states that if during marriage, a husband or wife acquire 
property in his or her name, it is presumed that the property belongs absolutely to that  person, 
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the other person is excluded unless the spouses jointly register their property in both names. It 
states: 
Where during the subsistence of a marriage, property is acquired: 
(a). In the name of the husband or of wife, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that 
the property belongs to that person, to the exclusion of his or her spouse; 
(b) In the names of the husbands and wife jointly there shall be a rebuttable presumption 
that their beneficial interests therein are equal. (URT 1971: 26).  
  This section of the Marriage Act contradicts with the Land Act which presumes co- 
occupancy of the family land, where each spouse has rights to the land (URT 1999b, ss. 161-
164). Many people in rural area have customary land rights, and have not registered their land. 
The small amount of registered land is registered on men’s names. In focus group discussions, I 
gathered that despite the Marriage Act of 1971 and the Land Act of 1999, and despite the fact 
that statutory laws are supposed to be superior to customary laws; customary laws are still used 
more and applied in rural areas than are statutory laws. When there is divorce, a woman is often 
chased away by a husband. She returns to her parents (without any property) and waits for 
remarriage. Moreover women said in focus group discussion that they have no means to lay 
claim to the family property upon death of a husband or divorce in formal courts because most of 
them don’t have any formal documents or titles.  
The Marriage Act prohibits spousal battery, but it does not impose any penalties for 
violating this provision (CRLP 1998). Customary laws that subordinate women remain strong in 
the Bariadi district.  In focus group discussion with women, they said, in Sukuma culture, 
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husbands can discipline their wives and treat them any way they like, and women are supposed 
to obey. Women said they are vulnerable to domestic violence because legal action against 
domestic violence is less readily available to them. Nearly 70 percent of women I spoke with 
during focus group discussions, said they experienced some sort of alcohol-related violence in 
the previous year. Unfortunately, some of the women in the focus group discussion viewed the 
situation as a normal part of life in a village. Some reported that they have no choice but to 
tolerate brutal treatment by men. One woman explained her experience with a husband who is 
alcoholic. The husband spends all his money for drinking and doesn’t care for his family. He 
comes home drunk and demands to get nice food. He also beats his wife, but the wife explained 
that she have no where to go and nothing to do. As she explained: 
My husband is alcoholic, he uses all his money for drinking. He doesn’t give me any 
money to buy food.  When he comes home from drinking, sometimes he will beat me up if 
he doesn’t find good food. It has been like that all since I got married to him. But what 
can I do? Where can I go? I always think what will happen to my children if I leave? 
 The constitution guarantees the right to work to as well as the right to equal pay for equal 
work to all people in Tanzania (URT 1998 ss 2(1-2)). But, the Employment Ordinance restricts 
the employment of women. For example, section 83(1) of Employment Ordinance stipulates that 
“no woman shall be employed in the hours of 6 P.M and 6 A.M in any industrial undertakings,” 
unless there is unforeseeable emergency. Also section 15(3) of Marriage Act prohibits married 
women from contracting another marriage during the time they are still married. But, the law 
allows men to contract more than one marriage at a time (CRLP 1998; URT 1971:11).  
 
231
The Sukuma people are patrilineal. Property is owned and devolves along the male line 
and excludes women. Under this patriarchal system, women face a lot of social, economic and 
political barriers in their everyday life. Although women work in the fields and are the major 
cultivators, they often don’t have property rights to the land they work on. In an interview, 
customary leaders and women said that in Sukumaland, the tradition is that women don’t have 
the right to own property, but instead they have the right to use property through their male 
relatives (father, brother, son) or their husbands. In focus group discussions, women said that 
their right to use property must be exercised with their husband’s consent.   
Although women have access to land once they marry, this access to land often ends if 
they are divorced, lose a husband, or fail to bear children, particularly male children (Mbilinyi 
1972).  Because women are regarded as property, they cannot own land or obtain rights to 
property. In focus group discussion, women said that cattle and other household wealth are 
owned by men. Married women own nothing in the family, not even the children they bear. 
Inheritance is only given to male children. The situation is even worse for women who are not 
married, don’t have sons, or are widows and divorced.   
There are three different legal systems that govern inheritance laws in Tanzania. These 
include the statutory law, customary law, and Islamic law (Rwebangira 1996). Customary law 
applies to most people in the rural areas. Islamic law is applicable to those who profess Islam.  
The statutory inheritance law used in Tanzania is the Indian Succession Act of 1865 that was 
made applicable to Tanzania by the Indian Acts (Application) Ordinance, Cap.2 (Rehmtulla 
1999).This law applies to Tanzanian residents of European origin, Asians who are not Moslems, 
and Tanzanians whose life styles do not incorporate customary practices (Rwebangira 1996). 
The Indian Succession Act of 1865 is seen as a codified English common law which was 
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imported to Tanzania mainland from India as it applied in India in 1907. Although this Act has 
undergone a number of changes in India, it has remained unchanged in Tanzania since its 
adoption (Brown et al. 2003). The statutory inheritance law maintains that when a man dies, one-
third of his property belongs to the widow and the rest belongs to other family members. When a 
woman dies, the husband inherits all the property.  This indicates that women’s property belongs 
to the family, but man’s property belongs to the man. The use of word “his property” instead of 
“their property” implies that property in the family belongs to a man and not to both a man and 
his wife. Section 27 of the Indian Succession Act of 1865 states: 
 Where the intestate has left a widow, if he has also left any lineal descendants,  
1/3 of his property shall belong to his widow and the remaining 2/3 shall go to  
his lineal descendants.  If he has left no lineal descendants, but has left 
 persons, who are of kindred to him, one third of his property shall belong to 
 his widow, and the other shall belong to those who are of kindred to him.   
If he left none who are of kindred to him, the whole of his property shall belong 
 to his widow.35  
 
The multiple legal systems that regulate inheritance in Tanzania tend to co-exist. The 
applicability of these laws has been problematic due to increased in inter-marriages which makes 
it difficult to determine which law to apply.   But the law which applies to the majority of people 
in Tanzania is customary law. The rest of the laws are rarely used even by the community they 
are intended to serve (Rwebangira 1996:25).  
In Sukumaland, there is a belief that after a man dies, his property should return to his 
direct family, not to his wife. When the husband dies, the husband’s relatives lay claim to the 
                                                 
35 As quoted from Rehmtulla (1999:8). 
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land and other properties and often chase away the widow. The widow may be allowed limited 
use of the land provided she agrees marry one of her in-laws. This exposes women to the 
possibility of losing access to the land (Gray and Kevane 1999; Mwagiru 1998).  
Moreover, women are often chased away if their husbands divorce them. The fear of 
losing access to land has forced many women to tolerate abusive relationships (Palmer 2002).  
As one male respondent explained in focus group discussion: 
I paid cows as a bride price to her father. The cows I paid keep on reproducing and 
multiplying each year. So I bought her  to come and work for me, cook for me, bring 
water for me to bath, wash my clothes, and to bear children for me so I can have sons to 
take care of me when I get old. If I divorce her, it is up to me to decide whether I will give 
her some wealth or not since everything is mine. She came from her father with nothing. 
 
In focus group discussions, women said that upon the death of a husband, the widow is 
expected to marry her brother-in-law (gungelwa).  If the widow refuses, she loses the rights to 
use land or other family properties. Women said that if a widow refuses to marry one of her 
brother in-laws, she will no longer be regarded by her in-laws as a member of their family 
(Osumaga ou mante abo).  The widow is allowed to use any family land to cultivate her crops 
because she has “denied” her in-laws and has distanced herself from them. Whatever property 
the deceased husband possessed, passes to his male heirs. The case of a 56-years old widow 
explained what might happen to women in Sukumaland when they lose their husbands: 
My husband died ten years ago. After the funeral, the family elders sat down to discuss 
who should be my next husband. Two men, who were my brother in laws were selected 
and were told by the family elders to come and talk to me, just to get an idea if I was 
willing to get married to one of them. Each one asked if he could be my next husband. 
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The two men were required to send the report back to the family elders, whether I seem to 
like “staying” in the family or not. I did not want to get married to any of them. The next 
day, the family elders called up a family meeting.  I was asked “who do you think suits to 
take care of you.” I mentioned a two years old boy to take care of me. Traditionally, 
mentioning a child to be your next husband signifies that you don’t want to be married 
again.  The elders were angry about my decision.  They took away everything from me, 
cows, beds, cooking pots, bed sheets, and everything from me. They said I have to give 
them everything because they paid bride price to my parents, and I don’t have any right 
to anything. I was left with six children and nothing to eat. I was confused and couldn’t 
find anyone to help. I decided to go back to my parents for help. When I came back to my 
house, I found that they have taken my land and my house. They chased me away. 
 
If a widow has made her decision to be inherited by one of her in-laws at the family 
meeting, she will mention the man she prefers to be her husband. If the man is already married, 
the widow will be aware that his current wife or wives will not like it. But, women explained in 
focus group discussion that even if the current wife or wives doesn’t like it, she or they cannot 
stop the husband from taking another wife.  The in-law who inherits a widow is supposed to take 
care of the widow as his wife. But this doesn’t always happen.  As one inherited widow 
explained in a focus group discussion: 
He never took any care of me. All he wanted was the wealth from my deceased husband. 
After we got married, he sold all the cattle and used all the money.  
I am the one who takes care of the family, he does nothing. 
Surprisingly, widow inheritance is seen as a positive practice by some women.  Some 
widows view widow inheritance favorably because it provided them with an opportunity to 
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continue having access to land.  In an interview, a woman said that most widows decide to marry 
their in-laws because they have no choice.  If they refuse to marry their in-laws they will be 
chased away and their children will suffer. Some inherited widows may be “lucky” if they marry 
a good man. An example of a “lucky” widow is a 60 years old woman, who explained her story 
during focus group discussion. This woman said she agreed to marry her in-laws because she had 
no choice. Her decision turned to be a good one as she explained:  
I got married when I was 14 years old. My husband died four years later leaving me with 
two children. It was devastating. I had no choice but accepting to be inherited by my 
brother- in law. I respect him as my husband although it was difficult at the beginning. 
He is a good man and he takes good care of me.  My deceased husband used to mistreat 
me, but this one doesn’t. I continue to grow crops on the same land. Now my sons are 
grown up, they will inherit this land. 
Today, widow inheritance is viewed in a different light. The high prevalence of HIV/ 
AIDS threatens the custom of widow inheritance. HIV/AIDS has scared away many in-laws 
from inheriting widows, particularly if they are not sure what killed the widow’s husband. 
Moreover, the population increase in Sukumaland has made land more scarce. As a result, many 
in-laws would prefer to “chase” the widow away so they can get possession of the land. 
Moreover, the frequent occurrences of drought, and the impact of structural adjustment 
programs, have contributed to increasing poverty among the Sukuma. Many people now realize 
that inheriting a widow and her children can be a burdensome expense.  
The customary system of tenure is unable to provide tenure security for women. Tenure 
insecurity reduces women’s incentives to invest in the sustainable management of natural 
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resources, which hinders productivity (Besteman 1994; Place and Hazell 1993). Because women 
don’t have the right to manage the resource or exclude others from using resources, it is very 
difficult for them to practice sustainable resource management. “Full ownership right including 
the right to dispose of the property through sale or inheritance, is often assumed to provide the 
strongest incentive to maintain resources over time” (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997).   
Data from focus group discussions revealed how gender perceptions about property rights 
are embedded in the patriarchal system of the Sukuma. Surprisingly, when I asked women 
respondents, if given a choice and the power to implement it, how they would distribute 
inheritance among their children, 42 percent said they would distribute wealth equally among 
both male and female children, 55.4 percent said they would give more wealth to the male 
children than female children, and 3 percent said they would give nothing to their female 
children (Table 7.2). I also asked men how they would prefer to distribute their inheritance 
among their children (Table 7.3). The majority of men (83.3 percent) said they would give more 
wealth to male children, a response consistent with the fact that a majority of women preferred 
giving inheritance to male children. Only 5.2 percent of men said they would give equal share of 
inheritance to male and female children, compared to 41.5 percent of female respondents. 
Moreover, 11 percent of men reported that they would give nothing to female children, compared 
to only 3 percent of women respondents. 
Table 7. 2: Women’s Perceptions about Inheritance 
 
Distribution of inheritance Percentage 
 Give equal share for male and female children 41.5 
 Give more wealth to male children 55.4 
 Give nothing to female children    3.1 
 Total 100.0 
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Table 7. 3: Men’s Perceptions about Inheritance 
 
Distribution of inheritance Percentage 
 Give equal share for male and female children   5.2 
 Give more wealth to male children 83.3 
 Give nothing to female children       11.5 
 Total 100.0 
 
It is amazing how women’s self-image has been affected by customs and norms. Women 
see themselves as inferior people who don’t have the right to own or inherit property.  This 
shows the deep-rooted culture of customary property rights, which makes it difficult to 
implement the statutory laws that ensure equitable property rights to both men and women.  One 
woman who said that she would not give anything to her female children justified it by saying 
that:  
Giving inheritance to a female child is like throwing it away. It will not benefit her, but 
rather will benefit her husband and his family. Once she gets married, she will move to 
her husband’s family. The husband may take all that wealth from her and use it to pay 
dowry for a second wife or use it all for drinking local beer. If her husband dies, his 
relatives will take away everything from her. It is more secure to give inheritance to male 
children because the family wealth will remain in the family, it can help every member of 
the family including the female children who need help or are chased away by their 
husband or in-laws. 
 
In this situation, a political economist would argue that the statutory legal system is 
important because people tend to act according to their norms (which may be discriminatory).  
Also the community-yoke thesis maintained that statutory institutions can provide rules of justice 
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that can free people from customary ties (which may be discriminatory). But, as Hayami(1998) 
and new institutional theorists maintained, statutory institutions need to work together with 
customary institutions because statutory institutions may not have the resources to enforce their 
laws.  
The fact that women cannot own property makes them dependent on their husbands for 
their livelihoods. So a woman must rely on the goodwill of her husband and male children. This 
was also observed by Mbilinyi (1972) who pointed out that lack of property rights to women 
intensifies their economic dependence on men. The situation becomes worse if a husband does 
not take care of his wife and children in good faith. Properties such as the houses and agricultural 
fields are recognized as belonging to the husband, and if formal title is obtained, they are often 
registered only in the husband's name.  According to customary laws, one can not sell land 
without getting permission from clan elders, and sometimes from children (if they are adults). 
Moreover, the Land Act required men to obtain their wife’s consent before they can sell any 
family land. But women said in focus group discussions that in many situations a husband can 
decide to sell the land without his wife’s permission, even if she and her children depend on the 
production from that land. Under these circumstances, women may be unwilling to invest in a 
land if they believe that it may be taken from them.   
 Although poverty affects the whole household, it affects women more than men. 
Greater poverty among women is due to inadequate economic resources and opportunities, low 
levels of education, and low participation in the decision-making process. Poverty forces women 
into situations where they are dependent on men and vulnerable to male domestic violence.   
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7.4. Gender Perceptions and Division of Labor 
             In the Sukuma culture, the division of labor is gender-based. Women have the primary 
responsibility for domestic work. This includes cooking, fetching water, collecting firewood, 
doing laundry, cleaning the house, managing household health, and raising children. Table 7.4 
shows data obtained from focus groups where people were asked to give a detailed explanation 
of daily activities in a household, and say who does what activity at what time.  Data on table 7.4 
indicates that women work longer hours than men. In fact, women barely have time to rest.  
  
 Table 7. 4: Household Gender Division of Labor36 
 
 Time Women’s activity Men,s activity 
6.00 - 7.00 am 
 
Wake-up, fetch water and milk the 
cows 
Wake up37  
7.00 - 8.00 am 
Fetch water, prepare breakfast, and 
clean the house Wait for breakfast 
8.00 - 1.00 pm Farm / off-farm work 
Grazing livestock, farm/off-farm 
work e.g. brick making, home 
repair, thatching the roof, etc. 
1.00-  2.00 pm Cook lunch Rest and wait for lunch 
2.00 - 3.00 pm Take lunch, and wash dishes Take lunch and rest 
3.00 - 5.00 pm  Farm / off-farm work 
 Go to work: grazing, farm/ off-
farm work 
5.00 - 6.30 pm Fetch water, fire wood and greens 
from bushes for dinner Back from  work and rest 
6.30 - 8.00 pm Prepare dinner, milk the cows, 
attend the children 
Rest, go to drink local beer, talk 
and play games with friends 
8.00 - 9.30 pm 
Take dinner and attend the 
children Take dinner and rest 
9.31 - 6.00 am Sleep Sleep 
   
                                                 
36  These were general estimates given by focus groups. 
37  In the rainy season, men sometimes together with women will to go the field to ox-plow. 
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 Although both men and women wake up at the same time, women have more work to do 
during the day than men. They have to do both domestic work and farm work, while men do 
farm work or other economically productive work. While women are busy with domestic work, 
men will rest and wait for food to be prepared or they go drink or visit their friends. Although 
men are more engaged in heavy physical labor work like farming, livestock grazing and 
watering, brick making, new house construction, and  home repairing, they get time to rest. 
Women have tight schedules every day, as one task follows another. 
In addition to walking long distances to fetch water, I observed that sometimes women 
waste a lot of time waiting in long lines for their turn to collect water from a water source.  
During the dry season, most water sources both natural and developed produce very little water, 
so women take a long time just to fill one bucket. In some cases, women must leave at the 
middle of the night to avoid long queue at the natural water sources. In shallow wells managed 
by water-user groups, an equal amount of water must be distributed to each member household, a 
process that takes a long time. In other cases, women said in focus group discussion that a 
woman might have to spend three hours waiting at distant water pump along with scores of other 
women, for a turn to fill a water container, and then return carrying the weight of a full water 
container. In most cases, a water container or bucket weighs about 20 kilograms and carries 20 
liters of water as shown in figure 7.2. Women who carry this weight on daily basis may end up 
getting headaches, joint pains, and, in extreme cases, get curved spines and pelvic deformities 
(Greenberg 2003; Water Aid 2000). 
The gender division of labor is also revealed during the development of shallow wells. 
When the new established water-user group decides to dig a well, they require one member in 
each household to participate in the digging. 
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Figure 7. 2:Women have to fetch water and carry heavy weight on their head everyday 
 
 
 
In focus group discussion with water-user groups, they said that every household is 
required to bring food to the well site, on a rotating basis. Men are responsible for digging the 
well, and women are responsible for cooking the food. The food to be eaten by men at the well 
site is supposed to be special, and nicely cooked.  In focus group discussions, villagers said that 
men wouldn’t eat any “normal” food brought to the well site. Women were expected to do their 
best to prepare special meals. In focus group discussions, men said that they deserved to eat 
special meals because digging a well is a difficult task, which needed energy and motivation to 
do. They also said that they felt that their wives care for them and appreciate their work when 
they brought special meals to them. Women said that men were so picky, men wouldn’t even 
touch the food if it wasn’t special. In Sukuma culture, this is a bad thing, and makes women feel 
embarrassed.  As a woman explained in an interview: 
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We were not supposed to bringing potatoes or any food that is not special. Also women 
who bring food to the well site must be clean, and the food containers must be clean too. 
If you take normal food or food which is not properly cooked, men won’t eat it, and the 
whole village will know. You will be embarrassed to death that day! If it is your duty to 
cook, you must do whatever possible to prepare special food. Sometimes you can borrow 
money or find temporary paid farm work to raise money to buy special food. 
 
           Table 7.5 shows the data from the household survey which indicates that the collection of 
domestic water is mainly the responsibility of women. The majority of respondents (94 percent) 
reported that the collection of domestic water was primarily the responsibility of women.38 In the 
survey, 59 percent of respondents reported that the collection of water for domestic use was 
exclusively women responsibility, meaning that women are solely responsible and men are 
excluded from drawing water for domestic use. Also 36 percent reported collection of domestic 
water was predominantly the responsibility of women. This means that men were also 
responsible but women were more frequently responsible than men in collecting water for 
domestic use.  Men were more engaged in livestock watering than women. A small number of 
women were engaged in livestock rearing activities such as cleaning, milking and watering, 
normally when men are absent or sick. About 45 percent of household survey respondents said 
that livestock watering was predominantly a man’s responsibility.  With regard to irrigation, 
table 7.5 indicates that women are also engaged in irrigation, with about 45 percent of 
respondents reporting that both women and men are more or less equally involved in irrigation. 
                                                 
38 This is the sum of the percentage of respondents who said that collection of water for domestic use is exclusively 
and predominantly women’s responsibility. 
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Table 7. 5: Who is Responsible for Drawing Water for Different Uses? (Percentage) 
 
                                                                          Type of water use 
Who is responsible? Domestic Livestock Irrigation 
Exclusively women 58.6 1.6 11.1 
Predominantly women 35.9 18.4   0.0 
Women and men more or less equally   3.6 35.2 44.5 
Predominantly men   1.4 44.8 33.3 
Exclusively men   0.5   0.0 11.1 
Total 100 100 100 
  
 Surprisingly, I gathered from women in focus group discussion that the majority of 
women agree that domestic chores are their responsibility and that they wouldn’t let men help 
them with domestic chores.  One woman explained in a focus group discussion:  
I wouldn’t let my husband cook, wash dishes, or fetch water, it is my responsibility. It is a 
shame for a man to do domestic chores, and the whole village will talk about if it 
happens. I wouldn’t let him unless I am very sick. 
 
Other reasons given by women in focus group discussion and during informal discussions as to 
why they won’t allow men to help them with domestic chores are all rooted in the customary 
ideologies about women. These include: 
“The community will say you are growing horns, and trying to be a man” 
“People will say you have used witchcraft to make your husband behave like a woman” 
“His parents and relatives will hate you for mistreating and harassing their son”  
“You will be regarded an abusive wife”  
“It will be a ticket for divorce”  
 Most male respondents  that I talked to through informal  discussions and through focus 
group discussions were not in favor of equally sharing domestic tasks with women, except if 
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their wives were very sick and they could not find a female relative to help.  This view was also 
given by some women in focus group discussions. Women said before they can let their 
husbands do domestic work when they are very sick, they will try to find a relative or a close 
friend to come and help first.  Men said it is embarrassing for them to intrude into women’s 
“colonies.” In Sukuma culture, a kitchen is regarded as a place for women or “women’s colony” 
because they are the ones who are responsible for cooking and washing dishes. I also observed 
that women do not eat together with men. In most cases women eat in the kitchen with children 
while men eat in the dinning room, sitting room, or outside. The few men who favored sharing 
domestic tasks with women said they would do so only if they were not seen by other people and 
they would not carry water on their head as women do, but instead they would use bicycles or 
trolleys.  As one customary leader reported in an interview: 
Domestic chores are women’s job, we also have our own jobs. It is okay to help our 
wives with domestic work when they are sick, but it is not possible to do it on a regular 
basis when everybody knows that your wife is healthy.  This is our culture and it has been 
like that. 
Other reasons given by male respondents as to why they won’t be willing to share domestic 
chores with women included: 
“Your wife will think you are disrespecting her for taking her job” 
“She will think you don’t love her” 
“Other men will laugh at you” 
“It is embarrassing for men to do women’s job” 
“I am a bread winner” 
“What did I pay the bride price for?” 
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“People will think you have mental problems” 
“It is degrading to men” 
“Unacceptable in our culture” 
“You will never be respected” 
 
 The above reasons show that most men believe that they are “better” than women. They 
think domestic work is degrading and embarrassing to them. Some felt that since paid the bride 
price and they are bread winners, so women should do domestic chores. Others indicated the 
influence of culture in gender division of labor where men who participate in domestic work are 
not respected.  Also some men felt like women feel loved and respected when they are left with 
the responsibility of domestic work.  This was also mentioned by women in focus group 
discussions that “if men are in charge of domestic work, what will we do?” Women said that 
they will feel worthless if their husbands begin to take charge with domestic work, except in an 
emergency situation. 
 Women are also highly involved in agricultural production.  Data from the household 
survey indicates that the major sources of irrigation water in the dry season included rivers (56 
percent), ponds (22 percent), and shallow wells (22 percent). In the wet season, rainfall (98.2 
percent) is the major source of water, with paddy rice as a primary irrigated crop. Table 7.6 
shows the data from household survey which indicate that a large number of respondents (44 
percent) reported that women and men were more or less equally involved in irrigation, while 33 
percent reported that irrigation was predominantly a male’s responsibility. Women were more 
involved in wet season irrigation, specifically on paddy rice production.  Men were more 
involved in dry season irrigation, mainly vegetables and fruits, rather than in wet season 
irrigation. Most men, who engaged in irrigation during the dry season, said in focus group 
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discussions that they did so for commercial purposes and not for growing crops for home 
consumption.  Women said in focus group discussions that a woman is traditionally responsible 
for growing and harvesting the crops, while her husband owns the produce by virtue of being the 
land owner. He also decides how much produce is sold and how much is kept for household 
consumption. The husband usually takes the produce to market and sells it, thereby taking 
control of cash income for the household. So, although women are highly involved in irrigated 
agriculture, men control the benefits of the harvest.  
 
Table 7. 6: Gender and Irrigation 
 
Who operates the irrigated parcel?        Percent 
  Dry season Wet season 
Exclusively women 11.1 16.1 
Predominantly  women   0.0 66.1 
Women and men more or less equally 44.4 14.3 
Predominantly men 22.2   3.6 
Exclusively men 22.2   0.0 
Total      100.0       100.0 
 
Customary laws have greatly influenced the way men and women perceive themselves. 
Gender perception has a great impact on the decision-making process because it dictates who has 
the right to make decisions (Nemarundwe 2003).  Tables 7.7 and 7.8 show how men and women 
in the focus group discussions perceived themselves. Women place an emphasis on domestic 
responsibility and problems that women face everyday. Women view themselves as mothers and 
wives, but as also being powerless and inferior, with responsibility for the family and domestic 
work. Although both women and men view men as powerful, bread winners, head of the 
households, and decision makers, some women view men as controllers and oppressors. By 
contrast, men view themselves as superior. They view themselves as intelligent and powerful, 
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strong, as kings, decision makers, leaders, and bread winners. Both men and women excluded 
men from domestic responsibilities and child care.   
Men perceive women as inferior, and responsible for all domestic and family 
responsibilities. Both men and women acknowledge the role of women as mothers and hard 
working. But, in focus group discussions, men revealed that they felt that they don’t have to 
work hard in the household because they paid a bride price for a woman and expected her to 
work hard and bear children in return. In everyday life, women are supposed to be submissive to 
their husbands and do whatever they are told by their husbands without question.  One key 
informant said that women are supposed to submit to their husbands because that’s what the 
bible says.  During an interview with him, he was holding a bible and he read bible verses to me:   
  The bible made it clear. In first Timothy chapter two verses 11 to 14, it says “let a 
woman learn in silence with all submission. And I do not permit a woman to teach or to 
have authority over a man, but to be in silence. For Adam was created first, then Eve.  
And Adam was not deceived, but woman being deceived, fell in to transgression.” 
 
The above bible quotations were also mentioned by men in focus group discussions.  I 
asked women in focus group discussions how they thought about the above verses,  and they said 
that although the bible says women need to submit to their husbands, it also says husbands must 
love their wives and take care of them. Women also said some men don’t take care of their wives 
and children (Ili mradi olei na ngosha guke, ngosha mahano). Women also said that it is true that 
Adam was created first, but Eve was created from Adam’s rib, this is a symbol of oneness.  So 
women agreed that they need to submit to their husbands, but, they also said they expect to 
receive love and care in return.  
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 As one woman explained in an interview: 
How can you submit to a man who beats you and harasses you every day?  
A man who doesn’t care about you? A man who uses all the money to drink beer,   
 and doesn’t care about the children? A man who is not faithful? 
 
Table 7. 7: Women’s Perceptions about Themselves and about Men 
  
How women perceive themselves  How women perceive men 
 
Hard working Bread winner 
Mother and wife Leaders 
Child bearing and child care Head of household 
Care for the family Powerful 
Powerless Intelligent 
Less educated and unintelligent Controller 
Insecure life Oppressors 
Suffer a lot of problems Decision maker 
Inferior Unfaithful 
Does all domestic work   
 
 
Table 7. 8: Men’s Perceptions about Themselves and about Women 
 
How men perceive themselves How men perceive women 
 Bread winner Child bearing 
Head of household Hard working 
King of the family Takes care of family 
Powerful, stronger Responsible for domestic work 
Decision maker Cant make good decisions 
Intelligent 
Leaders 
Patient 
Mothers of the house 
 
 
I observed that when greeting men, women are supposed to show respect and submission 
by kneeling down. It is unacceptable for Sukuma women to greet men while standing.  I also 
observed women’s submission during meetings with men. Women sat on the floor while men sat 
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on chairs as shown in figure 7.3. Similar results were reported by Nemarundwe (2003), who 
observed village meetings in the Romwe district of Zimbabwe and found that women sat on the 
ground while men sat on the chairs or on other elevated positions. Similar results were also 
observed by Agarwal (2001) who found that in India and Nepal, women sat on the floor while 
men (especially the older ones) sat on the cots or chairs during meetings. Sometimes women sat 
on the side or at the back of the meeting space. This made women’s participation less effective 
because points made by males during meetings (who happen to sit in front) received higher 
priority.  
 
Figure 7. 3: Women shows respect to men by sitting of the  
                   and let the men sit  on the benches 
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Although sitting on the ground was viewed as a cultural behavior, it reflects the different 
positions that men and women have in the community, where men are viewed as the dominant 
group. As observed earlier, gender perception among the Sukuma is rooted in their culture. 
Women acknowledged that they often don’t speak up in village meetings and that they often 
accepted decision made by men even if they didn’t agree with them. Women said they could not 
make “intelligent” points that would convince men to accept their ideas. Moreover, because men 
are viewed as superior, women could not challenge or men’s ideas.   
Over the years, women in Sukuma land have experienced some change in gender 
relations. Although men are still viewed as bread winners, an increasing number of women have 
engaged themselves in income-generating activities. Villagers reported that in the past, men were 
expected to provide everything for their family. Today, this trend is changing because more and 
more women are engaging in income-generating activities. They attributed this trend to 
government policies aimed at empowering women and helping women improve their lives by 
engaging in income-generating activities.   
In focus group discussion, women said they have the interest and commitment to improve 
their standard of living. They have tried to pool their scarce resources to form small groups for 
development.  They have organized themselves in different groups and have established different 
income-generating activities. In some villages, women have registered their groups and have 
applied for loans from the government. These women work together on issues like cash-crop 
production and tailoring. Some women’s groups have established credit institutions (ifogong’ho) 
where people could borrow money and return it with 10 percent interest per month.  
Women reported that NGOs such as CARE have provided financial support to women’s 
groups. Moreover, women have benefited from the Health through Sanitation and Water 
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(HESAWA) programs that began in Tanzania in 1985. HESAWA is mainly financed by the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) to work on rural water 
supplies, environmental sanitation and health education, focusing on poverty eradication and 
gender equality.  To achieve its goals, HESAWA has invested in the development of human 
resources by training village health workers, craftsmen, water technicians, and water pump care-
takers, where both men and women have equal access to training. Women groups have also 
benefited from HESAWA’s credit program which provides financial support for women’s 
groups.  
Although women are now engaging in income-generating activities, women said in focus 
group discussion that their participation is subject to approval by their husbands. Moreover, most 
women said they have no say on how to spend the money they earn. They are supposed to get 
approval from their husbands before they can spend their money. But men can spend their money 
and other family wealth like cows the way they want even without their wives’ consent. Some 
women reported that they try to hide the actual amount of money they make from their drunken 
husbands who may take the money and use it for drinking. 
Changes have affected men as well.   In focus group discussions, women said that in the 
past men never fetched water, but this is slowly changing.  I observed young boys from 7 to 11 
years in the villages fetching domestic water. But when boys fetched water, they didn’t carry 
water containers on their head but used a bicycle or a trolley instead (figure 7.4 and 7.5). Most 
women in the villages reported that drawing water for domestic use is a woman’s job and that 
they won’t let their sons draw water if there were girls in the family. 
In my observations, young boys were accompanied by an adult if they collected water 
from developed shallow wells, and unaccompanied if the water source was a spring. Older men 
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(teenagers and above) still do not fetch domestic water in the villages unless women are sick and 
there is no one to fetch water. However, I observed young boys and adult men fetching water for 
sale in Bariadi town as shown in figure 7.5.  
Figure 7. 4:  When men fetch water, they don’t carry on their head  
                      they use bicycles instead 
 
 
Figure 7. 5:  A water vendor in Bariadi town center 
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          Water vending was only observed in Bariadi town and it is not common in rural areas. 
Water vendors, who were all men, supplied water in restaurants, small hotels, and guest houses 
and in some well off households. Water for sale was mainly obtained from natural sources, from 
the charco-dam in Bariadi town, and from private shallow wells where water vendors had to buy 
water and sell it for profit.  
 
7.5. Gender and Institutional Arrangement for Water management 
Although women are very important in the economy of Tanzania and are significant users 
of water, they rarely make decisions about water management policies. Women remain under 
represented at all levels of policy formulation and decision-making in water management, from 
local positions to the ranks where national and international environmental policies are 
determined. Their experience and skill in water-resource management is often marginalized in 
policy-making and decision-making bodies, and in educational institutions and environment-
related agencies.  
The new system of water-resource management in the Bariadi district, and Tanzania in 
general, requires the creation of domestic water-user groups that make cash and inkind 
contributions. The new sysem appears to be more gender neutral because each water-user group  
has a water committee with an equal number of men and women (three  men and three women). 
Each member of a water-user group gets equal benefits regardsless of gender. But the system of 
membership fees and other money contributions may affect women with low financial ability, 
particularly  women who may not be able to get money from their husbands, who may regard 
water as the wife’s responsibility and place a lower value on saving women's time and effort than 
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women do themselves (Cleaver and Elson 1995). However, having an equal number of men and 
women in the water committee does not mean equal participation in decision making.  
Although the  involvement of women in water commitees and water-user groups provides 
women with new opportunities to manage  water, in reality  women are less likely to exercise 
real power in a patriachal system where men have more power than women and tend to dominate  
in most situations. One of the reasons is that women lack self-confidence, due to cultural 
constraints, which prohibit women from freely expressing themselves and participating in 
discussions at public gatherings of men and women (Lundqvist 1999). Another cause of lack of 
women’s self-confidence and inferiority is their low level of education. As pointed earlier, 
women in Tanzania have low levels of education compared to men.39 This means that women 
have difficulty in understanding the structures of different statutory systems. Issues such as how 
to register land, how to get land ownership, and how to contest land are not understood by a 
majority of women. Although participation in water-user group meetings could give women a 
voice in making decisions about water management, women rarely attend these meetings. 
Women’s low rate of participation may be caused by rules that may limit attendance to only one 
person per household, in which case the man usually attends meetings. Other factors that 
influence women participation are: a loss of social prestige that may accompany  a woman 
appearance in public; too little time that may be given to women at meetings; or lower literacy 
rates among women which give them a lower status in public meetings (Meinzen-Dick 1999a).  
Moreover, women are more committed to other domestic roles like cooking, childcare 
and general sanitation, so they tend to have little time to attend meetings. The few women who 
                                                 
39 For example, the literacy rate in 2004 for men in Tanzania was 85 percent compared to 65 percent of females 
(Engenderhealth 2005). 
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did attend meetings often sat at the back and kept quiet. In many water- related meetings, men 
dominated the meetings, elected each other in leadership positions and made most of the 
decisions with regard to water management (UNDP 2003). Traditionally, it was assumed that the 
men, as heads of households, represent their wives and that they will inform their wives about 
everything that was discussed at the meetings. Unfortunately, that is not always the case. 
Research shows that “much communication is gender segregated, and so male family members 
will keep the information to themselves” (Lundqvist 1999:14).  
7.5.1. Gender and Customary Institutions 
In my observations, I found that customary institutions in the Bariadi district are gender-
biased. In both the Dagashida and Sungusungu, only men are allowed to join, and they tend to 
apply a male-biased interpretation of customary laws. Women are not allowed to join either of 
these two important customary institutions.  Women are also not allowed to attend Dagashida or 
Sungusungu meetings. They are only informed that a law has been adopted or that decision was 
made, and they were expected to follow whatever decisions were reached.  Women don’t get an 
opportunity to challenge decisions or contribute to the discussions made by men. As one woman 
explained in a focus group discussion:   
Men will make all the decisions themselves and keep most of them as secrets. They 
wouldn’t tell us what they have discussed even if we ask. They only announce to us what 
they have decided and what we should do. They get a lot of money from fines paid by 
offenders of traditions and culture. Sometimes offenders are told to pay a cow by 
“Sungusungu” or “Dagashida.” The money is then distributed among men. Women 
receive nothing; they don’t even bring the money home.  When they get the money, they 
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go to drink local beer. If an offender pays a cow, they will slaughter the cow and eat the 
meat at the meeting. They won’t bring a single piece of meat at home. Sometimes they get 
a lot of money. If this money could have been used for development, we could have solved 
a lot of poverty problems in our village. We could have built hospitals, schools and we 
could have dug a lot more wells.  
All the Sungusungu groups I talked to said that the major reason for not allowing women 
to join Sungusungu was that women didn’t keep secrets. Moreover, there is a danger involved in 
local policing work, which may not be suitable for women. For example, patrolling the village at 
night or chasing and roughing criminals. In focus group discussions, I asked Sungusungu and 
Dagashida members whether they would be willing to work with women. One Sungusungu 
member said:  
No! We won’t allow women in Sungusungu or Dagashida, our work will be so difficult if 
we work with women. Women like to talk and gossip a lot, they never keep secrets. It is 
hard to arrest an offender and investigate cases if you dispose all the information about 
him or her 
The above discussion shows that customary institutions discriminate against women. 
However, chapter six shows that customary institutions are strong in water access and prevention 
of pollution and abuse issues. The biggest challenge that the government faces is to ensure that 
customary institutions provide for gender equality in development and governance processes.   
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7.5.2. Gender and Statutory Institutions 
The United Nations Beijing Platform for Action addressed the issue of power inequality between 
women and men in public affairs.  Governments were urged to take action in order to ensure 
gender equality in access to and participation in power structures and decision-making, and they 
were urged to promote women's capacity to participate in decision-making and leadership. The 
Beijing Platform for Action has recommended the following actions be taken to increase 
women's capacity to participate in decision-making and leadership. Governments, national 
institutions, the private sector, political parties, trade unions, employers' organizations, sub-
regional and regional bodies, non-governmental and international organizations, and educational 
institutions were asked to:40  
a. Provide leadership and self-esteem training to assist women and girls, particularly 
those with special needs, women with disabilities and women belonging to racial and 
ethnic minorities to strengthen their self-esteem and to encourage them to take 
decision- making positions;  
b. Have transparent criteria for decision-making positions and ensure that the selecting 
bodies have a gender-balanced composition;  
c. Create a system of mentoring for inexperienced women and, in particular, offer 
training, including training in leadership and decision-making, public speaking and 
self-assertion, as well as in political campaigning;  
                                                 
40 Source: UN 1995. 
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d. Provide gender-sensitive training for women and men to promote non-discriminatory 
working relationships and respect for diversity in work and management styles;  
e. Develop mechanisms and training to encourage women to participate in the electoral 
process, political activities and other leadership areas. 
Tanzania has tried to increase the representation of women at all levels of government. The 
aim is to reach the goal of the 1997 Gender and Development Declaration of having 30 percent 
of women in decision-making by 2005, which was set by the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC). The latest election held in December 2005 resulted in increased women’s 
representation in decision-making positions. The new presidential cabinet led by President 
Jakaya  Mrisho Kikwete has 16 women (26 percent), comprising six ministers and ten deputy 
ministers. In this cabinet, women have been appointed to occupy positions that had never been 
occupied by women. Such positions included the Finance and Cooperation, and Foreign Affairs 
ministries.   
 In 2005, Tanzania became the third country within the South African Development 
Community (SADC) to achieve the target of having women 30 percent of women in the 
parliamentary seats. Other SADC countries that have attained this goal are Mozambique and 
South Africa. The number of women in the parliament has increased from 21.53 percent in 2000-
2005 to 30.41 percent in 2005-2010 parliamentary terms (Table 7.9).  
Women who aspire to political office are faced with a number of constraints. First, the 
majority of women have lower incomes than men, and they have no power to use family 
resources to campaign unlike their male counterparts. Moreover, the traditional stereotype that 
women cannot be good leaders, affects women. Most voters prefer to vote for men. Given the 
slow progress in increasing the number of women in the decision-making process, one strategy is 
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to establish a legal quota system and adopt gender-sensitive campaign training for women 
candidates. Another strategy is for the government to provide campaign subsidies for women.  
Although the increase in the number of women in the parliament is a big step towards 
women empowerment in decision making, the number alone is not sufficient enough to 
transform patriarchal norms that exist in Tanzania. The most important issue is for women to 
have an impact on the transformation of patriarchal systems. To achieve this change, women 
need support from members of society, both men and women, and from institutions (both 
customary and statutory), and NGO’s to create gender awareness as well as to increase women’s 
confidence and participation in development. Moreover, patriarchal ideologies that exist in 
Tanzania, together with customary perceptions and attitudes about women cannot change 
overnight. It is a slow process which requires a team effort as explained by Hayami (1998). The 
multiple legal systems that exist in Tanzania need to be harmonized to support each other. 
Relying on statutory institutions alone is not enough to bring social change. 
 
Table 7. 9: Distribution of Members of Parliament by Gender 
                   for 2000-2005 and 2005-2010 Parliamentary Terms41 
 
Gender  Parliamentary term (year) 
  2000-2005 2005-2010 
  Number Percent Number Percent 
Female 62 21.53 97 30.41 
Male 226 78.47 222 69.59 
Total 288 100 319 100 
 
 
                                                 
41 Data  were obtained from  the Parliament of Tanzania website    
    http://www.parliament.go.tz/bunge/Assembly2.asp 
 
 
 
260
Tanzania ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) in 1981. CEDAW was adopted by United Nations General 
Assembly in 1979. By ratifying CEDAW, countries pledge to end discrimination against women 
in all forms. CEDAW stresses on the equality of men and women in the legal system, and 
established that women should have the same rights as men.  It calls for changes in constitutions, 
legislation and policies to reflect gender equality. Although the ratification of CEDAW is an 
important step for social and legal reform, it is not a sufficient measure of the government’s 
commitment to end gender discrimination (Clark 1991; Cook 1990).   
For example, Tanzania has not incorporated CEDAW into statutory law through an Act 
of Parliament. This means that it cannot be treated as part of statutory laws for the purpose of 
making formal judgments or court decisions (Rehmtulla 1999). Although Tanzania ratified the 
CEDAW, and incorporated the Bill of Rights in its constitution, “it is clear that the state is not 
altogether progressive in implementing these objectives beyond the level of rhetoric” (Manji 
1998:666).  Addressing gender discrimination means addressing the judicial, legislative, 
customary laws, and administrative powers. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
8. WATER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS: CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, AND STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
 
8. 1.  Introduction 
This chapter provides an assessment of customary and statutory institutions for water 
management. This includes the analysis of effectiveness and strengths and weaknesses of 
customary and statutory institutions.  As explained in chapter four, effectiveness of institutions 
was analyzed using three criteria: the role of institutions in conflict resolution, the extent of 
community participation, and how effective institutions are in achieving gender sensitive goals. 
The strengths and weaknesses of customary and statutory institutions were analyzed in order to 
determine how their strengths complemented each other and how weaknesses might be 
strengthened to achieve sustainable water management in rural Tanzania. 
 
8.2. Institutions and Conflicts Resolution 
Conflict refers to a state of  disharmony, opposition, or disagreement  that can occur 
when two goals are incompatibile (Dyer and Song 1997). Conflicts over resources occur when a 
scarcity of resources causes competition and disagreement (Grimble and Wellard 1997). 
Conflicts can occur at the micro-micro level or micro-macro level. Micro-micro conflicts are 
those that occur among individuals or groups within a community. Micro-macro conflicts are 
those that occur between individuals or groups on the one hand, and government,  or private 
companies on the other. 
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Conflicts are often viewed as negative because they cause tension, wasteful competition, 
uncertainty, and violence. But, conflict is not always negative. In fact, conflicts can be beneficial 
if managed effectively.  Conflicts can play an important role in informing society that there are 
problems that need to be solved. Conflicts may cause the society to consider new ideas and 
alternatives to solve problems. Well-managed conflicts can  strengthen relationships, bring new 
ways of thinking, and can lead to  consensus that better meets  the needs of an individual and 
society in general (Bourgeous 1985).  
Conflict resolution refers to strategies that seek to resolve an existing conflict or 
incompatible interests and behaviors. A conflict is resolved if the incompatibility between two 
parties disappears, or when sources of conflict situation are removed through a mutually 
acceptable process (Bar-Siman-Tov 1994). This study discusses two types of natural resource-
related conflicts that occur in the Bariadi districts, water-related and land -related conflicts. The 
discussion below examines these conflicts and how they are resolved. 
8.2.1. Water-Related Conflicts 
  The ability of community members to access and use water resources in the Bariadi 
district is defined mainly by customary laws.  As discussed earlier, these laws determine the 
priority of water use, provide control of water use, and dictate who has right to the resource and 
who has an obligation to manage water resources.  These laws involve both private and public 
rights and obligations to particular water resource use.  
 In focus group discussions, villagers said that the most common cause of conflict among 
irrigators is the theft of water. Because most irrigation during the wet season depends on rainfall 
availability, some rice farmers steal water from neighbors’ paddies. They usually steal water at 
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night. Customary institutions prohibit such theft, and impose heavy sanctions on water thieves. 
In focus group discussions, irrigators explained that water theft is mainly done when it rains. The 
thief will typically divert or redirect the flow of water of other nearby farmers to direct the water 
on his or her own paddy farm. In some cases, a thief pokes a hole into the nearby paddy wall at 
night, so the water can flow on his or her paddy farm and then seals the hole before dawn.  
The first level of conflict resolution is conducted by the two irrigators. After a thief is 
caught, he or she is confronted and asked to stop or return the water he or she stole (if the paddy 
farms are in a plain area, the thief will be asked to poke a hole on the paddy wall so the water he 
or she stole can flow back to the owner).  The second level is when the two can not resolve the 
conflict, or come to agreement. The irrigator whose water was stolen, reports the thief to 
Sungusungu or Dagashida. In focus group discussions, Sungusungu and Dagashida members 
said repeat offenders are fined, or in serious cases, ostracized.  Once they are taken to 
Sungusungu or Dagashida, offenders are required to pay double fines, one for the Sungusungu or 
Dagashida and one for the victim of water theft.  
Conflicts also exist between small-scale irrigators and other water users.  The major 
source of water for irrigation during the dry season is rivers, ponds, and developed wells. In 
focus group discussion with irrigators, they said that when water is scarce, irrigators upstream 
may use up most of the water, so little water remains for downstream users. This causes conflict 
between irrigators and water users downstream.  
If the river is trans-boundary, where upstream and downstream water user belongs to 
different villages, the solution to this kind of conflict requires joint action. Customary institutions 
in both villages get together and formulate joint laws because every one has an equal right to a 
 
264
natural water source that passes by their community. So, in addition to settling intra-community 
water conflicts, customary institutions also settle inter-community conflicts over water. Statutory 
institutions are “too thin” in rural areas to effectively and quickly identify and solve upstream-
downstream water conflicts (Van Koppen et al. 2004). 
Livestock keepers get into conflicts when they are not able to access enough water for 
their livestock. In focus group discussion with livestock keepers, customary institution members, 
village elders, and local government officials, they said that most of the conflicts occur in the dry 
season because most the common water sources for livestock watering dry out, and then, 
livestock keepers compete with other livestock keepers or with neighboring communities for 
water. A Sungusungu chairman said in an interview that when conflicts arise, most people first 
negotiate. But, if negotiation doesn’t work, they will ask customary institutions to resolve the 
conflict. In many situations, conflicts are resolved. In a few cases, the loser may appeal to 
statutory institutions for resolution.  
Domestic water use also leads to conflicts when water is scarce. Most shallow wells have 
water guards who make sure there is no theft and there is peace at the well. In focus group 
discussions, water-user groups said that no one is allowed to fight, argue, or use abusive 
language at the water source. Those who are at odds are supposed to report their disputes to the 
chairperson of the water-user group. 
During participant observation, I observed that at natural water sources like springs, there 
were no special guards, except that villagers were supposed to watch one another.  A woman key 
informant explained the suffering she goes through during the dry season. She is a member of a 
domestic water-user group but she doesn’t get enough water from a shallow well during the dry 
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season, so she has to get more water from springs. Her story shows that people try to resolve the 
conflict by themselves first, before they report it to customary institutions.  As she explained: 
When you get at the spring, there is a long queue. In the dry season there isn’t enough 
water for all of us.  You have to wake up at 5.00 am before everybody else otherwise you 
won’t get water on that day. Sometimes you can be at the spring up to noon waiting to fill 
up your bucket.  Everyone is supposed to line up; there is no way you can cheat because 
everybody at the well will have seen you. We all watch each other and we know who 
came first. Sometimes people want to cheat and jump to the front. But we normally 
confront them and make sure they are embarrassed or report them to the Dagashida. 
  The above situation can occur at a time when water is scarce and everyone scrambles for 
water.  When water is plenty, it is less likely that there will be very long queues at the water 
sources, but still some people may not want to line up. Instead, they may want to cheat and draw 
water quickly.  As the above woman explained, community members watch each other and 
confront those who want to cut the line.  
Conflicts can also occur when pastoralists graze their animals in croplands, either 
because of carelessness or accident.  This is another major source of conflict because most 
people depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Once their crops are grazed, their livelihood is 
threatened. In focus group discussions with livestock keepers, village elders and customary 
institution members, they said that grazing on other peoples’crops is regarded as a serious 
offence and is sanctioned severely. In many situations, the conflict is solved by negotiation 
between the two parties, and the livestock owner is asked to pay the loss his or her animals 
caused. In a situation where the two parties cannot agree, they will take the dispute to the 
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customary institutions. But, livestock keepers said they usually try to negotiate and solve the 
conflict before they are taken to customary institutions. They also said that it is better to 
negotiate and agree with the victim for many reasons. First, if the dispute is taken to a customary 
institution, they will have to pay a bigger fine. One Sungusungu chief said “we charge bigger 
fines because we don’t get paid for what we do, we totally depend on fines to run our 
institution.” Also Dagashida members said they charge bigger fines because half of it goes to the 
victim, and the other half remain in Dagashida. They used the word “bigger fine” to refer to 
double the amount of compensation asked by the victim. 
 Second, it is important for livestock keepers to have a good relationship with their 
neighbors because they need their help when there is cattle theft.  Cattle theft is very common 
among the pastoralists. Livestock keepers often rely on fellow villagers to help search for their 
stolen cattle. Maintaining a good relationship with fellow villagers is very important for cattle 
owners, so they usually plead guilty if their animals are caught grazing in other people’s crops, 
and most of the time they assume responsibility for their actions. Livestock keepers explained in 
the focus group discussions: 
We livestock keepers are very scared of fines. If you are caught, you will always want to 
negotiate and come into consensus because you will be required to pay a larger fine 
when you are taken to Dagashida or Sungusungu.  If you don’t solve the conflict with 
your neighbors, who will help you when your cows are stolen? When your cows are 
stolen and you whistle for help, people won’t come to help search for your cows. They 
will say you were so proud that you grazed their crops and they won’t come to help. 
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Third, there is a belief that livestock keepers will be cursed by ancestral spirits if they disobey 
customary laws.  Livestock keepers said they worry that angry spirits will result in the loss, 
death, or infertility of their livestock. 
8.2.2. Land-Related Conflicts 
Land conflicts in the Bariadi district are mostly related to boundary disputes, disputes 
between relatives over inheritance, and disputes between individuals and local government over 
the allocation of land. Most of these disputes are solved by customary institutions or households. 
In a situation where the dispute is not solved by the customary system, it is taken to the statutory 
institutions.  In focus group discussions with local government officials, they said that each 
village has a committee for boundary and land disputes (Kamati ya Migogoro ya Mipaka na 
Ardhi) established by the local government. Serious cases of land and boundary disputes are 
taken to this committee. But the committee works along customary lines. As the chairman of the 
committee explained in focus group discussions: 
When we get a complaint about land or boundary, first we call the village elders who 
have been in this area for a long time. Village elders know better than us. They also help 
us to identify witnesses who live or farm close to the disputed area.  Then we will go and 
look at the land or boundary. The witnesses and village elders know who has customary 
right in what area and where the boundaries are. They will show us who is right and who 
is wrong, then we will decide. 
In this case, it is very interesting that in some situations statutory institutions use 
customary institutions to resolve conflicts. It shows the potential of the two institutions to 
cooperate, taking advantages of the strength of each institution. The chairman of the committee 
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for boundary and land disputes said that the committee solves most land and boundary disputes. 
In a situation where an individual is not satisfied, they make an appeal to the formal court. But, 
most people in all the focus groups said they try to avoid going to formal court because it is too 
expensive both in terms of time and money. They also reported that because of corruption, they 
had lost faith in formal courts. Similar report was provided by Langseth and Michael (1998), who 
conducted a research on corruption in Tanzania, and found out that corruption and bribe 
payments, resulted in lower satisfaction with public service delivery, and less efficient public 
services.  
Most of conflicts over land inheritance occur when family members disagree about who 
should get what land.  As one woman explained in a focus group discussion: 
My husband died in 1995. He left me with five children of whom two were sons. My 
husband had other children with another woman in another village. The sons of the other 
woman showed up at the funeral and wanted their inheritance. My two sons wouldn’t let 
their step-brothers get equal share of land. Then a big fight emerged. The step-brothers 
claimed to have equal rights. Family elders intervened, the step brothers didn’t get equal 
share since their mother was not married to my husband. 
 
The above woman was lucky because she has sons who could inherit the property of their 
father, so she could continue to use the family’s land.  But women who don’t have male children 
may face difficulty if their husbands die or divorce. Perhaps the most difficult land disputes 
occur between individuals and the government. In focus group discussions, villagers reported 
that the local government sometimes took their land for developmental projects like schools or 
health care centers. There was one such conflict between villagers and TASAF (Tanzania Social 
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Action Fund). TASAF is a government institution established to reduce poverty by building 
schools, bridges, clinics, and water sources. In one incident, villagers explained, TASAF wanted 
to take private land for a development project. A conflict arose because land owners didn’t have 
anywhere else to farm. In another situation, the land was allocated to someone else through 
statutory land rights. In focus group discussions with livestock keepers, one villager described 
the situation: 
I was shocked when I went to my farm and found someone building his house. This is the 
land I inherited from my parents. The land has been ours from our great parents. When I 
asked why he took my land, he showed me a title deed; he said the land was allocated to 
him by the local government. It has been three years now but I haven’t been able to get 
my land back. When I went to customary institutions, I won the case, but the guy 
appealed to the formal court because he has a formal land right and I have nothing.  The 
case is still in court and a ruling has not been made. It pains my heart to see how poor 
people are oppressed by their own system.  
 
This conflict underscores the serious conflict between customary and statutory institution 
which is a result of lack of recognition of customary institution by the statutory institutions. The 
villager had customary right to the land in question, but because he didn’t have formal right, he 
was at a risk of losing his land. In this situation, the security of tenure provided by the formal 
land right had created insecurity of tenure to a villager above.  The above story tells how 
unhappy the man is with statutory institutions. He felt he is being oppressed with the formal 
system of land rights. This story provides evidence that the formal system of land right is not of 
interest to most villagers. 
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In the case of conflict resolutions in Bariadi district, it is clear that customary systems are 
preferred and widely used.  A customary leader said in an interview that the customary 
institutions take into account facts that are not presented in formal court systems. Most conflicts 
that occur in rural areas are often part of long-running disagreements. In order to handle a 
conflict effectively, a customary leader said, it is important to understand the history of the 
underlying conflict which is hard for the formal court system. He said “the judges sit in the 
courts, and they may not know what exactly happens in the village. But, we know our people, 
and we know who is right and who is wrong.” These statements are consistent with the land 
related conflicts, where the use of village elders who are not directly related to the case, is 
perceived to bring a more just solution to a conflict.   
8.3. Institutions and Community Participation 
  One of the central issues to sustainable rural water management is the concept of 
participation, involving rural people in making decisions concerning the water they use and the 
environment they live in.  The concept of community participation entails the idea that 
community members who inhabit an environment over time are often the ones best able to make 
decisions about its sustainable use (McIvor 2000). The idea of community participation is also 
supported by new institutional theorists that the best way to achieve sustainable resource 
management is to design institutions that are governed by resources users themselves and to 
involve local resource users in resource management (Blomquist 1990; Bromley 1992; McKean 
1992; Ostrom 1990; Pinkerton 1989; Singleton and Taylor 1992; Tang 1992). 
Participation can be categorized in many different ways. Studies on participation have 
come up with different types of participation (Agarwal 2001; Pretty et al. 1995).  This study 
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adapts Agarwal (2001) levels of participation as described in table 8.1.  The levels of 
participation are arranged from lowest to the highest level. The lowest level is nominal 
participation which is explained by membership in a group, and the highest is interactive 
participation, where people have a voice and influence group’s decisions. Agarwal (2001) points 
out that effective participation requires a shift from the lowest (nominal) to the highest 
(interactive) level of participation. 
Table 8. 1: Levels of Participation (Agarwal 2001) 
 
Form/ level of Participation Characteristic Features 
Nominal participation Membership in a group 
 
Passive participation 
 
 
Being informed of decisions ex post facto, or attending 
meetings and listening in on decision- making without 
speaking up 
 
Consultative participation 
 
Being asked an opinion about specific matters without 
guarantee of influencing decisions 
 
Activity-specific participation Being asked to (or guarantee to) undertake specific tasks
Active participation 
 
 
Expressing opinions, whether or not solicited, or taking 
initiatives of other sorts 
 
Interactive participation 
(empowering) Having a voice and influence in the group’s decisions 
 
 
The highest level of participation (interactive participation) is achieved when the 
community has total control of its resources. But, not every community member has a voice and 
influence in the community’s decision making. In the Bariadi district, although community 
members in focus group discussions said they participate in planning and implementing water 
management laws, in reality most of decisions about water- management laws are made by 
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customary institutions, which are primarily led by men. As explained in chapter five, members of 
customary institutions said women are not allowed to join Dagashida or Sungusungu. Also in 
focus group discussions with women, they said they cannot join Dagashida or Sungusungu 
because that is a “men’s thing.” Most women said they will not join Dagashida or Sungusungu 
even if they were allowed to do so because it just doesn’t look “natural.” People will say women 
“have grown horns” (bazwile mhembe) if they try to join Dagashida or Sungusungu, or if they 
speak up, give their ideas, or challenge men in village or clan meetings. Therefore, women in 
Bariadi district are not even nominal participants in the Dagashida and Sungusungu institutions. 
As explained in chapter seven, women are supposed to do what has been decided, and  they are 
not supposed to question it.  This was also revealed through my personal observation during 
focus group discussion with Dagashida and Sungusungu members, who were all men. I was the 
only woman, so they were all amazed, and wondered what gave me courage to “face” them, talk 
with them, and even ask them challenging questions. One Sungusungu chief said most women 
won’t even dare to come close to a place where Dagashida or Sungusungu members are holding 
their meetings. He also said Sukuma women won’t even ask some of the questions I was asking 
them, like why women are not allowed to join Dagashida or Sungusungu. He gave the reason 
that “it has been like that, women cannot be equal or above men.”  
 In an interview with village executive officers they said that the local government 
requires both men and women to equally and actively participate in decision making regarding 
water management. But, in practice that is not always the case. For example, the local 
government requires water committee to be comprised of equal number of males and females. 
However, in practice customary law still influences gender relations.  Participation of women in 
water-user groups is mainly passive. In most cases women will physically attend meetings, but 
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rarely participate actively. They usually sit and listen when the decisions are made without 
speaking up.  Moreover, the male members of customary institutions rarely consult women when 
enacting laws or making decisions about water management laws.  Despite the limited 
participation of women in decision making, women are more drawn to specific tasks related to 
water management activities like cleaning the area around the water source, and guarding the 
water sources. Thus, women lack active and interactive participation in decision making. The 
National Water Policy recognizes the importance of stakeholder participation in water resource 
management. The policy states: 
Water supply and sanitation facilities provided without the active participation of the 
beneficiaries in planning and management are often not properly operated and 
maintained and hence are unsustainable. (URT 2002a).  
This implies that community participation in the management of water resources is very 
crucial to achieve sustainable development. But, in reality community members are not involved 
in the formulation of statutory water management laws. Currently, community participation in 
the management of water resources through statutory institutions in the Bariadi district consists 
of “passive participation,” and, in a few cases “consultative participation.” The recognition of the 
importance of community participation in water management alone is not enough. The reality is 
that statutory institutions still treat the community as passive recipients of information and 
outside expertise who have nothing to offer in return (McIvor 2000).  
Nemarundwe (2003) pointed out that community participation in the management of local 
natural resources can lead to economic and managerial efficiency because: 
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A. It allows local people to bear the cost of natural resource management. They will be able 
to make decisions rather than waiting for the decision to be made by outsiders. 
B. It will reduce administrative and management transaction costs incurred by the statutory 
institutions. 
C. Community members will be able to use their local knowledge, values and customs in the 
design and implementation of natural resource management projects. 
 
Therefore, participation should include all stakeholders, not just men, if they are going to 
achieve a balanced decision making process. True participation should involve a joint decision 
making for planning and implementation of water management projects (Heyd and Neef 2004). 
The state needs to work together with customary institutions to formulate and implement water 
management laws that will also include gender progressive policies in order to bring a change in 
norms and gender perception. This research appeals for co-management between statutory and 
customary institutions and other stakeholders involved in water management.  A similar appeal 
was made by Singleton (2000) who argued that co-management will take advantage of the 
capacities and incentives of both state and local water managers. Moreover, co-management has 
a potential to succeed because it will combine local knowledge with scientific knowledge 
produced by state agency scientists. This combination will produce more complete, finely-tuned 
set of information which may be used as a base to make better decisions and formulate better 
water management laws. 
8.4. Strengths and Weaknesses of Statutory and Customary Institutions 
Previous studies of water management in Tanzania found that there is coexistence and 
interdependence between customary and statutory institutions (Sokile et al. 2005), and that their 
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interface is complex. There are situations where the two institutions conflict with each other, 
situations where the relationship of the two is of suspicion and disdain, and situations where 
customary institutions operate with relatively favorable oversight on the part of statutory 
institutions (Roy 2005).  
The importance of customary laws is often underestimated by statutory institutions. Von 
Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann (2001) said that policy makers tend to make three 
kinds of mistakes. First, policy makers assume that all laws do not issue from state institutions 
are customary and long established. In fact, customary laws are not static, but emerge and change 
over time. Many are quite recent.  
Second, policy makers tend to assume that every community member act according to 
customary laws because these laws are deeply ingrained in local society. In reality, people do not 
fully comply with customary laws, and levels of compliance vary  in every community.  That’s 
why customary institutions in each community enact new laws so they can adapt to changes that 
are constantly occurring in the community. Finally, policy makers assume that all customary 
property is communal property.  In reality, property in rural areas is never fully communal, but a 
mixture of communal and individual, and public and private elements. 
Field research in the Bariadi district indicates that most people trust customary 
institutions more than statutory institutions. In focus group discussions, villagers reported 
mistrust and dissatisfaction with statutory institutions. They felt that the state’s relationship with 
them is unequal, and that the state uses constitutional power to marginalize them. This was also 
revealed by the “evil-market” thesis that the “market” is “evil” because it undermines traditional 
moral codes and exploits poor people. 
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 Leaders of customary institutions reported that they had to get permission from formal 
institutions to ostracize individuals in communities. In situations where customary leaders didn’t 
obtain permission, they were arrested by local government officials. Moreover, rural 
communities preferred to use informal institutions to solve conflicts than using formal legal 
means, which they viewed as costly and corrupt. But, as explained by new institutional theory, 
customary and statutory institutions do not operate in isolation (Poteete and Ostrom 2004). They 
reinforce or counteract one another (Pelling and High 2005). Customary law greatly influences 
people’s perception about statutory law and the implementation of statutory laws regarding 
property rights and dispute resolution. 
8.4.1. Strengths of Customary and Statutory Institutions  
Customary institutions have the potential to work more efficiently in rural areas than 
statutory institutions (Schlager 2005). First, I observed that people respect customary laws 
because the rules are made by community members, for community members, and they are 
improved over time. Because customary laws originate from local institutions, they normally 
take in to account their environments and other problems facing the community. Community 
members said they are committed to enforcing their laws because they participated in enacting 
them.  
Second, customary laws are applied within a small geographical area, so they meet the 
specific needs of a particular locality. Community members are better able to manage their 
resources because they are knowledgeable about their local environment and the water they use, 
which they consider when making decisions (Leach et al. 1999; Tsing et al. 1999). Among the 
Sukuma for example, there are different customary laws governing drinking, irrigation, and 
livestock water uses. Likewise there are different laws for private, public, developed and natural 
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water sources. Through customary institutions, local resource users may be able to apply  
management designs that are capable of quickly adjusting to local environmental change 
(Colding and Folkes 2000).   
Third, I observed that community members have powerful social ties because they live 
together and know each other, have dense social networks, strong primary relationships, and 
group solidarity. Customary institutions are supported by effective information networks. In 
focus group discussions, villagers said it is easy for them to watch each other and observe who is 
breaking the rules. Additionally, the collective management of water resources brings the 
community together and strengthens existing ties and spirit of cooperation. Furthermore, 
discussions with focus groups and key informants revealed that customary laws are known by all 
community members because every community member is notified of a new law at village 
meetings.  Customary laws provide strong incentives for community members to comply with 
them by raising the cost of non-compliance through penalties such as social ostracism.  Members 
of Sungusungu said that the fear of social ostracism, shame, and loss of reputation increases 
people’s willingness to comply with customary laws and makes the guilty submit to punishments 
ordered by customary institutions.  
Fourth, villagers said in focus group discussion that the punishments imposed by 
customary institutions are more immediate and more efficient than those imposed by statutory 
institutions, such as imprisonment, which is costly. In focus group discussions,  Dagashida 
members said that it took a long time to go through the court system and to prosecute offenders. 
They also said that customary institutions punish offenders “on the spot” (sidalalaga eisha 
Dagashida).  
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As one member of Dagashida explained:  
Before the government knows there is a problem in the village, Dagashida knows first 
and immediately tries to solve the problem. We punish the offender right away, contrary 
to the government which sometimes takes a month to punish an offender. If we get 
information about an offender in the morning, we will arrest and punish him or her on 
the same day, and he or she will have to pay the fine on the same day. 
In an interview, one village chairman said that the enforcement and implementation of 
customary law is cost effective because community institutions have the ability to regulate use 
and arbitrate disputes quickly and cheaply. There is little need to pay bureaucrats to manage and 
enforce statutory laws (Sokile and Van Koppen 2004).  Similar results were observed by Colding 
and Folke (2000:7) who pointed that statutory institutions should consider the benefits of 
customary institutions. They explained: 
Informal institutions may facilitate a reduction of transaction costs. This is done by 
providing for reduced costs in institutional monitoring, enforcement of appropriators, 
and sanctioning of violators. Biological conservation and nature management should 
capitalize on such benefits. These benefits, implicit in most informal institutions, indicate 
that it may be worthwhile to make use of them in nature management designs in both 
non-Western and Western settings. (Colding and Folke 2000:7). 
Perhaps one of the most striking features of customary institutions is that they do not 
require recognition from statutory institutions to function.  I gathered from focus groups and key 
informants that customary institutions have greater local legitimacy in the Bariadi district. A 
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customary leader said customary institutions have been operating since time immemorial, and 
they still operate despite the lack of enforcement support from statutory institutions.    
In an interview with key informants at the Ministry of Water, they said that statutory 
institutions can provide expertise and technical knowledge in the management of water 
resources. This is because statutory institutions have access to larger-scale ecological 
information, as well as tools of data analysis that may not be available to local communities 
(Singleton 2000). Statutory institutions have greater access to financial resources, which may be 
used to provide local communities with subsidies that will support water management activities. 
Because of poverty, customary institutions may be incapable of meeting all the costs for water 
management. Table 8.2 provides a summary of the characteristics of statutory and customary 
institutions that help describe their strength and weaknesses. 
Table 8. 2: Characteristics of State versus Customary Institutions 
 Customary institutions Statutory institutions 
Scale 
 
 
 
Smaller-within boundaries of 
communities, unless coordination 
among communities 
 
Larger-crossing boundaries 
of communities 
 
 
 
Typical resource 
application 
Extraction 
 
Pollution 
 
 
Information Specific, time, and place Generalized, technical 
 
Social ties and norms Powerful Weak 
 
Rules 
 
Multiple depending on resource and 
users 
Tend to be uniform across  
resource and users 
Monitoring and 
enforcement 
 
Tend to be informal, rest heavily on 
social ties and norms 
 
Tend to be uniform across  
resource and users 
 
 
Adapted from Schlager 2005. 
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Although statutory institutions can provide tenure security through formal water and land 
rights, some villagers in Bariadi district said they have experienced tenure insecurity. This 
happened because some people obtained statutory land rights to land that belongs to another 
person who does not have formal land rights. Thus, formal land rights may provide security of 
tenure to better-off people, but not to poor farmers who can not afford the transaction costs of 
acquiring formal land right (see section 6.3.1). 
 
8.4.2. Weaknesses of Customary and Statutory Institutions 
Table 8.2 indicates that statutory institutions make laws that are uniform for different 
resources users and across all communities. They don’t consider the fact that norms and customs 
are not uniform for all communities in Tanzania. Although uniform laws are easy to design, 
monitor, and enforce, resource users are less likely to comply with laws that do not specifically 
apply to their unique circumstances (Schlager 2005).  In addition to making laws, state 
institutions must enforce them. One of the problems faced by the local government is poor 
infrastructure. For example, I observed that most villages in the Bariadi district are isolated. Due 
to poor infrastructure, local government officials said that it is very difficult for the district 
council to communicate efficiently with all the villages in the district. It is important that 
statutory laws leave room for local communities to elaborate local approaches to resource 
management that reflect specific cultural, legal, and hydrological conditions (von Benda-
Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann 2001).  
The state also faces difficulty because of its limited human and financial resources 
(Arnold and Campbell 1986), and a heavy reliance on formal punitive sanctions to enforce their 
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laws. Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world, where financial limitations prevent 
the governments from hiring enough personnel to enforce water management laws. Villagers 
said that because the government lack enforcement capacity, some people in rural areas are 
unaware of existing statutory laws, and others think the laws are no longer in effect. Villagers 
said that some offenders were not punished, so people decided not to follow some of the laws 
because there were no incentives to comply with them.  
Another problem facing statutory institutions is the corruption of employees who are in 
charge of enforcement and capture by elites where interest groups shape or influence statutory 
institutions for their own benefit (Olson 1971).  Corruption exists when an individual uses a 
public office or official position for his or her personal interest.  In focus group discussions, 
villagers said that the few personnel who are hired by the government to enforce water 
management laws are poorly paid, and hence some of them are corrupt or unmotivated. Tanzania 
doesn’t have an effective welfare and national social security program. People try save funds for 
their retirement. Many government officials feel insecure because they may lose their source of 
income if the party in power changes. So they try to get as much money as they can while they 
still hold office. Officials also try to acquire wealth through quick and easy means (Fidelis and 
Adjibolosoo 1994:124).  According to The World Bank (2002(a):145), “widespread corruption 
in the public sector has led to massive economic losses in terms of reduced income from taxes, 
revenues and other fiscal charges; loss of income from natural resources; and losses through 
misappropriation of government  asserts.”  
In focus group discussions and key informant interviews, villagers said that they trust 
customary institutions more than statutory institutions because customary institutions are “free” 
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from corruption.  They also said that it is not easy for the offender to escape punishment by 
bribing the whole entire village. As two members of customary institutions explained during 
focus group discussions:  
Statutory institutions have a lot of politics. There are smart people who know how to 
defend their interests and can get away with everything. If you take them to court, they 
will win the case even if they committed the offence.  
 
With customary institutions, every community member is a witness. You can’t bring 
politics, or try to be smart to get away with your offence. Everything you do in the 
community is seen by every community member. 
 
Local government officials also lack authority to make decisions on their own. In an 
interview, local government officials said that although they have been given power by the 
central government to enact by-laws and make decisions on water management, their decisions 
has to be approved by the central government. Many natural resource management problems 
require immediate action, but this is hard to do under the current local government structure 
(Mniwasa and Shauri 2001). The by-laws enacted by local governments are required to be 
consistent with statutory laws, otherwise they won’t be approved. Because community members 
have limited participation in the passage of statutory laws, the laws may not incorporate local 
conditions and customs (Nkonya et al. 2005). 
 Because the government lacks the capacity to enforce its rules, it needs to work with 
customary institutions. The government needs to strengthen, recognize, and formalize customary 
laws for water management.  Customary institutions have proven to be more effective in law 
enforcement than statutory institutions. This supports Hayami (1998) idea of harmonizing the 
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“evil market” with “community yoke” thesis on one hand, and moral economy with political 
economy perspective on the other. Customary and statutory institutions complement each other. 
The state could provide customary institutions with resources and the expertise to manage water. 
This could lead to creased in participation in water resource management by local communities.  
The failure of the government to enforce its laws increases corruption and reduces people’s 
commitment to manage their water resources. As Schlager explained: 
The government must implement, monitor, and enforce the rules that it has adopted in a 
consistent fashion. If the government officials repeatedly violate rules, or refuse to 
enforce them against certain individuals, commitment among water users is likely to 
erode. If the water users have no means, or very weak means, by which to hold 
government officials accountable, commitment problems may become that much more 
severe. Thus, in this situation, it is not just a matter of providing assurance to water users 
that all water users will follow the rules, it is also a matter of providing assurance that 
the government will also follow the rules.(Schlager 2005:45).   
Although customary institutions are highly desirable in rural areas, it would be wrong to 
assume that customary laws are necessarily more equitable than statutory laws, or that rural 
communities have the technical expertise they need to manage their water resources. Customary 
institutions can be inequitable, especially for women (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002).   As 
explained in chapter seven, customary laws in Bariadi district have shown considerable 
inequalities based on gender.  The traditional system in the Bariadi district is patriarchal, which 
denies women the right to property and economic opportunities. Women are exposed to violence, 
abuse, and exploitation. Although women and men have equal rights to land according to 
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statutory law, in practice, women’s ownership of land is very rare.  Inequality in land rights has 
an impact on water rights too, because water and land rights are usually connected. For example, 
the rights to irrigation water from public water sources are usually distributed among individuals, 
usually men who own land by the river. People who don’t have land by the river can cannot use 
water from the river for irrigation (unless they borrow or rent land by the river), but they can 
draw water from the river for other uses. Thus, the unequal distribution of land causes an unequal 
distribution of water (von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann 2001). As one irrigator 
explained during focus group discussions: 
 We irrigate by the river and when the river dries out, we dig a well on the river bed. 
Everybody irrigates his or her own land, but some have rented, at a cost of about 
Tanzanian shillings 5,000(about $5) for quarter of an acre.   The contract ends after 
every harvest. If an individual want to continue using the land, he or she must renew his 
or her contract with the land owner. 
 
 Statutory laws for water management also show some elements of inequality. For 
example, statutory management of irrigation water in Tanzania is done through formal water 
rights or water permits. Once a water right is acquired, an individual is supposed to pay water 
user fees depending on how much they extract (Mwaka et al. 1999; Sokile and Van Koppen 
2004).  The use of water permits by the state law makes it too difficult for many rural people to 
obtain water rights. Many rural people are not willing to apply for water right and pay water fees 
because they believe water is a common-pool resource. Moreover, water permits are very 
expensive. Water rights for domestic water supply cost Tanzania shillings 35,000 (about US$ 
35). “In a country with an average GNP per capita of just $210, this amount of money is very 
significant” (Huggins 2000).  
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 Most people in rural areas still give more allegiance to customary laws and institutions 
and so are less likely to apply for water use permits from formal government institutions. This 
has created a recipe for conflict. There are many instances of disputes between holders of 
‘deemed’ (customary) rights and those who have been given formal water rights (Huggins 2000). 
Some combination of both customary and statutory institutions may potentially increase the 
efficient management of rural water sources. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
9. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
9.1. Introduction 
The major purpose of this study was to understand the impacts of customary institutions 
on rural water management and to analyze how they may be used to complement statutory 
institutions. This study contributes to research on institutional arrangements for rural water-
resource management by addressing the differential impact of customary and statutory 
institutions on managing rural water resources for different water uses.  The study also analyzed 
the role of gender and showed how customary and statutory institutions affect men and women’s 
participation in water management in different ways.  Comparisons between customary and 
statutory institutions were drawn, and they revealed the level of compliance, effectiveness, and 
strength and weakness of each institution. 
 
9.2. Theoretical Framework, Data Collection and Analysis 
   This study adopted three related theoretical frameworks for understanding institutional 
frameworks that play a part in rural water management. First are moral theories including the 
moral economy and the “evil-market” thesis. Second are rational choice theories including the 
tragedy of the commons, political economy and “community-yoke” thesis, and the third are the 
new institutional theories.  
This research used both primary and secondary data. Primary data for this research were 
collected in 2005 for a period of four months from a sample of 20 villages in Bariadi district, in 
Northwestern Tanzania. Data were collected through household survey, focus groups 
discussions, participant observation, key informants, and photographing. Secondary data were 
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obtained from district water office, District council office, regional water office, The Ministry of 
Water and Livestock Development, and from literature.  In this study, an attempt was made to 
integrate qualitative and quantitative analysis in the analysis of the impact of customary 
institutions. This was useful because it reduced the likelihood of bias and increased an 
understanding of the phenomena that were being investigated. The use of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods helped to increase the reliability of the results because it was possible to 
cross-check one result against another.   
The rationale of this study was based on the idea that access to safe water is very crucial 
for improving human health and alleviating poverty. Improving access to safe water could lead 
to the improvement of production in agriculture (Kaliba 2002). An improvement in agricultural 
production could lead to an increase in household food security and income in general. 
Moreover, an improvement in water access could help to reduce women’s workload particularly 
long-distance walks in search of safe drinking water.  The next section summarizes the major 
findings of this research and provides recommendations for policy makers. 
 
9.3. Important Findings and Recommendations 
9.3.1. Compliance with Customary and Statutory Institutions 
The analysis of determinants of compliance with customary and statutory law was 
conducted using three regression models. The first regression model assessed the determinants of 
compliance with customary law that prohibited bathing or washing clothes by the drinking water 
sources. The second and third regression models assessed compliance with two statutory laws. 
The first statutory law requires each household to have a toilet facility and the second statutory 
law prohibited agricultural activities at a distance of less than 30 meters from a water source.  
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Results  from the three regression models indicated that significant factors that affecting 
community’s compliance with customary laws are market access, family size, membership with 
associations (credit and water), level of education, area of farmland owned by the household, 
tropical livestock unit, group size, and the household health.  Significant factors that affected 
compliance with statutory laws included religion, type of roof for the main house, association 
membership (security, credit and water), family size, and tropical livestock unit owned by the 
household.   
Regarding compliance with customary law that prohibited bathing or washing clothes at 
the drinking water source, variables such as access to market, participation in water associations, 
farm size, age of household head, and household health had a positive association with 
compliance with customary law. The rest of the significant variables, namely education, tropical 
livestock unit, and group size had a negative association to compliance with customary law.  
This implies that improving access to information and market, supporting the establishment of 
water-user groups and associations, encouraging community members to join those associations, 
and improving access to safe water and access to health facilities are crucial for community 
participation in local water management. Moreover, the government needs to empower, support, 
give more autonomy, and work hand-in-hand with customary institutions to increase the 
likelihood of compliance from the educated and rich members of the community.  
The regression model for compliance with the statutory law that required each household 
to have a latrine indicated that all the significant variables, namely religion, the type of roof for 
the main house, membership in security association, tropical livestock unit owned by the 
household, and household health had a positive association to compliance with this law. The 
third regression model, for compliance with the statutory law that prohibited agricultural 
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activities close to drinking water sources, indicated a positive association with religion and 
membership in security and support associations. The rest of the significant variables, namely 
membership in water associations, age of household head, and household health had a negative 
association to compliance with this law. This implies that the government needs to support rural 
development activities that will help improve rural income because wealth indicators such as the 
type of roof for the main house and tropical livestock unit increase the likelihood of compliance 
with statutory laws. Likewise, younger household heads tended not to comply with customary 
law but were more likely to comply with statutory law. This suggests that the government needs 
to recognize the need to promote both customary and statutory institutions. The positive 
association between membership in security and support associations and with compliance with 
the statutory law that prohibited agricultural activities close to drinking water sources implies 
that the government needs to support religious groups and other associations such as security and 
support organizations that promote and encourage compliance with water management laws.  
Evidence from this study suggests that some of the challenges facing rural communities 
include low levels of education, large family size, and poor sanitation.  Although education had 
no significant relationship with compliance with statutory laws, it had a significant negative 
association with compliance with customary laws. This indicates that more educated people are 
less likely to comply with customary laws, and are more likely to get into trouble with customary 
institutions.  This finding is supported by Freire (1972) who criticized the western education that 
was adopted by many African countries after their independence as “elitist” because it ignored 
indigenous African social and cultural values, and alienated people from their culture and 
traditions. He believed that multi-cultural education is essential for national education and 
development. This implies that education in Tanzania must incorporate important elements of 
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culture that guide social life. Although policy makers prepare national educational programs, no 
consultation with the local communities is carried out.  Through its curriculum, the current 
education system transmits and enforces western values and neglects traditions and customs of 
indigenous people. The government needs to recognize that peoples’ customs and traditions are 
important as well.  This might lead to the possibility of researching on ways to include customs 
and traditions along with formal education.   
Educated young people may also play a major role to bring change. As the older 
generation retires, young people, if equipped with proper education, will carry on and continue to 
appreciate customary laws and their importance in conserving the environment to rural people. 
This may increase the likelihood of compliance with customary laws from the educated members 
of the community. To have an educated and informed population is very important for policies 
and strategies to reduce poverty, excessive population growth, and environmental degradation.   
 
9.3.2. Gender and Water Management 
 As expected, this study found that women are not significant decision makers in most 
water management institutions. Customary institutions continue to discriminate against women 
as do statutory institutions.  To my surprise, most women “accept” this discrimination especially 
on issues of property rights. Most women said they prefer to give inheritance to male than female 
children.  Although non-governmental organizations have helped build self-confidence and 
empower women through financial support for income-generating activities, the gender barriers 
imposed by customary laws are still a major problem in rural areas.  
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 This study expected statutory laws to be more gender sensitive than customary laws. 
Although the constitution and the Land Act are against any form of discrimination, it was 
amazing to find out that other statutory laws such as inheritance laws and the Marriage Act have 
some provisions that tend to contradict the constitution and the Land Act.  Moreover, the 
enforcement of the constitution and the Land Act is still weak. In practice, customary laws 
continue to discriminate against women, particularly on issues of property rights.  This research 
has similar findings as that of Michael (1998), who observed that at the top-level of decision 
making, the Ministry of Water and Livestock development in Tanzania is male dominated, and 
that women’s participation in water management at the village level is still limited.  Women’s 
input is missing in the enactment of water management laws in customary institutions. This 
research recommends that policy makers design polices that could liberate women from gender- 
discriminating laws. The state needs to ensure that women have full rights to property, just like 
men, and challenge customary laws that obstruct women’s full participation in the management 
of natural resources. This can be done by educating rural people about the importance of 
incorporating women in decision making for managing water resources. Women have 
accumulated a lot of invaluable environmental experience and knowledge. They have always 
been the ones to find water, and choose sources according accessibility, availability, distance, 
time, quality and use.  So it is important that their concerns are represented in decision-making.  
The limited participation of women in decision making regarding water management 
means that women's perspectives, needs, knowledge, and proposed solutions are often ignored 
(Shiva 1989). Because women are major resource users, they are the ones who are directly 
affected by water management policies. Women may not be aware of some restrictions made by 
men with regard to water management and may continue to break the rules. Weakness in 
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communication, representation, democracy and accountability in water management may lead to 
free riding and corruption (Ostrom 1992). Sustainable development will be hard to achieve 
unless women's contribution to environmental management is recognized and supported. Both 
women and men affect the environment through their economic and household activities. 
Understanding gender differences is crucial for developing policies aimed at sustainable resource 
use, and improved health and well-being. Thus, women should be treated as partners in the 
development of the natural resource management policies, and they should be involved at all 
levels. The goal of development cannot be achieved if specific plans and expertise do not work 
to improve women’s position and condition. There is a need to have an approach that could 
facilitate a balanced community where men and women will not be unequal partners (Nahar 
2002).  
The study also found that women have lower levels of education compared to men. 
Women’s education is a very important dimension of development. Increasing women’s 
education is crucial for women’s empowerment. The lack of education among rural women 
increases their dependency on men and their vulnerability to gender discrimination. It also 
reduces their ability to participate in development activities and increases their likelihood of 
being excluded from new opportunities (Olumakaiye and Ajayi 2006).  Investment in women is 
particularly needed in Tanzania because women are the major users of water and are responsible 
for drawing water for the family and for providing food to the family. Therefore, there is an 
urgent need to increase access to education for all, particularly the girls.  
Moreover, women themselves need to learn about their rights and take charge in the 
process of change. Women’s active involvement in water management requires a strategy of 
empowerment. Empowerment combines education and capacity-building in the water sector with 
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participatory processes that give women the opportunity to participate in decision-making. The 
government needs to facilitate women’s empowerment by formulating development policies that 
increase the knowledge and skills of both women and men. Empowering women with water 
rights strengthens their access to water for both domestic and income-generating uses. Better 
access to water would liberate women from the daily suffering of fetching water. Moreover, 
better access to water would allow women to increase their income through gardening and 
farming, livestock, aquaculture, forestry, and other water-based enterprises (Van Koppen 2001). 
Increased participation by women in water management would also likely improve household 
hygiene and sanitation because women are more involved in household hygiene and sanitation 
than men. 
 
9.3.3. Effectiveness of Customary and Statutory Institutions 
As expected, this research found that conflict resolution in the Bariadi district is deeply 
rooted in the culture and history of the Sukuma people. The norms and customary laws define the 
traditional ways of resolving local water and land conflicts. This study found that customary 
institutions are mostly used to solve land and water conflicts. It was interesting to find out that 
sometimes statutory institutions use customary institutions to solve land and water conflicts in 
rural areas. Conflict resolution for land and water disputes using customary laws follows three 
steps: to settle the dispute using discussions and negotiation; to take corrective measure by 
compensating victims of wrong doing; and to ensure fairness in the judgments. Customary 
institutions members said they try to make sure that the methods of resolution and the procedures 
for resolving a conflict are fair to all parties of the conflict. Respondents reported that they 
wanted their problems and conflicts solved quickly. That’s why they were more likely to go to 
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customary institutions to resolve conflicts. Because of rising corruption in Tanzania, this 
research found that community members in the Bariadi district trusted customary institutions and 
felt that most of the judgments made by customary institutions were fair and balanced.  
Respondents pointed out that formal courts were costly, located too far away from their 
community, and took too long to render verdicts.  Individuals referred their cases to formal 
courts only if customary institutions did not successfully resolve the conflict.  
Regarding community participation, this research found that customary institutions were 
more participatory than statutory institutions. This was expected because local communities 
enacted and enforced their own laws.  This is one of the reasons why people complied with 
customary laws. But, as noted earlier, women lack representation in customary institutions. 
Although the establishment of water-user groups provided more opportunities for women to 
participate in decision making, the norms were still a barrier for women that prevented them 
from participating in decision making. Customary institutions need to take into account women’s 
role in water management decisions. It is important to sensitize customary institutions to this 
problem. This might be done by persuading NGOs and other organizations in rural areas to 
sensitize rural institutions to ensure that every one is involved in decision making. 
 
9.3.4. Strengths and Weaknesses of Customary and Statutory Institutions 
Research on natural resources management has stressed the importance of community-
based natural resources management (CBNRM). This has been caused by the failure of many 
state programs in developing countries to manage natural resources effectively. As a result, 
resource degradation has been on the rise, increasing the incidence of the disease and death 
associated with water pollution and poor hygiene. One of the reasons associated with the failure 
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of state institutions is the fact that they have often neglected the role of local people and their 
customary laws in designing and implementing solutions for these problems. 
Statutory institutions tend to apply uniform laws for everyone. But, customary laws are 
also important because they originate from local institutions and normally take in to account the 
local environment and other problems facing the local community. Moreover, customary laws 
are designed for a specific locality and for specific uses of water. Compared with statutory 
institutions, customary laws are cost effective because the laws are administered and enforced by 
local people. As expected, statutory institutions find it difficult to enforce their laws because of a 
lack of resources, poor infrastructure, and corruption.  
This alternative approach, the CBNRM, has been proposed as a crucial strategy for the 
sustainable management of natural resources. The CBNRM approach recognizes that local 
communities are knowledgeable about their local resources and have greater interest in the 
sustainable use of their local natural resources than statutory institutions. Moreover, community 
members have the motivation to manage their local resources collectively, provided that they 
have the assurance that they will benefit from their investments. In rural areas, local water users 
know each other, so they can easily monitor each other to make sure everyone abides by local 
customs. They can easily and quickly identify violators of water laws than statutory institutions.  
This research found that most rural people are not aware of the statutory laws for water 
management. Rural communities have enacted their own laws to manage their water resources.  
Respondents reported lack of human resources capacity at the local level to plan, manage and 
implement water management activities and policies as one of the major challenges of 
decentralization in Tanzania.  Hence recognizing and formalizing customary laws can help to 
address the problem of lack of human resources. Similar results were observed by Ayee 
 
296
(1996:50) who pointed out that effective decentralization requires the state to deliberately plan 
and build on what already exists in the community by taking into account the historical and 
institutional realities that determine why things are the way they are.  
9.3.5. The Role of Customary and Statutory Institutions in Water Access  
As expected, this research found that customary institutions are the most influential in 
water access and prevention of water pollution and abuse. For example, most laws enacted by 
water-user groups were consistent with the customary laws and were focused on prevention of 
pollution and abuse, and equitable water access. The awareness of the customary and water-user 
group laws was also generally high perhaps due to the participatory nature of those institutions. 
Thus, local institutions for water management may be empowered and motivated to increase 
their participation and cooperation in achieving equity in access to water and prevention of water 
pollution as a way to reduce the cost of water management using statutory institutions.  
The results of this research also underline the complementarities of the plural legal 
instruments that exist in Tanzania. While the local government appears to have a strong 
institution related to development of water, customary laws have stronger institutions related to 
equitable water access of natural water sources. These laws have been adopted by water-user 
groups for equitable access of water from developed sources. The same applies to laws for 
prevention of pollution and abuse of drinking water sources.  
 
9.4. Concluding Comments and Recommendations 
This study found that customary institutions are more effective at the local level 
compared to statutory institutions. This study therefore is in favor of empowerment, 
strengthening and integrating customary and statutory institutions through participatory 
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processes that ensure equal contribution in decision making process.  The current National Water 
Policy and the National Water Sector Development Strategy in Tanzania have ignored customary 
arrangements for managing rural water resources. Also the river basin management approaches 
have paid little attention to management of domestic water sources (which are mainly 
underground water sources in rural areas). 
Water supplies in the Bariadi district are not sufficient to sustain water needs particularly 
in the dry season. Most natural and developed water sources are seasonal. There is a need to 
consider how to develop water supplies in rural areas. Rural water supplies also need to be 
improved because they are much poorly developed than urban areas. This imbalance in the 
provision of social services has contributed to rural-urban migration, which in turn has led to 
development of slums, environmental pollution, and crime in urban areas. Current efforts to 
develop rural water supplies therefore need to be revived. The development of more shallow 
wells, deep wells, and boreholes to tap underground water is a pragmatic strategy that could 
increase the availability of safe water in dry regions like the Bariadi district. The government 
needs to work on the implementation of its laws, not just adoption of laws. This can be 
successful if the government cooperates with local institutions. The government needs to 
consider a participatory approach to water management that involves users, planners, and policy 
makers at all levels.   
Female participation in water management is still limited. The emphasis of equal number 
of men and women in water committees, and the reliance of water-user group meetings as a way 
to involve women in decision making is not enough. Women participation is still influenced by 
culture and gender stereotypes that place women in an inferior position. A more gender-sensitive 
approach is needed to increase women’s participation. It is important to recognize that 
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community members, both men and women, are not homogenous. People differ in term of 
power, wealth, class, and their ability to express their needs, concerns, and ideas.  These 
differences put women in a more disadvantaged position. Therefore, a more gender-sensitive 
approach is important to understand and “unpack” these differences and change them in order to 
facilitate equal participation in decision-making by men and women. The government needs to 
ensure that women’s and men’s needs,  opportunities, constraints, concerns, roles, and 
experiences appear as an important component of water management policies, projects, 
legislations, and strategies.  
The government can also promote a more gender-sensitive education curriculum that will 
emphasize on the importance of customs and traditions, incorporate non-discriminating aspects 
of culture, and empower young people both men and women to overcome gender stereotypes 
that exist.  The government can encourage NGOs and international organizations to fund, 
promote, and support development of gender- sensitive water management strategies in rural 
areas. This include the use of youth-focused organizations that can help increase the participation 
of young people in water management and to educate them about water priorities, gender issues, 
and the importance of women participation in decision making. Young people can be used as 
agents for change for effective water management. Youth holds key to the future, so they can be 
used to promote gender awareness among their peers, community members, and policy makers. 
Although this study found that customary institutions are still strong in the study area, 
they can come into conflict with statutory institutions.  There is a need for participatory legal 
reform that will address the weaknesses of both customary and statutory institutions. Local 
community participation in rural water management would provide important values, ideas, and  
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experiences that could lead to a practical, relevant, achievable and acceptable water management 
approach (Dungumaro and Madulu 2003). This research found that investment in social 
networks ensures security and access to water by the members of social network. Policy makers 
need to consider the cultural and political principles that underlie their interventions (Mollinga 
2000), and recognize and consider the plural legal system that now exists in Tanzania. Relying 
on a single system to managing water resources is not enough. Suitable combinations of different 
institutions and laws may be more efficient and practical in the management of rural water 
sources. 
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APPENDIX  A 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Questionnaire Number: __________Date of interview (dd/mm/yyyy) _________  
 
Interviewed by: ___________________Date checked (dd/mm/yyyy): __________ 
 
Division:                 DIVCODE:                  Ward:          WRDCODE:________  
 
Village: ____________________________ VILCODE: ___________ 
 
 
PART 1. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
 
1. (a) Household1 head:  Sex (M/F)_______ Age_______ 
    (b) Respondent: Sex(M/F)_____Age_________ 
          Respondent’s relationship with the household head_______________ 
           (ask  only  if  the respondent is not household head) 
 
 2. Ethnic background _______________________________________ 
 (1=Sukuma from Bariadi, 2=Sukuma from outside Bariadi, 3=Non-Sukuma )   
 
 3. Religious affiliation: _________________________ 
   (1=Christian, 2=Moslem,  3=Ancestors, 4=Atheist,  9=Other  (specify) _________ 
 
4. Highest level of formal education of household head (years) ________________ 
 
5. If no formal education is reported in Q.4, is the respondent able to read and write?  
  Yes=1, no = 0 ________________________ 
 
6. Major source of income of household head______________________________ 
1=Cereal production, 2=Cotton production, 3=Vegetable production 4=Livestock production, 
5=Non-farm activities, 6=Employment (earns regular salary), 9=Others (specify)_______ 
 
7. Household members: Below 15 years ________Above 15 years but still dependents (i.e. in 
school or not able to work)__ Above 15 years and not dependents (i.e. able to work) ______ 
 
8. When was this household established in this district? (e.g. by becoming independent from 
parents or by migrating from other villages outside Bariadi district) ____________ (year) 
 
9. Mention name of district if migrated from outside Bariadi __________________ 
 
10. What is the type of roof does this household have for their main 
house?_____________________ 
          1= grass, 2= tiles, 3= corrugated iron sheets, 9= others(specify)__________ 
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PART 2:    A.  HOUSEHOLD PARTICIPATION IN PROGRAMS & ORGANIZATIONS  
AND WATER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS 
 
1. Does the household belong to any association or participate in any program and 
organization? No=0, Yes=1 ____ If yes, report the name of the 
association/program/organization, and its major focus. 
 
Name of 
organization, 
program or 
association 
Major 
focusa 
Who 
initiated t?b 
Type of 
organizationc 
Major contribution to 
association/NGOd 
    Quantity 
(specify eg Tshs,  
5 hrs of labor etc) 
Duration/cycle 
(eg per day or 
per week) 
      
      
      
 
a Major focus: 1.Financial services (Savings or credit)  2.Mutual support activities 3.Provision of commercial labor  
4. Provision of exchange labor 5. Provision of free labor  6. Agricultural extension  7. Health or nutritional  
education/training/sensitization  8. Construction & maintenance of community based infrastructure  9. Provision of 
Aid/facilitation 10.Marketing & Processing of agricultural products,   99.Other (specify)  
 
b  1=Villagers around this area(up to district level), 2=People from outside Bariadi but within Tanzania     
    3=Outside Tanzania, 9 = other (specify) __________________ 
 
c      1=NGO  (Non-government organizations include both international and indigenous organizations  
                      established to provide services to communities or districts. They are autonomous and   
                      required  to conform to the government's regulatory requirements regarding registration    
                      an reporting.) 
2=CBO (Community-based organizations are those that evolve and are administered, financed and            
             managed at the local  level. Community-based organizations are not registered with  
              government). This includes customary institutions  such as dagashida, sungusungu, etc.) 
3= Government program or project. Program is a long-term/permanent activity implemented by   
      government. Project is a short-term activity with specific time frame of implementation 
9= Others (specify) 
 
d   This could be labor per month, per year, annual contribution, etc (mention quantity and duration of contribution) 
e.g. 124 hours per month for entire year, or 124 per month for 3 months in a year, or Tsh 4000 per year as 
membership fee.  
 
 
326
2. Where does the household get water and who owns the source of water? (probe to get all 3 
water use: domestic, watering cattle and irrigation) 
 
Source 
of 
watera 
Is the source 
seasonal or 
permanent? 
Seasonal=0, 
permanent=1 
Major 
use of 
waterb 
Was the 
water source 
developed or 
is naturally 
occurring?  
Natural =0, 
Developed=1 
 
If 
developed
, who 
developed 
it?c 
Who owns 
water 
source?d 
Who 
normally 
draw 
water 
from the 
water 
source?e 
If the water 
source is not 
private, how 
many 
households 
abstract water 
from source? 
        
        
        
        
 
a  Source of water :1=river, 2=spring, 3=shallow well, 4=deep well, 5=surface water (pond, dam, etc) 
b  Use of water: 1=domestic use (drinking, cooking, washing, etc), 2=watering animals, 3=irrigation 
   9=Others (specify)_________________ 
c    Who developed: 1=This household, 2= villagers, 3=division or district authority, 4=NGO from   
     outside village,  5=central government, 6=International donor (non-NGO), 9=others(specify) 
d   Who owns water source: 1=This household, 2= villagers, 3=division or district authority, 4=NGO  
    from outside village,  5=central government, 6=International donor (non-NGO). 
e  Who draws water: 1= exclusively women  2=predominantly women  3=women and men more or less  
   equally  4=predominantly men  5=exclusively men 
 
 
3. What is the major source of water for bathing? ________ 
1=river, 2=spring, 3=shallow well, 4=deep well, 5=surface water (pond, dam, etc) 
 
 
4. Where do members of the household bath?   
Member of household Location of batha 
 Dry season Wet season 
Children (0-10 years)   
Girls (11-15 yrs)   
Boys (11-15 yrs)   
Women (>15 yrs)   
Men (>15 yrs)   
a Location of bath: 1= at the source of water, 2= draw water and bath at home, 3= draw water and take bath away 
from source of water but not at home 
 
5. What is the major source of water for washing clothes? ________ 
1=river, 2=spring, 3=shallow well, 4=deep well, 5=surface water (pond, dam, etc) 
 
6. Where do you wash cloths?  ___________ 
1= at the source of water, 2= draw water and wash at home, 3= draw water and wash away from source of water but 
not at home 
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7. If you have ruminants (cattle, sheep and goats), where do you water them?   
 
Where do you water them? 
Dry season Wet season 
Type of ruminant Number of 
ruminants 
owned by 
the 
household 
Watering 
point a 
Primary use 
of waterb 
Watering 
point a 
Primary use of 
waterb 
Cattle (2 yrs or older)      
Calves (below 2 yrs)      
Goats      
Sheep      
Others(specify)      
a Watering point: 1= at the source of water, 2= draw water and water animals at home, 3= draw water  
    and  water animals away from source of water but not at home 
b   Primary use of water:  1=domestic use (drinking, cooking, washing, etc), 2=watering animals,   3=irrigation 
 
8. How far are your crop plots from the sources of water and who normally operate on the crop 
plot? 
 
Type of crop Source of 
watera 
Distance (say units 
eg meters, feet etc) 
from source of water 
Who normally operate 
on the crop plot? b 
Annual cereal & leguminous crops     
Vegetables    
Sugar cane    
Orchards (fruit farm)    
Fiber crops (cotton)    
Other(specify)    
a   Source of water: 1=river, 2=spring, 3=shallow well, 4=deep well, 5=surface water (pond, dam, etc) 
b   Who normally operate on plot:  1= exclusively women  2=predominantly women  3=women and men more or less 
equally  4=predominantly men  5=exclusively men 
 
9. Does the household irrigate any crop? _________ No=0   Yes=1 (If “no”, move to Q 12) 
 
10. If  “yes” to Q.9, what soil and water conservation structures or practices do you have on crop 
plots close to water sources? 
 
Soil and water conservation 
(SWC) structures/practice 
Do you have the SWC structures? 
 no=0, yes=1 
Use of watera 
Soil bund   
Terraces   
Trash/stone lines   
Stone walls   
Drainage ditches   
Live barriers   
Others (specify)   
a Use of water: 1=domestic use,  2=irrigation water, 3 =livestock watering 
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11. Do you have a human waste disposal structure? No=0, Yes=1_______  
          (Check “yes” if you see a toilet) 
 
 
12. If “yes” to Q.11, what is the distance from human disposal structure to water sources? 
(specify units) _______________ 
 
 
13. If  “no” to Q. 11, where do  members of the household release themselves? (Enumerators 
need not ask this question if they see a toilet)  
 
 
Water source for:  Location of human waste disposala 
 Short call (urinating) Defecation 
 Boys Girls Men Women Boys Girls Men Women 
Domestic use         
Irrigation          
Watering animals         
a Location of human waste disposal: 1=behind bushes/other place with reasonable privacy away from water source 
(>30 meters), 2=any place regardless of distance from water source 3. Place closer to water source(< 30 m) 
 
 
14. On average, how many hours does this household spend per month to do the following 
activities at the common source of water? Also mention the household member who normally 
offers labor for managing and developing common water source 
 
Use of water 
Drinking water Irrigation water Water for animals 
Activity 
at common 
water source membera Hrs/ 
month 
# of 
months/
yr 
membera Hrs/ 
month 
# of 
months/
yr 
membera Hrs/ 
month 
# of 
months
/yr 
Cleaning/ 
desilting  
         
Development 
of water 
source 
         
Guarding          
Attending 
water user 
meetings 
         
Other 
(specify) 
         
          
          
a  member of household offering labor: 1= exclusively women  2=predominantly women  3=women and men more 
or less equally  4=predominantly men 5=exclusively men 
 
329
B.  WATER MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS 
 
15. For the common sources of domestic drinking water that this household uses, what are the 
regulations that are in place to ensure equitable water access, prevention of pollution and abuse, 
and development of water source? 
 
 
Regulation 
(mention at 
most three for 
each group) 
Who enacted 
regulation?a 
Method of 
enforcement 
Level of 
compliance in 
the villageb 
 
If the level of 
compliance is low 
(few or no one 
complies) why? 
a. Equitable 
water access 
regulations: 
    
1     
2     
3     
b. Prevention 
of pollution 
and abuse 
    
1     
2     
3     
Development 
of water 
source 
    
1     
2     
3     
 
a  Who enacted:  1 = central government,  2=local government,  3= customary institution,  4=NGO/religious 
organization  5 =water user association/group, 9=others (specify) 
b   Level of compliance: 1= no one complies,  2=some comply 3=majority comply, 4= all comply 
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16. For the common sources of  water for animals that this household uses, what are the 
regulations that are in place to ensure equitable water access, prevention of pollution and abuse, 
and development of water source? 
 
Regulation (mention 
at most three for 
each group) 
Who 
enacted 
regulation?a 
Method of 
enforcement 
Level of 
compliance in the 
villageb 
 
If the level of 
compliance is 
low (few or no 
one complies) 
why? 
a. Equitable water 
access regulations: 
    
1 
 
    
2 
 
    
3 
 
    
b. Prevention of 
pollution and abuse 
    
1 
 
    
2 
 
    
3 
 
    
Development of 
water source 
    
1 
 
    
2 
 
    
3 
 
    
a  Who enacted:  1 = central government,  2=local government,  3= customary institution,  4=NGO/religious 
organization  5 =water user association/group, 9=others (specify) 
b   Level of compliance: 1= no one complies,  2=some comply 3=majority comply, 4= all comply 
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17. For the common sources of  irrigation water that this household uses, what are the 
regulations that are in place to ensure equitable water allocation, prevention of pollution, siltation 
and abuse, and development of water source? 
 
Regulation 
(mention at most 
three for each 
group) 
Who 
enacted 
regulation?a 
Method of 
enforcement 
Level of 
compliance in 
the villageb 
 
If the level of 
compliance is low 
(few or no one 
complies) why? 
a. Equitable water 
access regulations: 
    
1 
 
    
2 
 
    
3 
 
    
b. Prevention of 
pollution and abuse 
    
1 
 
    
2 
 
    
3 
 
    
Development of 
water source 
    
1 
 
    
2 
 
    
3 
 
    
 
a  Who enacted:  1 = central government,  2=local government,  3= customary institution,  4=NGO/religious 
organization  5 =water user association/group, 9=others (specify) 
b   Level of compliance: 1= no one complies,  2=some comply 3=majority comply, 4= all comply 
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18. For the private sources of water that this household uses, what are the regulations that are in 
place to exclusion of others to access, prevention of pollution and abuse, and development of 
water source? 
 
Regulation 
(mention at most 
three for each 
group) 
Who 
enacted 
regulation?a 
Method of 
enforcement
Level of 
compliance 
in the 
villageb 
 
If the level of 
compliance is low 
(few or no one 
complies) why? 
a. Equitable water 
access regulations: 
    
1 
 
    
2 
 
    
3 
 
    
b. Prevention of 
pollution and abuse 
    
1 
 
    
2 
 
    
3 
 
    
Development of 
water source 
    
1 
 
    
2 
 
    
3 
 
    
 
a  Who enacted:  1 = central government,  2=local government,  3= customary institution,  4=NGO/religious 
organization  5 =water user association/group, 9=others (specify) 
b   Level of compliance: 1= no one complies,  2=some comply 3=majority comply, 4= all comply 
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19. In addition or in absence of statutory or customary regulations, do you take any steps to 
exclude others from using and/or polluting the water at the private source?  
 
Steps taken 
(mention at 
most three 
for each 
step taken) 
 
Method 
of 
enforce
ment of 
own 
stepsa 
Cost of 
enforcem
ent of 
own 
steps  per 
monthb 
Level of 
success 
to 
enforce 
own 
stepsc 
Who 
took 
these 
steps?d 
 
Who enforces 
these steps?d  
If no steps 
taken, why?e 
Exclusion 
of others  
      
1       
2       
3       
b. 
Prevention 
of pollution 
and abuse 
      
1       
2       
3       
Developme
nt of water 
source 
      
1       
2       
3       
 
a   Method of enforcement:  1=guarding, 2=physical barrier (confinement), 3=fines, 4=others (specify) 
b If respondent reports cost in terms of labor, convert to equivalent salary per month. Likewise, convert any other in-
kind payment to equivalent monthly salary. 
c Level of success of enforcement of own steps: 1=not successful at all, 2=somehow successful, 3=successful, 
    4 = very successful 
d    1= exclusively women  2=predominantly women  3=women and men more or less equally  4=predominantly men 
    5=exclusively men 
e  Why no steps taken? 1= customary institutions enforce strict rules for private water use and access, 2=statutory 
institutions enforce strict regulations for private water use and access, 3= It is futile to take any steps since they 
will not be successful, 4=no need of taking any steps since water is plentiful and/or  there is no potential of 
abuse/pollution or water theft  9 =others (specify) 
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20. In your opinion, what do you think are the major strengths and weaknesses of the statutory 
and customary water related regulations that you mentioned above? Mention at most three 
important regulations ( A, B, and C ) for each type and at most three strengths and three 
weaknesses (1, 2, and 3)  for each regulation.  
 
Customary   Regulations 
 A B C 
  
 
 
  
Strengths 
                   
   
1    
2    
3                   
Weaknesses 
                   
   
1    
2    
3    
 
 
Statutory   Regulations 
 A B C 
    
Strengths    
 1                    
 2    
 3    
Weaknesses 
                   
 
 
  
  1    
  2                 
  3    
 
 
 
PART 3: WATER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
1. What is: 
a. Total area owned (acres)______  
b. Total area rented in or borrowed in 2004/05 (acres)______ 
c. Total area cropped (acres)____________ 
d. Total area irrigated (acres)_____ 
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2. List the crops that you irrigate and not irrigate. Mention at most three important crops per parcel. 
 
 Irrigated  Crops 
 Parcel 1* Parcel 2* Parcel 3* Parcel 4* 
Season (Dry or rainy season) Dry Rainy Dry Rainy Dry Rainy Dry Rainy 
Area of plot  irrigated (acres)         
Who claims ownership of this parcel?a     
How did the owner acquire the parcel?b     
Who operates the parcel?c         
Who benefits from the harvest?c         
Source of irrigation waterd         
Type of source: 1=private(own), 
2=private (neighbor’s) 3=public 
        
                          Crops irrigated:         
                                                  1         
                                                  2         
                                                  3         
Production from each parcel per season 
(kg, bags, etc/plot) 
        
                                         Crop 1         
                                                  2         
                                                  3         
Production of the same crops grown without irrigation (same crops, non-irrigated)  
 Parcel 5* Parcel 6* Parcel 7* Parcel 8* 
Area of rain fed parcel (acres)     
 crop production crop production crop production crop produ
ction 
                                         Crop 1         
                                                  2         
                                                  3         
   *A parcel is a contiguous piece of land with the same land use 
 
Note: if there are more than four parcels irrigated or rain fed, create additional columns on the RHS 
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a     Who claim ownership: 0= female  1=male   2 =both   3. non-household member 
b   How parcel acquired:  1= inherited/given by family member,   2. bought,   3.allocated by government  
    4. given by non-family member 9.other(specify) 
c        1= exclusively women  2=predominantly women  3=women and men more or less equally  4=predominantly men  5=exclusively men 
d       Source of irrigation water:   1=river, 2=spring, 3=shallow well, 4=deep well, 5=surface water (pond, dam, etc)       
 
 
3. If there is a large difference in production per acre, why do you think this is the case? check whichever is applicable. 
(a) Availability of irrigation water/rainfall regimes 
(b) Soils are more fertile in the plot that yield higher 
(c) Both (a) and (b) 
(d) Other reasons (specify) _____________________ 
 
4. Report the amount of water drawn by this family from all sources of water for domestic use and for watering animals 
 
Type of water 
source 
Source of 
watera 
# of animals 
watered/year 
Amount drawn per day for domestic use
 a b c Cattle Goats 
& 
sheep 
 
Who 
usually 
water 
animalsb 
 
Amount/dayc Unit of 
measured 
Who draws 
water for 
domestic 
useb 
 
       Dry season Rainyseason   
Public           
Private (own)           
Private 
(neighbor’s) 
          
Other (specify)           
           
a  Source of water :1=river, 2=spring, 3=shallow well, 4=deep well, 5=surface water (pond, dam, etc) 
b  Who usually water animals:1= exclusively women,  2=predominantly women,  3=women and men more or less equally,     
    4=predominantly men,    5=exclusively men 
c Estimate this on daily basis by probing the pattern of drawing water 
d Units of measure: 1=20 liter container (e.g. debe, bucket (ndoo), etc),  2=200 liter Drum,  3=Other  (specify and      
   request for the container and estimate volume)
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5. Estimate the distance (specify units) to sources of water and time spent to draw water or water 
animals. 
 
 
 
6. In the past three months, how many days has working adults (above 15 years & not students or 
unable to work) have lost labor days due to sickness? List all adults and they days they lost due 
to illness or attending to someone sick in the family. 
 
 
Adult # # of 
days 
lost due 
to own 
sickness 
Type of disease suffered 
by the adult 
# of days lost 
due to 
attending the 
sick in the 
family 
 
Type of disease suffered 
by a  family 
member(patient attended 
by the adult) 
 
  a b c  a b c 
1   
 
      
2   
 
      
3   
 
      
4   
 
      
5   
 
      
6   
 
      
 
 
Type of water source Domestic use Watering animals 
 Rainy 
season 
Dry 
season 
Rainy 
season 
Dry 
season 
Public     
  Number of days of drawing water per week     
  Distance to source of water (km)     
   Time spent to draw water (hours) for each trip     
     
Private (own or neighbor’s)     
    Number of days of drawing water per week     
  Distance to source of water (km)     
   Time spent to draw water (hours) for each trip     
